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During the early Cold War, as the Soviet menace placed Canada in between two 
hostile superpowers, the Canadian government decided to take steps to ensure that its 
sovereignty and national interests were not threatened by the Americans in the new 
strategic environment.  This study examines the extent to which the Canadian 
government actually defended its sovereignty and rights against American intrusions in 
the early Cold War.  At its core is an examination of the government’s policy of gradual 
acquisition in the Arctic between 1945 and 1951.  This thesis explores the relationships 
that existed at the time, the essence of the negotiations, the state of international law and 
the potential costs and benefits of certain Canadian courses of action.  It also explains 
how Canada’s quiet diplomacy allowed it to avoid alienating its chief ally, contribute to 
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Introduction: Activists and Gradualists 
 
 
Concerns over Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic have arisen intermittently since 
the Second World War, provoking national anxiety.  The irony of this powerful and 
familiar reaction is that when there appears to be no immediate threat to Canada’s 
control of its North, the entire region retreats to the all important “land of tomorrow” that 
can be forgotten today.   When some kind of external threat looms over the Arctic, and 
Canadians suddenly perceive that other nations or foreign companies are developing 
strategic or commercial interests in the region, the place is rescued from the periphery of 
Canada’s national interests.  “Arctic sovereignty seems to be the zombie – the dead issue 
that refuses to stay dead – of Canadian public affairs,” explain the authors of Arctic 
Front. “You think its settled, killed and buried, and then every decade or so it rises from 
the grave and totters into view again.”1 The issue has become a proverbial thorn in the 
side of Canadian governments.  
The threats to Canada’s sovereignty in the North have ranged from the influx of 
American personnel into the region during the Second World War and the early years of 
the Cold War, to the disputes over the status of the Northwest Passage spurred on by the 
voyages of the S.S. Manhattan in 1969 and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) cutter 
Polar Sea in 1985.  As climate change warms the Arctic at an exceptional rate, 
contemporary challenges have drawn attention to disputes over boundaries, control over 
the Northwest Passage, and an alleged “race for resources.”  How decision-makers read 
                                                
1 Ken Coates, Whitney Lackenbauer, William Morrison, and Greg Poelzer, Arctic Front, (Toronto: 
Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008), 1.  
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pasts decisions will undoubtedly influence their perceptions of how to anticipate and deal 
with current and future ones.2 
The gravest sovereignty crises that Canada faced historically shared two distinct 
features: they involved the Americans and they forced Canadian governments, both 
Liberal and Conservative, to choose between adopting a gradualist or activist stance on 
Arctic sovereignty.  The gradualist approach is the more cautious of the two responses, 
characterized by careful negotiations and quiet diplomacy to achieve an implicit or 
explicit recognition of Canada’s sovereignty.  Gradualists argue that sovereignty is 
strengthened over time and wish to avoid overly aggressive acts that might jeopardize 
Canada’s claims.3 An activist approach involves a more forthright and forceful 
pronouncement of Canadian sovereignty, such as the drawing of straight baselines by the 
Mulroney government.  Both approaches seek the same objectives: the attainment of 
international recognition of Canada’s de jure sovereignty over the North, especially by 
the United States, and of de facto control of the Arctic land and waters.4  
Canadian diplomats have had to walk a fine line in deciding how far to push the 
boundaries of international law and how much they could test the patience of the 
                                                
2 Whitney Lackenbauer, “From Polar Race to Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada and the 
Circumpolar World,” paper for the Canadian International Council, July 2009.   
3 Franklyn Griffiths, “Canadian Sovereignty and Arctic International Relations,” in The Arctic in Question, 
ed. E.J Dosman, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 144-148.  
4 Sovereignty is officially defined as “The possession of supreme authority within a territory.”  This 
concept is further split into de jure and de facto sovereignty.  De facto “is the reality of control or 
possession, but not by right of law,” and basically involves exercising control over land and water. De jure 
is legitimate ownership under the law, and the recognition of others that one can use force in a designated 
territory; Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel, Arctic Diplomacy: Canada and the United States in the Northwest 
Passage, (New York: Peter Lang, 1998), 5;  In 1946, Vice Chief of the General Staff D.C Spry defined 
sovereignty as “as power, right or authority over a clearly defined and delimited area, Sovereignty in the 
Canadian Arctic in Relation to Joint Defence Undertakings, Memorandum from Department of National 
Defence to Cabinet Defence Committee, 18 May 1946, Department of External Affairs, Documents on 




Americans in affirming Canada’s sovereignty.  For the most part, decision makers 
weighed the costs and benefits of a forceful assertion of sovereignty and erred on the side 
of caution.  In the years of the early Cold War, the Liberal government faced this 
dilemma as the exigencies of continental defence brought the world’s attention squarely 
on the Arctic.  
 In the spring of 1946, Canada’s senior diplomats pondered the troublesome 
problem of Arctic sovereignty as American defence plans piled up on their desks.  The 
presence of a Soviet threat across the northern approaches could be plainly seen on the 
polar projection maps that Canadian and American officials began to use in place of their 
old Mercator projections.  Canada found itself sandwiched between two superpower 
adversaries, and its American neighbour expected it to cooperate in defending the 
continent.  Decision makers understood the implications of the new world situation for 
their country’s sovereignty.  In order to defend North America from communist 
aggression, the Americans would demand the right to carry out defence operations and 
projects in the thinly occupied islands of the Arctic Archipelago: an area in which 
Canadian control and ownership seemed insecure.  The documents from this period 
reflect an almost frantic worry over the establishment of an American presence in the 
North and the potential dangers this posed to Canada’s claims.  It took Canadian officials 
several years to recover from the fallout of the mega-projects undertaken by the United 
States in the Canadian Northwest during the war, when the government had allowed the 
Americans onto Canadian territory en masse and with little regulation.  Embarrassment 
and panic ensured that this oversight would not be repeated. 
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This time the Canadians insisted that American proposals be met with a measured 
response and effectively controlled from the start.  Sitting in his office at 1746 
Massachusetts Avenue NW on 5 June 1946, Lester B. Pearson, the Ambassador to the 
United States, pondered Canada’s sovereignty problem and decided that his country had 
an opportunity to gain formal and public acknowledgement of its claims in the Arctic.  
The American desire for defence rights in the region gave Canada a bargaining chip that 
it could use in its negotiations with the U.S.  “I am wondering whether we could not take 
advantage of the present situation,” mused Pearson in a letter to Hume Wrong, the 
Acting Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, “to secure from the United States 
Government public recognition of our sovereignty of the total area of our northern 
coasts, based on the sector principle.”5 If his bid worked, Pearson’s activist approach 
would secure Canadian control over a large slice of the polar region in short order.6  
Hume Wrong doubted that the State Department would simply “fall in line, if 
falling in line means that they are asked to proclaim their adhesion to the sector theory of 
Arctic sovereignty.”7 Wrong told Douglass Abbot, the Minister of National Defence, that 
Pearson “underestimate[d] the difficulties” faced by the United States.  The Americans 
                                                
5 “Ambassador in the United States to Acting Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, 5 June 1946,” 
Department of External Affairs, DCER Volume 12, 1946, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1967- ), 1565-66.  
6 The Sector Principle was a concept adopted largely for nation’s wishing to claim a portion of the polar 
regions. Gordon Smith defined the sector principle as: “Each state with a continental Arctic coastline 
automatically falls heir to all islands lying between its coastline and the North Pole, which are enclosed by 
longitudinal lines drawn from the eastern and western extremities of the same coastline to the Pole.” In 
Canada this principle claimed all areas in between the 141st and 60th meridians to the North Pole.  Gordon 
Smith, “Sovereignty in the North: The Canadian Aspect of an International Problem,” in The Arctic 
Frontier, ed. R. St. J Macdonald (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966).  
7 H.H. Wrong to A.D.P. Heeney, 8 June 1946, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, vol. 3347, file 
9061-A-40, part 1. 
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would not accept the sector principle,8 and any Canadian pressure on the issue might 
“put some unwelcome thoughts into some heads in Washington”9 and prompt them to 
challenge Canada’s claims.10 “For a good many years now we have proceeded without 
difficulty on the assumption that our sovereignty was not challenged,” Wrong observed. 
“A declaration of this sort would revive discussion of an issue which may in practice turn 
out to have been closed.”11  
While Pearson wished to lay all of Canada’s cards on the table, Hume Wrong 
embraced a modest diplomacy that sought a more sustainable, if less dramatic, solution 
to Canada’s sovereignty worries.  A successful defence of Canadian sovereignty avoided 
antagonizing the Americans into a confrontation over the legal status of the Arctic. 
Unwilling to push the U.S. into a position where they had to disagree with Canada’s 
claims, Wrong advised Pearson to avoid any formal attempt to secure American 
recognition that would, in all likelihood, prove impossible to obtain.  
How well Wrong’s strategy worked is open to debate.  The Canadian decision to 
cooperate with the U.S. in continental defence, the terms under which the two countries 
worked this relationship out and its impact on Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic has 
generated three distinct schools of thought.  The first school reflects the ideas of Donald 
Creighton’s seminal work The Forked Road, which proposed that the government of 
William Lyon Mackenzie King led Canada into the suffocating embrace of the 
                                                
8 H.H. Wrong to D.C. Abbot, 13 June 1946, LAC, RG 25, vol. 3347, file 9061-A-40, part 1. Wrong cited 
the interests the United States had in the Antarctic as one of the main reasons why they would not accept 
Canada’s sector claims. 
9 Note to R.M. MacDonnell, LAC, RG 25, vol. 3347, file 9061-A-40, pt. 1, H.H. Wrong to A.D.P. Heeney, 
8 June 1946. 
10 H.H. Wrong to A.D.P. Heeney, 8 June 1946, LAC, RG 25, vol. 3347, file 9061-A-40, part 1. 
11 H.H. Wrong to D.C. Abbot, 13 June 1946, LAC, RG 25, vol. 3347, file 9061-A-40, part 1.  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Americans, who ignored Canada’s wishes and threatened its sovereignty in the North.12 
During the Second World War the Liberals advocated collective security first and 
considered national sovereignty to be a distant second, allowing a military dependency 
on the U.S. to grow unchecked for a decade.13 Although the Canadian government 
worried about its sovereignty it still allowed the Americans to take “a good big bite, 
nearly free of charge, out of the Canadian north, and thereafter they never lost their 
appetite for more.”14 
Other scholars expanded on this theme of American dominance and Canadian 
weakness in protecting its North.  In Sovereignty or Security?, Canadian Studies scholar 
Shelagh Grant alleged that Canada sacrificed its control of the North to meet American 
continental defence needs and failed to protect its sovereignty.15 While the Canadians 
obtained “paper guarantees” from the U.S. government, the ever conniving Americans 
continuously violated Canadian laws and de facto control in their quest for security.16 In 
a quick survey of Arctic policy, “Lock, Stock and Icebergs?,” historian Adam Lajeunesse 
has also sharply criticized the Canadian government for not adopting a sufficiently 
aggressive approach to defending sovereignty after 1946. “The situation,” he claimed, 
“seemed to call for a clarification of official Arctic policy and a more forceful assertion 
of Canadian control.”17 Instead of taking a strong course of action, the Canadians 
established a policy of purposeful ambiguity and tried to avoid the issue, which worked 
                                                
12 Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957,  (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976). 
13 Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957, 241, 285.   
14 Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957, 74.  
15 Shelagh Grant, Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950, 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988) 
16 Grant, Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950,), 241, 243. 
17 Adam Lajuenesse, “Lock, Stock, and Icebergs? Defining Canadian Sovereignty from Mackenzie King to Stephen 
Harper,” CMSS Occasional Paper No. 1 (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2007):  3.  
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in the 1940’s and 1950’s, but set Canada up for failure in the ensuing decades.  Though 
not as staunchly anti-American as Creighton or Grant, Lajeunesse insisted that Canada’s 
unwillingness to invest in the Arctic, and the sheer dominance of the U.S. on the ground, 
undermined Canada’s de facto control of the region.18 
The second school, aptly named the “middle ground,”19 began with the work of 
Charles Stacey and James Eayrs, who stressed the conflict, cooperation and complexity 
of the Canadian-American relationship.  It also includes historians such as Morris 
Zaslow, Norman Hillmer, and Jack Granatstein.   Proponents of the middle ground 
school view the bilateral defence relationship and its projects within the context of the 
global efforts of the Western allies in the early Cold War, which is an important point.  
While Canadian officials agonized over the situation in the Arctic, their American 
counterparts thought of it as one theatre of operations amongst many.  Nevertheless, 
Canada remained an important ally to the U.S. and had to participate in continental 
defence, despite inevitable consequences for sovereignty.20 Arguing that Canada acted as 
required, given the prevailing Cold War context, these scholars rarely provided any 
praise for the government’s handling of the situation and ignored Canadian 
accomplishments in preserving its sovereignty while ensuring security.  
The third line of thought, which can be called the revisionist school, challenges 
these interpretations.  Scholars David Bercuson, Whitney Lackenbauer and Joseph 
Jockel have emphasized the cooperation, respect and open dialogue that characterized 
                                                
18 Lajeunesse, “The True North As Long As It’s Free: The Canadian Policy Deficit 1945-1985,” (MA 
thesis, University of Calgary, 2007), 25. 
19 Whitney Lackenbauer, “Right and Honourable: Mackenzie King, Canadian-American Bilateral Relations, and 
Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest, 1943-1948,” in Mackenzie King: Citizenship and `Community, eds. John 
English, Kenneth McLaughlin, and Whitney Lackenbauer.  (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2002): 153. 
20 Cuff and Granatstein, Canadian-American Relations in Wartime: From the Great War to the Cold War, 105.  
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the defence relationship after 1943, and illuminated the victories of the Canadian 
government in safeguarding its sovereignty while pursuing Canada’s security.21  
Canadian manoeuvring led to American recognition of Canada’s terrestrial sovereignty 
in the Arctic from 1947 onwards, they argue, balancing security and sovereignty needs in 
a prudent manner.   
While scholars of the revisionist school have forged a new trail for the study of 
the defence projects undertaken in the North during the Second World War and the early 
Cold War, the details of the defence negotiations and projects undertaken in the early 
post war years require elaboration. The late 1940’s were formative years in the bilateral 
defence relationship that developed through the Cold War, and Canada succeeded in 
shaping a firm platform for cooperation.  Given its strategic position and its historic 
alliance with the U.S., Canada had to participate in continental defence.  Canadian 
officials, however, understood that a purely passive approach to northern sovereignty and 
security could only end in disaster.  From the beginning they attempted to work out a 
solution that offered both, and they managed to do so.   
Critics such as Grant and Lajeunesse, who argue that Canada should have taken 
more activist steps to better protect its sovereignty in the early years of the Cold War, are 
practicing ‘what if’ history.  They argue that Canada should have secured its Arctic 
claims more aggressively, given that it could have taken a different course of action and 
                                                
21 Lackenbauer, “Right and Honourable: Mackenzie King, Canadian-American Bilateral Relations, and 
Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest, 1943-1948;” Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel, Arctic Diplomacy: Canada 
and the United States in the Northwest Passage, (New York: Peter Lang, 1998); David Bercuson, 
“Continental Defence and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-1950: Solving the Canadian Dilemma,” in The Cold 
War and Defence, eds. Keith Neilson and Ronald Haycock (New York: Praeger Press, 1990); Joseph 




that this would have yielded a stronger Canadian claim today. To assert that Canada 
could have pushed the U.S. into formally accepting its sovereignty shows a 
misunderstanding of the relationships that existed at the time, the essence of the 
negotiations, the state of international law and the potential costs and benefits of certain 
Canadian courses of action.  Canada’s cautious and gradualist strategy allowed the 
country to consolidate its territorial sovereignty over the Arctic lands.  While agreeing to 
disagree about controversial legal issues like the sector principle, the two countries used 
informal negotiations to create workable solutions that supported Canadian claims in the 
region.22  
Although Canada adopted a reserved policy to secure its claims, this course 
proved sensible and successful.  Rather than becoming a subservient partner, the 
Canadians managed to maintain their influence and an acceptable degree of control over 
defence projects executed in the Canadian Arctic between 1946 and 1951.  Instead of 
losing their cool in the face of minor American indiscretions and embracing the alarmism 
prevalent in the media, Canadian officials developed a mutually acceptable strategy with 
the Americans that protected both countries’ interests.  Through informal networks and 
mutual accommodation, the two countries built a defence relationship based on 
cooperation, respect and open dialogue.  Although quiet diplomacy lacked the glamour 
of a grand sovereignty-asserting action, Canada managed to avoid alienating its chief 
ally, contributed to continental defence, and laid the groundwork for a relationship with 
                                                
22 This paragraph and the following are drawn from a book chapter, “Sovereignty and Security: The 
Department of External Affairs, the United States, and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-68,” that I co-authored 
with Whitney Lackenbauer, and reflects his research and thinking on this topic as well as my own. Work 
from our joint research appears in this thesis with his expressed permission. 
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the Americans that culminated in the amicable “agree to disagree” principle officially 























Chapter 1: In the Shadow of the Second World War 
 
Old Nightmares and New Threats 
In August 1945 Germany and Japan lay in ruins, and people everywhere 
anticipated a new era of peace.  After six long years of war, the Canadian government 
looked forward to cutting down on defence expenditures and investing its resources in 
areas neglected during the conflict.  Canada could be proud of its wartime service as one 
of the leading members of the Western alliance.  Furthermore, the politicians could 
breathe a sigh of relief that Americans troops were leaving the Canadian North.  Earlier 
in the war, politicians had feared that the American presence might become permanent.   
At the end of 1941, the destruction of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and the 
continued march of the Nazi war machine across Russia led North Americans to fear that 
the Axis powers might attack the attic of the continent.  To defend the northern 
approaches the Americans increased the size of their garrison in Alaska from 21,500 to 
40,424 men.  To supply it, the U.S. military undertook large scale defence projects in 
northern Canada.  The aerial component, the Northwest Staging Route (NWSR), 
included airfields to accommodate fighters, bombers, and transport aircraft on their way 
to Alaska.  By the end of 1943 the U.S. Army completed the Alaska Highway, a 2,451 
km supply route to the isolated territory that cost a staggering 150 million dollars to 
build.23 The third major wartime effort in the northwest, the Canol project, involved the 
building of a major pipeline and oil processing facilities to supply Alaska and support the 
                                                
23 Gregory Johnson, “Strategic Necessity or Military Blunder: Another Look at the Decision to Build the 
Alaska Highway,” in Three Northern Wartime Projects, edited by Bob Hesketh (Edmonton: Canadian 
Circumpolar Institute and Edmonton and District Historical Society, 1992), 18, 28.  
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highway.24  Concurrently, the Americans developed several ambitious projects in the 
Northeast, including a major air base at Goose Bay, Labrador, and the Crimson Route, an 
incomplete system of airfields for ferrying planes to Britain, which involved an 
installation on Baffin Island.25 For the most part, the U.S. paid for the construction costs 
of these projects and operated the completed facilities independently from Canadian 
command. 
By 1943, at the height of the war time projects, nearly 33,000 Americans 
(military personnel and civilian workers) operated in Canada’s North and the host 
government did little to monitor or regulate their actions. Although Liberal Prime 
Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King allowed the Americans onto Canadian soil en 
masse and with few constraints on the “army of occupation,”26 he remained suspicious of 
their intentions.  In 1942 King confided that the Alaska Highway “was less intended for 
protection against the Japanese than as one of the fingers of the hand which America is 
placing more or less over the whole of the Western hemisphere.”27 Still, he took little 
action to protect Canada’s interests in the North.   
Worrisome reports from Malcolm MacDonald, the British High Commissioner, 
and other concerned Canadian officials and journalists who grew alarmed at the scale of 
American activities when they visited the defence projects, finally spurred the prime 
                                                
24 James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada Vol. 3: Peacemaking and Deterrence, (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1972), 349. 
25 Coates et al, Arctic Front, 61. The Crimson Route included bases at Frobisher Bay, Southampton Island, 
Churchill and The Pas.  Although the North-eastern projects were massive, most of the sovereignty 
concerns revolved around the North-western projects.    
26 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada Vol. 3: Peacemaking and Deterrence, 349.   
27 WLMK Diary, 29 March 1943.  The full text of MacDonald’s memorandum is reprinted in The Alaska 
Highway ed. Coates, 95-101. 
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minister to retake control of the Canadian North.28 In late 1943 the King government 
became more proactive and started to assume control of events ‘on the ground.’ The 
government appointed a special commissioner, Brigadier-General W.W. Foster, to 
oversee the American defence projects in the North and began to set parameters on new 
American proposals.  As the war drew to a close, Canada secured its control by paying to 
acquire full ownership of the permanent facilities on its territory.29 The Americans also 
agreed that, before they began any project on or over Canadian territory, they required 
approval from the Canadian government.30 With the threat to the continent gone and the 
Canadians assuming control of the northern defence projects, the Americans soon began 
to leave the region.  By the summer of 1945, most had gone home.   
The Canadian effort to secure its control of the North was timely because the post 
war international situation dictated almost immediate American requests to return to the 
region.  Even before the Japanese capitulation in August 1945, the wartime relationship 
between the Western allies and the Soviet Union began to dissolve.  On 11 September 
1945, this fact became all too apparent to the King government, which desperately 
wanted to avoid becoming embroiled in another global crisis.  Igor Gouzenko, a cipher 
clerk at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, provided evidence of an extensive spy network 
that reached into the Department of External Affairs, the labs of Canada’s atomic 
                                                
28 Elliot-Meisel, Arctic Diplomacy, 43.  
29  By the end of the Second World War, Canada had spent $76,811,551 to purchase all American bases on 
Canadian soil to regain its solitary claim of ownership in its arctic. 
30 Lackenbauer, “Right and Honourable: Mackenzie King, Canadian-American Bilateral Relations, and 
Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest, 1943-1948,” 154. 
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program, and the bureaucracies of its senior allies.  A discouraged King remarked that “if 
there is another war, it will come against America by way of Canada from Russia.”31  
 In the ensuing months tensions continued to mount between the East and the 
West.  As relations between the two blocs grew more frigid, analysts within External 
Affairs wrote reports attempting to gauge Soviet intentions.  Although Dana Wilgress, 
one of the leading Canadian experts on the Soviet Union, believed that Soviet policy 
remained essentially defensive in nature and did not pose a significant threat to the West, 
he also realized the dangers posed by the new power system.  He sensed the mounting 
tensions as Western toughness against the Soviets increased and disputes began to form 
over the fate of the Balkans, Iran and Turkey.  “It is this irresponsible readiness to play 
with fire that makes me uneasy about the ability to avoid conflagrations,” Wilgress 
lamented in September 1945.32  By November, he argued that the hard stance the United 
States took against the Soviets should be replaced by the gentler “Roosevelt touch.”33 In 
forwarding these arguments, Wilgress echoed the sentiments of a number of Canadian 
analysts and reflected the general opinion held by External Affairs.34 
 While Canadian analysts urged the West to adopt a more conciliatory approach to 
the Soviet Union, concerns over the security of the North American continent continued 
to grow in the minds of Canadian and American officials.  Prior to the Second World 
War, few people had adopted the strategic outlook of Brigadier-General W.B. “Billy” 
                                                
31 King, 11 September 1945. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada Vol. 3: Peacemaking and Deterrence, 320. 
32 Dana Wilgress to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 25 September 1945, LAC, RG 25, File 2-
AE(s).  Reproduced in Denis Smith, Diplomacy of Fear, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 
111.  
33 Dana Wilgress to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 12 November 1945, King Papers, 389: 
359440-42. Reproduced in Smith, Diplomacy of Fear, 118.    
34 See Smith, Diplomacy of Fear and Eayrs, In Defence of Canada Vol. 3: Peacemaking and Deterrence.    
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Mitchell, who viewed Alaska as “the most central place in the world of aircraft” and one 
of the most important strategic positions on the planet. “Whoever holds Alaska will hold 
the world,” Mitchell asserted.35 During the war, however, strategists recognized the 
vulnerability of the northern approaches to a limited conventional attack.  In the post war 
years, the Soviet Union sat ominously across the North Pole, the technological advances 
of the war slowly strengthened its military arsenal, and many strategists came to see the 
Arctic as North America’s Achilles heel.  Although the large scale strategic bombing 
operations carried out during the war proved more ineffective than Western strategists 
had hoped, the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki changed the 
strategic picture.36 The prospect of one devastating blow effectively ending any future 
war suddenly became all too real.   
 Led by American A.D. de Seversky, military thinkers began to unroll polar 
projection maps which emphasized the proximity of the United States to its new enemy, 
the Soviet Union.  Vilhjalmur Steffanson’s much publicized idea of the Arctic becoming 
the world’s ‘new Mediterranean’ no longer seemed far fetched.37 The short distance 
between the opposing superpowers through the Arctic basin suddenly became one of the 
most important geostrategic regions in the world.  American military strategists and the 
press obsessed over the idea of Soviet bombers coming over the Pole to launch bombing 
raids on the industrial heartland of the United States.   
                                                
35 S. Conn, R. Engelman, and B. Fairchild, The U.S Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere.  
Guarding the United States and its Outposts, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1964), 247.  
36 Kenneth Eyre, Custos Borealis: The Canadian Military in the North, (Submitted to UBC Press in 2007).  
37 Eyre, Custos Borealis: The Canadian Military in the North.   
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 The Soviets seemed far advanced of the Americans and Canadians in Arctic 
flying.  As early as 1936, the air fleet of Glavsevmorput comprised 125 planes and ninety 
pilots trained in Arctic operations, a valuable nucleus for an Arctic air corps that slowly 
expanded during the war.  In 1937, two spectacular flights started in Moscow and ended 
in Vancouver and San Jacinto, California, and a third flight started in LA and finished in 
Moscow.38  Although at war’s end the Soviet Union possessed only a small strategic 
bomber force and no aircraft capable of making a round trip bombing mission to the 
U.S., the idea of a Soviet aerial assault preoccupied members of the American military, 
especially in the United States Army Air Force (USAAF).  On 5 December 1945 General 
H.H. Arnold, Commander in Chief of the USAAF, declared to the public that the Arctic 
would be the heart of any new conflict.39 The strategic importance of Alaska and the 
Canadian North only grew in the minds of defence planners in the years ahead.   
 Wartime and early postwar Canadian military operations in subarctic and arctic 
conditions convinced some government officials that the northern approaches could 
become the focus of an attack by hostile ground forces.40 In the late winter and spring of 
1945 the Canadian military undertook Exercise Polar Bear in northern British Columbia 
and Exercise Lemming in northern Manitoba and the southern portion of the Northwest 
                                                
38 Report on the Arctic, Atlantic Division Air Transport Command, Headquarters, Atlantic-Division Air 
Transport Command, Report on the Arctic, 1946, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), 
RG 319, Entry 82 (A1), Box 2975.  
39 David Beatty, The Canadian-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, (Ann Arbor: University 
Microfilms International, 1969), 117. 
40 Post-War Canadian Defence Interests in United States Defence Projects in Northwest Canada,  
Preliminary Draft by Army Representatives on Joint Drafting Group, Working Committee on Post-
Hostilities Problems, 6 July 1945, Department of External Affairs, DCER Volume 11, 1944-45, 1588.  
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Territories.41 These exercises, coupled with technological developments, led defence 
planners to claim “that the inaccessibility of the Arctic is just another myth, and, 
providing supplies are ensured, operations on the barren grounds which represent one-
third of Canada’s area can be as unhindered as operations on the Libyan Desert.”42 
Already officials worried that the enemy might use a diversionary land assault in the 
North to tie down large numbers of friendly forces.  In the winter of 1946 the Canadians 
conducted another large scale exercise, Operation Musk Ox, which gained international 
attention.43 With these new aerial and land threats Canadian decision makers foresaw 
that the Americans would soon be pressuring them assist in continental defence.    
 In November 1945 the American section of the Permanent Joint Board on 
Defence (PJBD), the senior bilateral defence agency created at Ogdensburg in 1940, 
suggested that a joint revision of ABC-22, the wartime defence plan, be undertaken as 
quickly as possible.44 In September, Canadian officials anticipated that ABC-22 would 
be revised in light of the new strategic situation, and they embraced the opportunity to do 
so.45 The process would allow the Canadians to learn as much as possible about 
American plans and assessments, help them to prepare for the responsibilities the U.S. 
would impose on Canada, and give them the opportunity to assist in preparing specific 
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defence plans. Almost immediately, however, concerns grew amongst Canadian officials 
in Washington that the PJBD was starting premature and improper planning for a formal 
defence treaty.46 Canada had managed to create some breathing room between it and the 
behemoth to the south and the prospect of an even closer and connected defence 
relationship with the U.S. was disconcerting to politicians and some senior bureaucrats.   
The Canadians, however, had learned valuable lessons from the Second World War.  
Their attitude and approach changed, and they would not repeat the mistakes – or the 
apathy – of 1942 and 1943.    
 
A New Canadian Approach 
 Prior to the end of the war, Canadian officials foresaw a global power struggle 
looming just over the horizon.  In 1943 the government created the Advisory Committee 
on Post-Hostilities Problems, which released their final report in February 1945.  The 
committee correctly surmised Canada, lying across the shortest air routes from Europe 
and Asia, would become of more “direct strategic importance to the U.S.  This new 
strategic importance made it likely that the Americans would “exert undue pressure on 
Canada, particularly as respects matters of defence.” 47 The report concluded that Canada 
could not retreat into the isolation of the interwar years and that, to protect its 
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sovereignty, Canada must provide adequate defences for its part of the continent.  In 
April 1944, Maurice Pope, Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in Washington, 
echoed these thoughts, explaining that if the U.S. went “to war with Russia they would 
look to us to make common cause with them and, as I judge their public opinion, they 
would brook no delay…what we have to fear is more a lack of confidence in U.S. as to 
our security, rather than enemy action.”48 As the Canadian and American defence 
relationship tightened, this simple reality became even more obvious.   
How could Canada handle the Americans and their defence needs? This was one 
of the most pressing questions facing External Affairs during the last two years of the 
war.  In February 1944, R.M. MacDonnell reported on the nature of Canadian-American 
relations and remarked that wartime developments would only increase the propensity of 
the U.S. to get its own way. He recommended that Canada take a firmer stand on 
important issues.49 As the Minister-Counsellor at the Canadian Legation in Washington, 
Pearson also criticized the overbearing Americans, as well as the Canadian habit of 
taking a hard line on issues and then simply giving in when the Americans applied any 
pressure.50 “When we are dealing with such a powerful neighbour, we have to avoid the 
twin dangers of subservience and truculent touchiness,” claimed Pearson. “We succumb 
to the former when we take everything lying down, and to the latter when we rush to the 
State Department with a note every time some Congressman makes a stupid statement 
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about Canada…”51 When it found an issue worth fighting over, Pearson insisted that 
Canada should “go to the mat with Washington” and pursue the matter until the end.52 
During the early Cold War era, Canada would follow this advice while keeping its close 
bilateral relationship intact. 
By 1946, most of the issues that had fed wartime fears that Canada might lose its 
sovereignty because of American northern defence projects no longer existed.  Shelagh 
Grant argues that in 1942 and most of 1943 Canada sacrificed its sovereignty in the 
Northwest when the U.S. acted to ensure its security.  When reviewed in the context of 
the war, however, Canada’s short-sightedness becomes more understandable.  Facing the 
prospects of a possible German victory over Britain in 1940, Canada signed the 
Ogdensburg Agreement and grew accustomed to working in close cooperation with the 
Americans on hemispheric defence.53 While the Americans became more forceful with 
the Canadians after their entrance into the war, they remained one of Canada’s closest 
allies.  To reject their defence plans seemed out of the question.  Wartime urgency 
ensured a positive Canadian response to American proposals.     
 In the early postwar years, however, the imperative for urgent action seemed less 
obvious.  Reports from Canada’s analysts and diplomats did not spark fear of an 
imminent threat and the Americans could not convince the Canadians otherwise.  In 
February 1946 George Glazebrook and Gerry Riddell argued that they could find little 
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indication of an undue Soviet interest in the continent and little evidence of aggressive 
Soviet designs.54 This, however, is where the Canadians differed markedly from their 
American counterparts.  The Americans, especially those in the military, tended to 
anticipate threats based on Soviet capabilities rather than their intentions.  The 
Canadians, on the other hand, tended to emphasize intentions and motives, rather than 
technical capabilities.   In any case, they had to take note of American thinking. 
 Canadian officials attempted to review the situation as soberly and calmly as 
possible in 1946.  They investigated American requests and evaluated them with the 
protection of their country’s interests in mind.  Despite the willingness of the Canadians 
to engage in bilateral defence planning, they were more cautious about proceeding 
beyond the planning stage.  At the September meeting of the PJBD the American section 
suggested that the time had come for the allies to standardize their military equipment.  
The Canadian section of the Board, led by its new chairman Andrew McNaughton, saw 
little need for this action and rejected the proposal.  In their first postwar test the 
Canadians demonstrated that they could delay or reject American proposals, without fear 
of the U.S taking drastic unilateral action. 
Historian Elizabeth Elliot Meisel has argued that the failure of External Affairs to 
properly regulate American defence activities in Canada during the war stemmed from 
its small size and its relative inexperience.  With a severe shortage of personnel, External 
Affairs had to set feasible priorities – which did not include the Canadian North early in 
the war.  Neither did the Department plan for the difficult sovereignty issues that arose 
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during the war or develop an effective way of dealing with American pushiness.  As the 
war progressed, however, it grew in size and sophistication and began to handle complex 
problems more effectively.55 Accordingly, the Canadians were much better prepared to 
meet the incoming onslaught when defence planning started to heat up in 1946.   
 
Planning the Defences 
By early 1946 high ranking Americans fully accepted the Soviet Union as an 
enemy and the threat to the continent as reality.  Two events in particular influenced 
American decision makers, especially James Forrestal, the influential Secretary of the 
Navy.56  On 9 February 1946, Stalin delivered a speech which emphasized the need for 
the Soviets to remain prepared for the continuing conflict inherent in the capitalist world.  
Whatever Stalin’s intentions, Forrestal took this speech as the ‘Declaration of World War 
III’ and decided that a peaceful solution was no longer possible.  George Keenan, the 
U.S. charge d’affaires in Moscow, unintentionally fortified this sentiment with his 
famous ‘Long Telegram.’  Keenan argued that while the Soviets could be unscrupulous 
and did represent a threat, they did not want to engage in another global conflict.57 
Nevertheless, Keenan’s nuanced report on Soviet intentions became required reading for 
hundreds of American military officers, who read in it the possibility of a threat.  “The 
Soviet Union was the enemy, war a possibility, bombers were the threat, the polar 
corridor the route,” historian James Eayrs explained.58 Although some Canadian analysts 
                                                
55 Elliot-Meisel, Arctic Diplomacy, 56. 
56 Smith, Diplomacy of Fear, 122.  
57 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada Vol. 3: Peacemaking and Deterrence, 335.  
58 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada Vol. 3: Peacemaking and Deterrence, 335.  
 
 23 
like Riddel and Glazebrook disagreed with these estimates, Canada remained a faithful 
ally of the U.S. because of geography, trade, and history.59 If the Americans believed that 
the continent required defences, the Canadians would listen.  They would not, however, 
be cajoled into making swift and damaging decisions. 
 By the spring of 1946 the Americans began to pepper the Canadians with defence 
proposals aimed at improving their capabilities in the Arctic.  The projects suggested for 
the Canadian Arctic Archipelago in March, April and May 1946 all sought to give the 
U.S. military greater knowledge of Arctic conditions. They did not demand large scale 
installations, but relatively small operations with specific goals.  On 14 March 1946, 
Major General Guy V. Henry, American chairman of the PJBD, alerted his Canadian 
counterparts that the U.S. War Department wanted to establish a program of 
photographic and virtual reconnaissance in the western Arctic Archipelago, covering the 
islands of Banks, Victoria, Prince Patrick, Borden, Meighen, Bathurst and Prince of 
Wales.  The USAAF 46th Reconnaissance Squadron working in Alaska could be diverted 
to the Canadian Arctic for the following winter.60 From a military perspective, this 
project was sensible.  The first step to any military operation is understanding the lay of 
the land; the reconnaissance proposed by the Americans would have provided this 
essential knowledge.  Any defence planning would also require detailed maps of the 
Canadian Arctic, which Ottawa did not have. Photographic reconnaissance would begin 
to resolve this problem.    
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 Despite the military benefits inherent in the American request, the Canadians 
quickly attempted to sidestep it.  In early April, Charles Deerwester, the U.S. Air 
Member of the PJBD, approached the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington seeking an 
answer to his country’s proposal.  Deerwester told the Canadians that the U.S. welcomed 
Canadian participation in the project, but that it would act unilaterally if permitted to do 
so.61 The Canadian Joint Staff responded that this proposal created difficulties for the 
King government.  They chose not to give a definitive answer regarding cooperation, nor 
did they give the Americans permission to act unilaterally.  Although disappointed, 
Deerwester chose “to advise the A.A.F not to proceed with the operation until they have 
obtained Canadian government approval.”62 Although the reasons for the Canadian 
rejection are not stated, they likely worried about the Americans exploring and taking 
pictures of a portion of the Canadian Arctic that remained unoccupied and barely 
explored. In this case, Canadian sovereignty trumped the defence needs of the 
Americans.  
 On 30 April 1946, General Henry wrote to the Canadian secretary of the PJBD 
requesting permission for the USAAF to institute a “regular air transport service of three 
round trips per week” over the Canadian Arctic.63 The three B-29s assigned to the 
mission would travel over Canadian territory as they moved between Meeks Field, 
Iceland and Ladd Field, Alaska.  Henry outlined the five purposes of the Polaris project: 
“to gain operational experience in the Arctic; to determine navigational difficulties and 
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procedures for overcoming same, to investigate the reliability of communications; to 
analyze polar air masses; [and] to study air mass circulation in Polar regions.”64 This 
rationale reflected the American desire to improve its operational capability in the 
region, especially in Arctic aviation.   If American bombers ever had to cross the Polar 
Regions on a mission against the Soviet Union, the crews required advance training and 
their equipment needed to be tested in conditions unique to the Arctic.  The Canadians 
did not immediately respond to this proposal, however, preferring to give the issue more 
thought. 
  At the end of April, the American section of the PJBD also requested the 
continuation of the low frequency long range aid to navigation (Loran) program 
established in northern Canada to assist in the air and ground navigation for Exercise 
Musk Ox.  The program consisted of three transmitter stations at Dawson Creek, Himli 
and Gimli, and monitoring stations operated by the RCAF in Yellowknife, Norman 
Wells and Edmonton, the army at Baker Lake, and the Navy at Churchill.  The U.S. 
operated and provided equipment for the transmitter stations, while Canada did the same 
for the monitoring sites and assisted in the messing, housing and transport for the 
American controlled stations.  The PJBD “agreed that the continuation of these tests of 
low frequency Loran was essential in that they were not only of the utmost importance in 
the development of long range aids to navigation, but also valuable in the development 
of early warning systems, long range guided missiles etc.” It recommended that Canada 
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approve the American request.65 On 10 May 1946 the Cabinet approved the extension of 
the Loran program until the following May.66 During that time, the program would work 
its way into the less secure areas of the Canadian Arctic.  
Throughout March and April an American proposal to establish a joint service 
testing station in the Canadian North began to bounce around Ottawa.  Both the 
Canadians and Americans agreed that the technical services required a space where they 
could test equipment in Arctic conditions.  Many suggested that the ideal location would 
be Fort Churchill, Manitoba, which was surrounded by a barren, Arctic landscape that 
was accessible year round by plane and rail.67  This proposal did not unduly worry the 
Canadians, but they still baulked at the idea of permitting the semi-permanent stationing 
of American troops in the North.   
 On 14 May 1946 the Americans also alerted the Canadian section of the PJBD 
that they wanted to carry out naval operations in the Arctic that summer.  The objectives 
of Operation Nanook included the training of U.S. naval personnel in Arctic operations 
and the recording of detailed hydrographic, electromagnetic and meteorological data.  
The Americans never clearly defined the third objective, the “conducting of other 
scientific investigations.” Showing sensitivity to Canadian concerns, the American 
proposal explained that “since it is understood that the Canadian government desires to 
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supervise magnetic work in the area, any work of this nature undertaken by the United 
States will be performed under Canadian supervision.” The Americans offered to take 
along a Canadian observer qualified to take magnetic readings and also invited two 
Canadian naval officers to accompany the voyage. 68 The task force would consist of five 
vessels, including a coast guard icebreaker, an altered net layer, two cargo ships and a 
submarine.  In addition, aircraft would perform ice reconnaissance and obtain data on 
flight operations in the Arctic.  Later in May, the Americans added the USS Norton 
Sound, a seaplane tender, and the USS Sicily, a small carrier, along with a destroyer 
escort to the list of ships attached to the operation.  At this time the Americans also 
sought Canadian permission to land a force of 28 Marines for a one month period, 
preferably at Dundas Harbour on North Devon Island.69   
The Americans requested permission to carry out the operation from 1 July to 1 
October in the waters of Viscount Melville Sound and Lancaster Sound.70 While the 
seaplane tender and the carrier would carry out most of their work in the high seas off the 
Baffin Bay area, the other American ships would operate in the Northwest Passage.71 An 
internal Canadian memorandum reviewing the project explored the possibilities of the 
expedition and noted: 
That part of ‘NANOOK’ which is going to Viscount Melville Sound is of 
particular importance in that it is proposed to operate a force of five ships in an 
area that has seldom been penetrated before save in a spirit of adventure and with 
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ships of less than half the size…The experiences and findings of the Melville 
Sound section are of particular interest when it is remembered that the Soviet 
operated convoys from Vladivostok to Archangel during the war and that a recent 
press release states that, in the new Five Year Plan, it is envisaged that the “Great 
Northern Route” shall have become a normal commercial sea lane by 1950. 
 
The report speculated on the possible commercial promise of the Northwest Passage, and 
highlighted the lack of Canadian activity in the area.  The document admitted that no 
Canadian naval ship ever entered the Arctic waters and no officers in the navy had any 
Arctic experience. “While the possibility of naval operations in these areas may be 
remote,” it emphasized, “it is felt that our complete lack of such experience should be 
corrected.”72 The document made no mention of the expedition’s potential impact on 
Canadian sovereignty.  
When the American Coast Guard Cutter Polar Sea transited the same waters in 
its journey through the Northwest Passage in 1985, it sparked outrage in Canada and 
elicited a strong response from the Canadian government.  In late 1946, however, the 
government expressed little concern over the status of the Arctic waters.   While it 
consistently worried about the impact of permanent or semi-permanent stations on 
Canada’s claims to the Arctic islands, large scale American naval operations did not 
seem to pose the same kind of threat.  Terrestrial sovereignty remained the government’s 
primary focus.   
In the fall of 1944, Hugh Keenleyside received a letter from Lt.-Colonel Charles 
Hubbard of the USAAF, who insisted that weather stations in the High Arctic would be 
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essential to future military operations.73 The following March, Hubbard, who gained 
northern experience through his work on the Crimson Route, met with Escott Reid and 
Lester Pearson in the Canadian Embassy in Washington.  Hubbard pointed out that the 
North Atlantic air routes required advanced weather forecasting.  By 1944, forecasts for 
this area could only be made 24 hours in advance and remained unreliable.  To solve this 
problem Hubbard envisioned six or seven stations spread across the Northwest 
Territories.  He suggested that since the benefits of the stations would accrue to both the 
United States and Canada “in proportions roughly equivalent to their relevant 
populations” it would be fair if the U.S. bore eleventh-twelfths of the total cost.  Of 
course, if the U.S. bore three quarters of the cost, they would want a share in running the 
stations. To wrap up his briefing, Hubbard asked Reid and Pearson to keep the 
discussion strictly confidential.74 
 While the Canadians neither approved nor disapproved of such a scheme, 
Pearson commented that his government would be more comfortable with an 
international plan of action that covered Alaska, the Canadian Northwest Territories and 
Greenland.75 In a letter to Norman Robertson, Pearson explained: 
In this connection, I pointed out to [Hubbard] that Canadians would look with 
some hesitation on meteorological stations in Canada’s northern areas unless they 
were under the control of Canada itself, or of an international organization set up 
with the knowledge and consent of Canada and in the control of which Canada 
shared.  Colonel Hubbard quite appreciated this but suggested that some doubt 
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still existed as to the extent of our sovereignty over some of these Arctic districts 
north of Canada.76 
 
If Hubbard was trying to coax the Canadians into accepting his proposal on weather 
stations, raising questions about Canada’s sovereignty was a faulty strategy.  The 
Canadians suddenly faced the prospect of increased American activity in the High 
Arctic.  Robertson, however, was already aware of Hubbard’s ideas and he questioned 
senior officials at the Arctic, Desert and Tropic Information Centre of the USAAF about 
the plan.  These officers told Robertson that Hubbard’s suggestions should be taken with 
a certain amount of reserve. “I gather that Hubbard is far from being persona grata to the 
Arctic experts of that organization who, in fact, managed some months ago to forestall 
his assignment work with them,” Robertson concluded.77   
After Hubbard’s meeting with Reid and Pearson, the weather station proposal fell 
off the Canadian government’s radar.  On the other side of the border, however, Hubbard 
remained hard at work trying to get someone in a position of power to champion his idea.  
He finally found a willing and powerful ear in Senator Owen Brewster of Maine, whom 
he convinced to propose a bill requesting funds for the United States Weather Bureau to 
“construct and operate meteorological stations in conjunction with a number of other 
countries.”78 As proposed in the Senate, the project would be initiated and controlled by 
a civilian agency.  Although Senator Brewster recognized the military importance of 
meteorology he also described the “farming, construction, transportation, merchandising, 
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and many other activities” helped by advanced weather forecasting.79 The civilian 
purposes of the weather stations bill proposed by Brewster were significant.  In a recent 
paper on the Joint Arctic Weather Stations, historian Daniel Heidt noted that critics such 
as Shelagh Grant and Adam Lajeunesse dismissed the “civilian framework of JAWS as 
fraudulent.  Lajeunesse similarly describes JAWS as a ‘military project’ in which the 
United States ‘played its part’ by using a civilian guise.”80 From the very beginning, 
however, American officials acknowledged the civil importance of the weather stations 
program and placed control of the project in the hands of the civilian weather bureau.  
(When the stations were eventually constructed most of the control was left in the hands 
of civilian operators, with the military playing a supporting role.)   
 In early May 1946 the Americans formally presented their plan for Arctic 
weather stations to the Canadian government.  A memorandum from Lewis Clark, the 
Counsellor at the U.S. Embassy, proposed the establishment of three weather stations on 
islands in the western portion of Canada’s Arctic by the summer of 1947.  Clark made it 
clear that, while the United States was prepared to establish these stations independently, 
it “assumed that this would not be desired by the Canadian government in view of its 
general policy of retaining control of establishments in Canadian territory.” 81 In this 
light, Clark made two suggestions: that the U.S. establish and assist in maintaining the 
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stations which would be under Canadian control or that Canada establish, operate and 
maintain the stations independently.  
  If the Canadians chose the second option, Clark asked that the technical 
standards meet U.S. requirements and that U.S. personnel be posted at the stations to 
gain experience.  Most importantly, Clark “emphasized that his government wished to 
work out a programme on a fully cooperative basis and had no thought of interfering in 
any way with Canadian sovereignty.”82 Officials at External Affairs worried despite 
these assurances.  Norman Robertson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
told the Deputy Minister of Transport that Canada would not be justified in assuming the 
total cost of the project, but would also be in a precarious position if the Americans 
established and controlled the stations.  Ideally, Canada required a compromise in which 
it retained control of the weather stations and made modest contributions to the program, 
while the U.S provided the supplies, necessary personnel and equipment.83  
By mid-May 1946 Charles Hubbard again stood before the Canadians as a 
member of the American delegation at the first joint conference on the Arctic weather 
stations.  All of the key departments on the Canadian side were represented at the 
conference, including Mines and Resources, the army and navy, the Department of 
Transport, External Affairs and the meteorological service.  Hubbard reiterated the 
important role these weather stations could play in advanced forecasting and alluded to 
the military requirement for these stations when he argued that they would provide 
essential information about flying conditions in the North.  In addition, the United States 
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Navy (USN) and AAF agreed to provide logistical support for the operation.  Lewis 
Clark argued for a quick decision, stating that “the international political situation at the 
present time is important.  Those on the other side of the Arctic are very active.  Because 
of this we can get funds at the present time and later this may not be possible.”84 With 
these funds the Americans hoped to establish weather stations at Winter Harbour on 
Melville Island in 1946, and on Banks Island, Prince Patrick Island, and on the west side 
of Ellesmere Island or Axel Heiberg Island in 1947.  Although the U.S. presented a 
sound plan and seemed respectful of Canadian sovereignty, the Canadians again refused 
to make a quick decision.     
The defence projects proposed by the Americans in the early Cold War made 
sound strategic sense and all had valuable non-military applications.  They had practical 
and achievable aims and would not involve as many American personnel as the wartime 
mega-projects had required.  The Americans provided multiple assurances that the 
weather stations program would not jeopardize Canadian sovereignty.  These promises, 
however, did little to counter the de jure and de facto sovereignty concerns of the 
Canadian government.  In the aftermath of the joint conference on the weather stations, 
the Northwest Territories Council echoed the opinion of many Canadian officials when it 
claimed that it “was concerned about the aspect of sovereignty in these remote sections 
of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago since most of these stations were going to areas 
where our claims on the basis of actual occupation are very weak.” The council noted 
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that the sector principle had never been accepted internationally and that it believed any 
permanent northern projects should be operated by Canada.85  
 
Sovereignty Worries in the Arctic 
By 1946 Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic Archipelago was best encapsulated 
by Hume Wrong’s phrase: “unchallenged, but not unchallengeable.”86 Since the early 
twentieth century Canada had taken slow but steady steps to secure its claim over the 
region.  In the interwar period the Eastern Arctic Patrol visited remote stations almost 
every year, and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) posts, post offices and customs 
houses dotted the mainland and archipelago up to Ellesmere Island.  The government 
paid the Norwegians to drop their claims in the Canadian high Arctic and insisted that 
American expeditions entering the region acquire a Canadian permit.  From time to time 
in the House of Commons a Canadian Minister would stand up and make mention of the 
Sector Principle and declare Canada’s intent to protect its Arctic islands.87 Other than the 
occasional brave statement, however, the government showed little concern about the 
nature of Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic and did even less to develop or settle the 
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region.  During the war, the Canadian government worried about its de facto control of 
the northwest.  Rarely was official attention directed to the Arctic islands.    
In 1944 a small number of officials in the Department of Mines and Resources 
and External Affairs began to ponder the nature of Canada’s sovereignty in the high 
Arctic.  On 9 February 1944, J.G. Wright, a member of the Northwest Territories 
Administration, wrote a report on the establishment of weather stations in the region.  He 
noted that “it is the far and western islands, which are reached by our administration 
mostly in theory, where our claims to sovereignty are most likely to be questioned.”  
Wright explained that Russia strengthened its claims to its Arctic possessions by 
establishing scientific and weather stations in the area.  He surmised that “we may have 
to do something like that ourselves, in which case we would require weather stations to 
service air travel to reach some of our otherwise scarcely accessible islands.”88  
One of the few reports on the issue of Arctic sovereignty released by the 
Department of External Affairs during the war years argued the necessity of effective 
occupation under international law.  Any attempt to claim land based on discovery would 
generate possible rival claims from different nations that had explored the archipelago.  
The report concluded that the Arctic region required some degree of control and 
administration and “even taking into account that such ‘control and administration’ need 
not be as real in northern regions as in more temperate ones, there may be some doubt 
whether Canada is actually extending enough jurisdiction throughout lands already 
discovered to make her claim to these territories unquestionable.”89  
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The External Affairs report also recognized that there was no clear definition of 
effective administration and control.  “The principle generally agreed to however, is that 
the possessing state must make its authority felt in the occupied territory and maintain 
order therein,” it noted.  “As a matter of practice, I should think this is translated in the 
administration of justice and the enforcement of national laws and regulations in the 
territory concerned.” The report mused that in the near future this control could be 
expanded to encapsulate stricter customs laws and regulations, air regulations, 
immigration control, and the enforcement of specific Northwest Territories (NWT) Acts, 
such as rules against the importation of intoxicants, game laws, and permits for foreign 
scientists and explorers.90 Enforcing these regulations would strengthen Canada’s de 
facto control of the region.  Accordingly, demonstrating a reasonable level of control, 
rather than making grand assertions of sovereignty based on discovery or the sector 
principle, became the government’s game plan.   
 Other Canadian commentators shared a more positive interpretation of Canada’s 
legal claim to the Arctic.  In response to Hubbard’s suggestion that some doubt existed 
as to the extent of Canadian sovereignty in the region, Charles Camsell, Deputy Minister 
of Mines and Resources,  noted that three wartime publications issued with the consent 
of the U.S. War Department “refer repeatedly to the islands north of the Canadian 
mainland as ‘the Canadian archipelago.’”91 A 1946 report prepared by the U.S. also 
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employed the phrase “Canadian Arctic Archipelago.”92 These mentions, however, did 
not allay the concerns of Canadian decision-makers involved with continental defence 
planning.  
The American defence proposals called for activity in areas not permanently 
settled or even patrolled by Canada, claimed using the sector theory which had no solid 
basis in international law.  In particular, the weather stations would be established in 
areas that few Canadians ever visited and, in many cases, they would be the only 
settlements and sources of authority for hundreds of miles.  The thought of tiny 
American-controlled stations popping up throughout Canada’s Arctic, flying the stars 
and stripes, gravely worried all branches of the Canadian government.   
 The release of PJBD Recommendation 35 in early May did nothing to alleviate 
the King government’s concerns.  The recommendation, which the Board started work 
on in November, attempted to establish the basic principles for defence cooperation.  It 
called for closer collaboration between the two countries in intelligence sharing, the 
interchange of personnel, equipment standardization, joint manoeuvres and training, and 
the right of transit through either country’s territory.  The recommendation, however, 
said little about the protection of sovereignty.  The safeguards that the King government 
had anticipated were absent.  Rather than meekly signing on to these principles, Cabinet 
rejected the recommendation and ordered the PJBD to begin revising the proposal. This 
time, the Canadian section would have to push harder for clauses explicitly protecting 
Canada’s sovereignty. 
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 The shortcomings in Recommendation 35 coincided with an equally frightening 
revelation from R.M. Macdonnell, the Canadian secretary of the PJBD.  On 6 May 1946, 
he circulated a leaked report from the American Standing Sub-committee on the Arctic 
that called into question Canada’s sovereignty over undiscovered lands within its 
sector.93 The report, prepared in November 1945, explained that a gap existed in the 
network of Arctic aviation facilities extending from Spitsbergen to Greenland and across 
the “Canadian islands” to Alaska.94 To fill this gap, the paper suggested American 
reconnaissance flights to look for undiscovered islands in the Arctic upon which to 
establish weather stations.95 The committee questioned whether the U.S. recognized 
Canadian claims to the region north of Prince Patrick Island and west of Grant’s Land, 
and pondered whether the U.S. could claim newly discovered islands north of the 
Canadian mainland.96 In short, the report dismissed Canadian claims to the region based 
on the Sector Principle.   
Reading too much into this document is erroneous.  The Sub-committee’s report, 
a low level planning document, carried little political weight in Washington.  To a 
Canadian government already worried about sovereignty, however, the report seemed to 
confirm its worst fears.  The Americans wanted to improve their capabilities in the Arctic 
and, it seemed, they might test Canada’s de jure sovereignty to do so.  The American 
report reinforced concerns expressed by Vice Chief of the General Staff General D.C. 
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Spry that “hitherto unknown islands may be discovered within the Canadian sector by a 
foreign power, and claim laid to them by right of discovery and primary occupation.” 
Spry’s analysis criticized the lack of Canadian occupation, settlement, or development in 
the area and noted the weakness of Canada’s claims. “Thus it is of great importance that 
Canada should carefully safeguard her sovereignty in the Arctic at all points and at all 
times,” Spry remarked, “lest the acceptance of an initial infringement of her sovereignty 
invalidate her entire claim.”97 Solving Canada’s sovereignty concerns remained at the 
top of the list as the Canadian government and military became more entwined in 
continental defence.  By the end of May a meeting of the Military Cooperation 
Committee (MCC) made resolving these concerns even more imperative.    
Between 20-23 May 1946, Canadian and American military delegations met to 
hammer out a revised version of ABC-22.  After a marathon session of planning and 
discussion, the MCC released an “Appreciation of the Requirements for Canadian-
United States Security” and a “Joint Canadian-United States Basic Security Plan.”  The 
documents stressed that the military potential of North America would be a major target 
in any outbreak of hostilities.  In three to five years the offensive capabilities of any 
potential enemy would steadily improve, making the continent more vulnerable to attack.  
If the enemy acquired the atomic bomb, an attack might come sooner and would be 
much more lethal.  Any aerial attack would come over the North Pole, making use of 
Spitsbergen, Greenland, and the Canadian Arctic islands as stepping stones to the 
continent.  To protect the continent, the Canadians and Americans had to keep ahead of 
                                                
97 Sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic in Relation to Joint Defence Undertakings, Memorandum from 




the enemy capabilities by building an integrated air defence system, air warning, weather 
forecasting, communications networks, surveillance, anti-submarine capabilities and 
mobile strike forces to counter any possible enemy lodgement in the north.98 The defence 
scheme of the MCC would force Canada to invest ten-fold more resources into 
continental defence and brace itself for a veritable Maginot Line in the Arctic.  
Acceptance of such a plan would also have a drastic impact on Canadian sovereignty.   
 
Defending Against Help 
The defence plans and threat assessment prepared by the MCC had an immediate 
influence on the Canadian policy community.  On 11 June 1946 Hume Wrong circulated 
his thoughts to his senior colleagues at External Affairs and to Arnold Heeney, the 
Secretary of the Cabinet.  He argued that the appreciation overestimated the danger to the 
continent, gave a greater capacity to the Soviets than they would have in the next decade, 
and noted that the military occupation of North America seemed highly unlikely.99  Later 
in the month, Wrong observed that the Soviets seemed intent upon building up their 
military but they would not be capable of waging war for another fifteen years.  He also 
expressed fear that a low-scale local conflict could escalate out of control due to the 
“blundering diplomacy and the inability to compromise of the Soviet Government.”100 
Wrong believed that the Soviet Union posed a threat, but he thought that the MCC’s 
defence plans were disproportionate to the probability of an actual attack.   
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 Heeney also reported on the MCC recommendation to Prime Minister King.  The 
senior public servant in Ottawa suspected that continental defence would become the 
most serious problem facing the government in the postwar years.  He predicted that the 
Canadian military planners would likely come to the same conclusions as the MCC, 
based purely on military criteria.  Heeney told King to prepare for an approach from the 
highest levels, considering the importance the Americans placed on securing an 
agreement on continental defence.  “The government will probably have to accept the 
U.S. thesis in general terms,” Heeney concluded, “though we may be able to moderate 
the pace at which plans are to be implemented and to some extent the nature of the 
projects which are to be undertaken.”101 Canada was in a difficult position.   
Historian Joseph Jockel has made a convincing case showing that the American 
government did not intend to establish a massive air defence system on Canadian 
territory in 1946.  Despite the threat assessment prepared by the MCC, the USAAF 
remained predominately focused on offensive operations in the early postwar years, not 
continental air defences.102 The American Joint Chiefs of Staff were “interested in 
signing Canada on as a faithful postwar ally and as a secure geographic element in their 
forward strategy.”  Most defence planners in the U.S. and Canada realized that at some 
point the Arctic approaches would require protection.  The question was how much.  
Nevertheless, Jockel notes that early bilateral “negotiations were conducted before the 
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higher authorities had fully established what, precisely, the American interest was.”103 
Senior American officials tended to leave the details of bilateral defence planning in the 
hands of lower ranking officers and diplomats and often, as in the case of the MCC 
recommendation, knew little about the actual plans.104 These senior officials had little 
interest in the grandiose plans of the MCC, and suggestions for air defence bases and 
radar stations throughout the Arctic faded away for the short-term. 
Regardless of the intentions of senior American officials, the plans prepared by 
the MCC, the multitude of proposed northern defence projects, and the failure of the 
PJBD to create a set of basic principles for cooperation that protected Canadian 
sovereignty left the King government reeling by June 1946.  In spite of its sovereignty 
concerns, everyone knew that Canada would participate in continental defence. 105 As 
senior Cabinet minister Louis St. Laurent stated, “Canada could not stay out of a third 
World War if 11,999,999 of her 12,000,000 citizens wanted to remain neutral.”106 
Furthermore, Canadian military officials recognized the importance of the proposed 
defence projects.  After the conference on weather stations in May, Group Captain 
Bradshaw, the RCAF representative, stated that he “hoped that the project would not be 
turned down on the basis of the sovereignty question as he felt there was a very great 
need of these stations for air activity in view of the rather disturbing political situation at 
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the present time.”107 The Canadian Arctic would be one of the front lines of any new 
global war and, according to historian David Bercuson, this posed a series of important 
questions for policy makers:  
Did Canada have the resources to guard that front line to the satisfaction of its 
powerful ally, the United States? It was obvious, almost from the start, that it did 
not.  But could Canada allow the United States to mount that “long polar watch” 
alone, from Canadian territory? Would this not be an admission that whatever 
sovereignty Canada claimed in the polar regions was weak at best and 
nonexistent at worst?108 
 
How would Canada respond to the proposals for American defence projects in the 
Arctic? How would it protect its sovereignty in the region?  
Canada required a solution to its problem that both protected sovereignty and 
provided adequate continental defence.  Whitney Lackenbauer introduced the idea of 
defence against help into the scholarly discourse on the northern defence projects of the 
early Cold War.  Nils Orvik first suggested defence against help in the early 1970’s as a 
way for small states to avoid infringements on their sovereignty by large neighbours for 
defence purposes.  “One credible objective for small states,” suggested Orvik, “would 
be, while not attempting military resistance against a large neighbour, to persuade him 
that they are strong enough to defend themselves against any of the large neighbour’s 
potential enemies.”109 In 1981 David Barry suggested that one of the major tenets in 
Canadian foreign policy during and after the Second World War was the idea of defence 
against help.  Barry argued that Canada could not ignore the requirements of U.S. 
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security and had to create credible responses to any external threats to the security of the 
continent that might arise.110  
Following Barry’s lead, Lackenbauer has argued that the driving force behind 
Canada’s approach to the Cold War Arctic was the need to “defend against help.”111 The 
Canadians worried that the Americans might act unilaterally if they did not attempt to 
defend the Arctic, which the U.S. perceived as a strategically vulnerable position.  To 
effectively defend the Arctic, however, the Canadians had to partner up with the U.S. 
and once again allow American soldiers onto Canadian territory; which raised grave 
sovereignty concerns.  In the process of securing the continent the U.S. would become a 
threat to Canada.   In the end, defending against help actually strengthened Canada’s 
claims in the Arctic.  The negotiations that brought the Americans into the region 
protected Canadian sovereignty.  In addition, the partnership “offered the Canadians a 
say in decision-making, solidified its alliances with the Americans, and could guarantee 
both security and sovereignty.”112 Canadian diplomats realized that any policy in the 
Arctic would need to provide both sovereignty and security.  Defence against help 
guaranteed both.      
 In the summer of 1946, however, such an advantageous outcome seemed like 
wishful thinking to the King government. As the summer wore on and American 
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pressure for Canada to sign on to its continental defence plans mounted, the King 
government continued to struggle to find the solution to its dilemma.  Nevertheless, the 
government showed signs it learned some lessons from its wartime experiences.  It did 
not plunge head first into defence cooperation with the Americans and accept every 
defence proposal immediately.  Instead, the government bided its time, pondered the 
problem, and attempted to form a response that would protect Canada’s sovereignty and 
provide the American’s with the security they desired.  The shadow of the Second World 
War haunted King and his senior advisers, and they sought to avoid the mistakes they 























Chapter 2: Deferment and Negotiation 
 
 
Activist versus Gradualist Approaches and the American Position 
 
By the beginning of June 1946 the Americans began to press the Canadian 
government for a quick decision on the proposed defence projects, lest they miss the 
narrow window of opportunity for operations during the Arctic’s short summer.  
Canadian officials understood that their country had little choice but to participate in 
continental defence, but as American pressure mounted Canadian decision-makers 
became more determined to find a solution that would allay their sovereignty concerns.   
Some scholars have used the northern defence projects of the Second World War 
and the early Cold War to support arguments about peripheral dependence.  This theory 
has been applied to Canadian foreign, defence and economic policy to show that Canada 
is “a weak and penetrated country with little ability to resist others, in particular the 
United States.”113 In this framework, Canada is generally unable to articulate a proper 
response to American requests and concedes to its ally’s demands.  Canadian actions 
during the summer of 1946, however, do not support this conclusion.  Canadian officials 
engaged in a seemingly endless cycle of debate and planning as they focused on the twin 
problems of Arctic sovereignty and continental defence.  Throughout this period, the 
Canadians challenged American assertions and refused to capitulate to pressure as they 
delayed decisions about defence projects planned for the Arctic.  
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R.M. Macdonnell, who had notified Ottawa about the U.S. Subcommittee on the 
Arctic’s alarming 1946 report questioning Canada’s claims, anticipated that Arctic 
problems would be at the forefront of Canada’s foreign affairs in years ahead.  Soon 
“there will be extensive programmes of northern exploration and development in which 
the United States will either be participating with Canada or will have been given 
permission to act independently,” he predicted. With worrisome thoughts of American 
flags flying over bases in the Canadian Arctic flashing through his mind, Macdonnell 
suggested that the Canadians go on the offensive from the start and “endeavour to secure 
[American] agreement to our claims about Canadian sovereignty.”114 He advocated an 
activist approach to Canadian sovereignty – a radical departure from the gradualist 
approach of the first half of the century.   
After the Canadian-American Arctic weather stations conference in May, James 
Allison Glen, the Minister of Mines and Resources, expressed his worry to Louis St. 
Laurent about the prospect of permanent American installations in a region where 
Canada did little to strengthen its sovereignty.  Glen thought that the project was not as 
urgent as the American alleged, and he emphasized that any resolution should include “a 
clear and definite understanding” of Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic islands.115 
Senior military officers seemed to agree that an aggressive offense was the best defence, 
and also advocated formal recognition of Canada’s claims.  Charles Foulkes, the Chief of 
the General Staff, felt that “the whole question of Canadian sovereignty should be settled 
now, and that if weakness is shown at the present juncture it will only lead to increasing 
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demands in future.”116 A memorandum concerning the army’s position highlighted its 
agreement with the Department of Mines and Resources (DMR) and suggested that 
Canada work to gain “full title” to the islands on which defence installations might be 
built.117 The military’s leadership, usually so willing to work closely with the Americans, 
remained wary of their chief ally setting up permanent facilities in the Arctic during 
peacetime. 
In early June, Lester Pearson wrote his letter to Hume Wrong suggesting that the 
Americans be asked to recognize Canadian sovereignty based on the sector principle.  
Historian Adam Lajeunesse alleges that Canada should have adopted the approach 
endorsed by Foulkes, Macdonnell and Pearson. Canada should have pushed the U.S. for 
acceptance of its claims, in return for the defence rights the Americans wanted in the 
Arctic.118 Certainly a dramatic activist approach had tremendous appeal.  In theory, 
forcing the powerful Americans to bend to Canadian demands while solving, once and 
for all, Canada’s sovereignty worries is both alluring and idealistic.  Given the world 
situation of 1946, this approach surely would have failed.  Neither Lajeunesse, nor 
Pearson, Foulkes or Macdonnell, offered any evidence to support the assumption that the 
U.S. might have formally accepted Canada’s claims.  In the late 1940’s, strategic and 
political considerations ensured that the Americans would not and could not accept a 
forceful Canadian request for sovereignty recognition.   
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The situation in the Arctic necessitated a gradualist approach.  Although the State 
Department made it abundantly clear that the United States did not want to violate 
Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic, the Americans never offered to formally accept 
Canada’s claims.119 Global interests made such a declaration unrealistic, lest this be seen 
as acceptance of the sector principle.  In 1926 the Soviet Union issued a decree that 
proclaimed its recognition of the sector theory and claimed an enormous swath of 
territory stretching from its eastern and western borders to the North Pole.  Even if the 
U.S. did not object to Canada’s sectoral claims in principle, it did not want to strengthen 
the position of the Russians.  Any formal acceptance of Canada’s claims would have 
done just that.   
U.S. political and strategic interests in the Antarctic also dictated its response.  In 
the first decades of the twentieth century countries used the sector principle to claim vast 
portions of the southern polar continent.  The U.S. government refused to do so, and 
stated in 1924 that no Antarctic claim could be made unless it satisfied a strict definition 
of effective occupation far more stringent than the British version for polar regions 
(which only called for the occasional visit and legislative act).120 In September 1929, the 
U.S. Navy Department criticized the sector principle as an illegal attempt by a few of the 
world’s powers to unfairly divide up a large portion of the globe.121  
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After the war the United States began preparing its territorial claim in the 
Antarctic, and the strategic importance of the continent grew as the Soviet Union began 
to express an interest in the region. The USN began planning for a massive military 
project in the Antarctic, Operation Highjump, initiated in August 1946 and involving 13 
ships, nine aircraft and 4700 personnel.  That December, Dean Acheson, the Acting 
Secretary of State, indicated the political importance of the American Antarctic 
expedition when he claimed that the operation highlighted “a definite policy of 
exploration and use of those Antarctic areas to which we already have a reasonable basis 
for claim…in order that we may be in a position to advance territorial claims to those 
areas.” Highjump, and a later expedition known as Windmill, provided the Americans 
with a firm foundation for claims based on effective occupation.122  
Between 1946 and 1948 the State Department slowly crafted the American claim 
in the Antarctic.  Samuel Boggs, the State Department’s Geographic Adviser and the 
man responsible for these plans, argued that the Americans could gain possession of an 
area from 35 degrees West to 180 degrees to 13 degrees East.  Boggs’ idea ignored all 
sector claims on the continent and formulated an American claim based on discovery and 
effective occupation.  As long as the sector principle was not established in international 
law, the U.S. government could argue for a portion of the Antarctic that it considered 
both accessible and economically attractive.123 Any recognition of the sector principle in 
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one polar region would have established a precedent for the other, to the detriment of the 
American position in the Antarctic. 
As long as the Americans rejected the sector claims in the Antarctic, they could 
also continue to operate in any area of the region they chose.  The American military 
considered the Antarctic to be valuable for training and experimentation.  Learning to 
cope with the extreme conditions could prepare men and equipment for deployment in 
the Arctic, while avoiding the political sensitivities involved with undertaking a project 
the size of Highjump in the Canadian archipelago.124 Senior American officials realized 
that they would lose this ability to train and prepare their forces for war against the 
Soviets if they accepted the sector theory in the Arctic.125 Accordingly, if Canada had 
insisted on formal American recognition of its sovereignty in the early post war years, 
based on the sector principle, the U.S. would have inevitably rejected its request.  This 
would have weakened any legal claim based on foreign acquiescence. 
Two documents from this period illuminate American opinion on Canadian 
sovereignty in the Arctic.  While at times critical of Canadian claims, both reports 
endorsed cooperation rather than unilateral American action.  In early 1946 Lt. Colonel 
James Brewster, Assistant Chief of Intelligence, Atlantic Division Air Transport 
Command, noted that international acceptance of a territorial claim and effective 
occupation were the only ways to take possession of a territory.  Brewster pointed out 
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that the rigid American conception of effective occupation did not align with the 
precedents established by international law.  In 1933 the Eastern Greenland Case 
decided that Denmark had demonstrated sufficient authority over parts of Greenland to 
claim the entire area as its own, although this jurisdiction was manifested solely by 
Danish legislative acts which could not be effectively enforced in most of the territory 
involved.  The case indicated that the administration established for areas like the 
Canadian Arctic could be adapted to local conditions and meet only local requirements.  
Brewster recognized that development or mass settlement of the region was not 
required.126  
Although the report acknowledged Canadian efforts to assert their sovereignty in 
the Arctic, Brewster still found many problems.  The Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
carried out patrols and set up posts, but the region remained “incompletely explored” and 
“inadequately administered,” especially in comparison to the Soviet Arctic.  As a result 
the northernmost regions of North America remained susceptible to foreign intrusion.  
These islands “represent[ed] either a potential spearhead pointed at Europe…or, on the 
other hand, an especially vulnerable area, a possible spring-board for any foreign assault 
on the North American continent.” Brewster did not suggest the U.S. take immediate 
unilateral action in the Arctic, however, or that it should look for undiscovered islands to 
claim.  Instead, he called for joint defence activity in the region, including patrols and the 
deployment of a network of meteorological, radio and air stations to ensure effective 
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occupation before some other foreign power did so.127 The U.S., after all, would much 
rather see Canadians in the Arctic Archipelago than Russians.  
A second report entitled, “Problems of Canadian-United States Cooperation in 
the Arctic,” also came from the intelligence branch of the Atlantic Division, Air 
Transport Command.128 Released in October 1946, the paper claimed that, while many of 
Canada’s senior military advisers understood the interdependence of the two countries in 
continental security, many Canadians opposed any American military presence in the 
Arctic during peacetime lest it erode Canadian sovereignty.  The U.S., however, did not 
want to challenge Canada’s position in the Arctic.  While the American government 
might think that the Canadians had not done enough to effectively occupy the region, “in 
light of the latter decision [East Greenland], we are forced to conclude that the Canadian 
claim to sovereignty over the entire American Arctic would be sustained by an 
international judicial body.”129  
The Air Transport Command report listed Prince Patrick Island, Banks Island and 
Grant Land as the only locations that the American government could occupy with any 
hope of making a legal defence of its actions.  While such an occupation might be 
technically legal, the violation of Canadian territorial rights “would lead to repercussions 
so severe that the violation, except in the case of emergency, would not be worth it.”  
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The report stressed that the United States should not undertake a unilateral program of 
polar defence.  Cooperation was preferable, even if this meant grappling with Canada’s 
sovereignty concerns in ways that did not prejudice American interpretations of 
international law.  In short, the U.S. could not accept the sector principle, but it also did 
not want to challenge Canada’s sovereignty.  
Shelagh Grant used the October 1946 report on the problems of Canadian-
American defence cooperation in the Arctic as proof of diabolical American intentions.  
In her view, the Americans consistently considered undertaking the defence of the Arctic 
unilaterally and thought seriously of annexing certain Canadian islands.130 This 
judgement stems from a problematic reading of the primary sources.  In the end, this was 
a low-level planning document prepared by a low-ranking officer attached to a unit that 
was one small part of USAAF.  “Sweeping internally generated ‘think’ pieces, 
discussing hypothetical situations does not represent actual policy,” David Bercuson 
explained in a review of Grant’s book. “In fact, there is not a shred of evidence that any 
top-level US policy body ever disputed Canada’s claims to the Arctic Archipelago.”131 
While the paper investigated unilateral action in the Canadian Arctic, it actually 
concluded that Canadian sovereignty must be respected, even informally recognized by 
Washington.  The report advocated cooperation, not coercion or intimidation. 
The majority of Canadian officials understood that the Americans would not 
approve the sector principle.  U.S. proposals never suggested the acceptance of the 
principle and often implicitly rejected the theory.  One of the clearest examples of this 
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came in September 1946, when the American section of the PJBD announced the 
intention of the United States to establish a Great Circle Flying Route from the West 
Coast to Tokyo.  In presenting the proposal, General Henry explained to the Canadian 
Section:  
that these weather planes which would be doing a great deal of flying in 
the Arctic would not fly over territory between 60° and 142° without 
permission from Canada.  The State Department Representative said that 
this was not to be construed as acceptance by the United States 
Government of the Sector Theory and intimated that the State Department 
was concerned about the implication of this Theory in other parts of the 
world.  Possibly the selection of 142° as the Western limit rather than 
141° which is the boundary between Alaska and Canada, was made so as 
to avoid giving support to the Sector principle.  In any event, it is a matter 
of satisfaction that these planes will stay out of this territory in question 
unless Canadian permission is obtained.  Canadian claims in this area are 
at least implicitly recognized.132 
 
Like Hume Wrong, most officials in External Affairs recognized American concerns 
about the sector principle in the Antarctic and suggested not placing the U.S. government 
in a position where it had to officially reject Canada’s application of the theory in the 
Arctic.133  
Despite the desire of several prominent officials to adopt an activist approach to 
Arctic sovereignty, other public servants intervened before damage was done to the 
Canadian case.  On 8 May 1946, E.R. Hopkins, a member of External Affairs’ Third 
Political Division, advised that “we should not raise any question concerning our 
sovereignty in the Arctic in advance of necessity.” It did not make legal sense to cast 
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doubt about Canada’s own claims. Instead, the government required time to consolidate 
its knowledge about Arctic sovereignty and establish a firm position before it made any 
decision.134 Since the days of O.D Skelton, External Affairs had promised to update its 
file on sovereignty in the North. By the summer of 1946, the department still had done 
nothing.135 The government accepted Hopkins suggestion and soon officials started to 
articulate different ways to fortify Canada’s claims. 
 
Debating the Options  
 Given the relatively permanent nature of the Arctic weather stations and the long-
term plan proposed by the Americans, the most substantive discussions revolved around 
this proposed program.  A number of public servants believed that Canada should take 
full responsibility for the weather stations, erecting and operating all of the facilities 
itself.  The Northwest Territories Council questioned why Canada, after spending an 
obscene amount of money buying back all the wartime American bases in the North, 
would once again invite the U.S. into the region?136 Canada might as well construct, 
operate, supply and man the stations on her own, rather than spend money to purchase 
them from the U.S. later.137 The Minister of Mines and Resources took this idea seriously 
and rationalized to External Affairs that:  
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Canada should establish and operate any necessary stations even if U.S. 
official publications admit Canada’s sovereignty.  This looks like one of 
those defence (?) proposals that seem as though we were getting 
everything for nothing at the beginning and then we wake up after a 
while to find that the U.S. Senate has turned everything upside down 
and that the U.S diplomats are back again to ask us to pay for work we 
could have done better and more cheaply ourselves.”138 
 
After the joint weather stations conference in May, J.G. Wright, the Acting 
Superintendant of the Eastern Arctic, proposed that if Canada scraped the bottom of the 
barrel in the Meteorological Service and the military it might be able to find enough 
personnel to operate the stations.139  
Several Canadian officials recognized that it would be impossible for Canada to 
independently establish and operate such stations in the Arctic.  Representatives from 
Canada’s Meteorological Service complained that to supply the necessary personnel to 
operate the proposed station, they would have to close at least one, and possibly two, 
current stations.  Additionally, they doubted the likelihood of recruiting enough qualified 
personnel to staff all of the proposed Arctic stations.  Andrew Thomson and Commander 
Edwards noted that Canada’s position on sovereignty seemed “unduly cautious.”  
Edwards suggested that Canada really only needed to supply three of the ten staff 
members when the first stations were established.  In the ensuing years, this number 
could increase so that Canadians made up at least half of all weather station personnel.140 
In his sober appraisal, this personnel ratio would effectively protect Canada’s claims. 
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Other officials worried about the costs of the project.  Estimates for the 
construction of each station hovered around $200,000, and planners estimated annual 
operating costs of $465,000.141 During the war Canada ran up a debt of 
$16,807,000,000142 and by 1946 the Federal deficit remained at $2,452,000,000.143 The 
costs of Arctic defence seemed like an unnecessary burden to bear alone, especially 
when the U.S. Weather Bureau received substantial financing to build the stations.  
Furthermore, what would paying for the stations mean if Canada could not find sufficient 
personnel to operate them?  How would the Canadians supply these stations without the 
assistance of the United States Navy and Air Force? The Canadian Navy was noticeably 
absent in the Arctic and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) did not have the capacity 
to supply the stations by air.  Creating a Canadian transport capacity in the Arctic would 
require time and money, both of which were in short supply.   All of these factors 
pointed to one obvious solution: Canada needed to cooperate with the Americans. 
At the end of May, the Department of External Affairs produced a memorandum 
discussing the different courses of action available to Canada.144 Either the U.S. or 
Canada could undertake the weather station program independently, although 
sovereignty concerns and the huge price tag made this option unattractive.  The King 
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government could refuse to cooperate with the project, although this would elicit a strong 
reaction from the U.S. and, in a worst case scenario, could lead to unilateral American 
action.  The Canadians might defer decision on the program until a joint planning group 
could go over the plans and establish the specific parameters of the project.  Finally, 
approval could be given immediately for the program, with the stipulation that it be a 
joint project with as many Canadian observers as possible. 145  
None of the courses of action did enough to protect Canada’s sovereignty in 
External Affairs’ opinion.  It wanted to create a set of guidelines for the weather station 
program that would safeguard Canada’s claims and control over the Arctic.  
Acknowledging U.S. assurances that Canadian sovereignty would not be threatened, the 
Department suggested that the weather stations program be approved as a joint project so 
long as Canada controlled the stations, the U.S. had no vested interests or claims in the 
facilities, Canadians replaced American personnel as soon as possible, and the two 
countries shared the annual operating costs.146 Such an approach is reflective of the steps 
taken during the final years of the war to gain control of the defence projects in the 
Northwest. Using these tested methods, which resembled those adopted with the 
Northwest defence projects late in the war, the Canadians hoped to secure their 
sovereignty.   
A report prepared under the auspices of the Vice Chief of the General Staff, 
Major General D.C Spry, listed the same possible courses of action as the External 
Affairs memorandum.  The general embraced the idea of establishing a clear set of 
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formal guidelines for all defence projects in the North.  Spry added that the Americans 
should be required to seek permission before starting any exercise or project on or over 
Canadian territory, that the majority of personnel involved at permanent installations be 
Canadian, that Canadians participate in all projects (even if only as observers), and that 
any publicity on the projects stress their joint nature.147 The Cabinet Defence Committee 
accepted his recommendations at its meeting on 6 June 1946.148  At last, the Canadians 
seemed ready to offer the Americans a positive answer on their proposals for defence 
projects in the Arctic.  
 
Deferring the Decision 
 As Canadian officials discussed their preferred course of action, the United States 
attempted to hasten a Canadian decision.  At first the Americans tried to alleviate 
Canadian concerns by making the northern defence plans appear less threatening.  For 
instance, the original plan for the weather stations program called for extensive air 
facilities at the Melville Island site.  In early June, the Americans informed the Canadian 
government that “this programme has now been scaled down considerably.  Strategic Air 
Command have been put in charge instead of Air Transport Command and they do 
things more simply than the somewhat grandiose Air Transport people.” Strategic Air 
Command downgraded the proposed permanent airstrips to small scale temporary 
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ones.149 When these changes failed to elicit a quick and favourable Canadian response, 
the U.S. government began to apply more pressure to expedite the Canadian decision.150  
 Unwilling to make a decision without King, who was in England at the time, the 
Cabinet decided to defer decision on the weather stations at their meeting on 12 June 
1946.151 As the month went on, worries continued to surface about Canada’s interests 
and continental security.  On 21 June Pearson told Norman Robertson that he asked “the 
War Department…not press us too hard with urgent requests for quick action in the field 
of defence in the North.  I said that, while developments in the north were perhaps 
relatively small items in the defence plans of this country, they were for us matters of 
great importance, strategically and politically.”152 In a letter to Albert Heeney, Hume 
Wrong noted that the U.S. utilized “a number of different channels in an effort to extract 
a prompt and favourable decision.” The Canadian government was still in a precarious 
position.153  
 Prime Minister King returned from a trip to London to find the weather stations 
as one of the most pressing issues on his agenda.  After attending a meeting of Cabinet, 
King wrote in his diary that: 
Before Council was over, the question was brought up of the U.S. 
seeking to get certain weather stations established in our territory and 
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reference was made to a discussion of Council during my absence as to 
not allowing the Americans the use of Canadian territory for the 
protection of their own country. Gardiner had suggested that the 
exchange be made of the Panhandle on the Pacific Coast or certain 
islands on the North. I am not at all sure that the pan handle is not in 
many respects a very strong protection to our own country. However, 
apart from this, I told Council what I had said in conference with Attlee, 
Lord Addison and Ismay with respect to the arrangements that would 
have to be made on this continent between the Americans and ourselves 
for the protection of North America; that the British admitted they could 
not hope to hold their own against Russia without the aid of the U.S. 
Also the belief was very strongly that the only war that was likely to 
come in the future would be a war with Russia and would be a war for 
world conquest. In overtaking the U.S. the  Russians would make the 
base of operations - Canada, and on the whole we had to re-orient all our 
ideas about protection. I insisted there should be the fullest discussion 
with the British before we made any agreement with the U.S. which 
might affect the general plan, and also that we were not to be rushed in 
settlement on what was to be done. I said this whole matter needed the 
fullest possible discussion.154 
 
King clearly understood the magnitude of the situation.  Though he considered 
continental defence to be necessary, he would not rush into a decision without taking 
careful steps to protect his country’s interests - and his legacy.   
 At a Cabinet meeting on 27 June, King and his ministers decided to deny the 
American request to start the weather station program that summer.155 The Prime 
Minister emphasized that the government required more time to study the general 
problem of continental defence and to formulate a coherent policy.156 Despite the merits 
of the program, the absence of formal guidelines regulating the Canadian-American 
defence relationship and unresolved questions about the extent of Canada’s participation 
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in the project troubled the government.157 King would not take risks without an urgent 
threat forcing Canada’s hand.  His government adopted a cautious policy of delaying 
decisions on continental defence until the complex situation could be sorted out to 
Canada’s benefit.   
 On 2 July R.M. Macdonnell informed a disappointed Lewis Clark about the 
Canadian decision over the telephone, carefully noting that this “did not rule out future 
consideration of the project.” In his memorandum describing the Canadian decision, 
Macdonnell argued that “there were not lacking indications of developments not 
calculated to increase Canadian confidence in the intentions of some United States 
officials.  Some irresponsible enthusiasts in lower levels in Washington were known to 
have made ill considered remarks about the possibility of raising the Stars and Stripes in 
unoccupied Arctic territory.” The Americans had already collected vast amounts of 
material for the project and started to recruit personnel for service in the Arctic.  These 
hasty actions did little to alleviate Canadian concern about American intentions.  After 
hearing the decision, Clark relayed the disappointment of the U.S. government and 
Macdonnell concluded that the Americans would continue to place pressure on the 
Canadian government to accept defence plans.158   
As the summer months wore on, pressure on the Canadian government grew as 
the press slowly learned more about continental defence planning and the Arctic.159 In 
June, Kenneth R. Wilson’s Financial Post article appeared with the long and misleading 
title “Canada ‘Another Belgium’ In U.S. Air Bases Proposal?  Hear Washington Insists 
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Dominion’s Northern Frontier be Fortified - ‘Atomic Age Maginot Line’ is Feared.” 
Wilson wrote that the United States offered Canada a ‘virtual ultimatum’ to establish a 
massive air defence system in the North.  He noted that the King government denied 
British proposals for the establishment of a United Kingdom air training scheme in 
Canada prior to the war, but proved unwilling or unable to reject much more intrusive 
American defence plans in peacetime.160 Wilson argued that Canada should cooperate 
with the U.S., but also invest more resources in the North to safeguard its sovereignty. 
 Wilson’s article enraged King and his advisers.  Macdonnell characterized the 
article as “irresponsible and mischievous” and described the author’s assertion that the 
Americans gave Canada an ultimatum as “absurd.”161 King decided that the situation 
called for a public denouncement of the story in the House of Commons.  On 28 June, 
the Prime Minister reassured parliament that “this wholly misleading article contains so 
many serious inaccuracies that I am bound to take exception to it in the strongest terms.  
It is, of course, absurd to imagine that the government of the United States would present 
anything that could, by any stretch of the imagination, be described as an ultimatum.”162 
King explained that the PJBD was investigating joint defence problems, and he shared 
nothing more.   
Despite King’s public attack on his article, Wilson published another piece on 20 
July entitled “Ottawa Scotches U.S. Plan to Man Weather Bases in Canadian Arctic.” 
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Having gained access to insider information, Wilson provided detail about the proposed 
project and Ottawa’s rejection of it.163 An editorial emphasized that Wilson had received 
his information from “unimpeachable quarters” and that there “can now be no doubt 
whatever that very considerable pressures are being exerted on Canada by the United 
States” for defence projects in the North.  The editorial concluded that “the moral is 
clear: Canada must quickly get a policy of her own for developing the North or someone 
else may insist on doing it for us.”164   
 Pearson joined the public discussion with his 1946 article on the Canadian North 
in the popular journal Foreign Affairs, which tried to alleviate some of the sovereignty 
concerns raised in the press.165 Pearson explained that Canada used the sector principle 
to claim not only Canada’s northern mainland, but also the islands and the frozen sea up 
to the North Pole – the first public indication of maritime claims.  He emphasized the 
importance of continued cooperation in the Arctic, with the U.S. and other interested 
nations.166 The article left the reader with the distinct impression that the Americans 
respected Canada’s claims, but did not dispel all reporters’ concerns about American 
interests in the region.   
While the Canadian government dealt with difficult questions on the home front, 
the Americans shifted tactics.  In August and September American officials stopped 
pressuring the Canadians to accept continental defence proposals. Instead, they set about 
                                                
163 Kenneth Wilson, “Ottawa Scotches U.S. Plan to Man Weather Bases in Canadian Arctic,” Financial 
Post, 20 July 1946. 
164 Financial Post, 20 July 1946. 
165 Gordon Smith was not sure whether he had the government’s blessing or not for this article.   




reassuring their Canadian counterparts.  Major General Victor Henry wrote to Graham 
Parsons and explained why he felt the Canadians resisted the American defence plans.  
He argued that Canada’s response was shaped by the large costs, the perceived threat to 
sovereignty, the possibility of negative public opinion, unwillingness to desert the 
Commonwealth in favour of the U.S., and the fear of becoming another Belgium.  To fix 
these insecurities, he suggested, “Canadian public opinion must be convinced of a 
potential threat before the Dominion Government will feel fully justified in carrying out 
this new, and from a Canadian point of view, revolutionary policy.” Henry urged that the 
two countries reach an agreement in principle to alleviate Canadian fears.167 
 In early September, General Henry attempted to convince the Canadian section of 
the PJBD to sign on to continental defence.  The international situation dictated that the 
“security of the homeland of both Canada and the United States is unalterably bound up 
one with the other and will require the utmost of coordination.” He emphasized that the 
American High Command did not want to violate Canada’s sovereignty or its rights: it 
was a purely military problem that required joint defence cooperation.  Henry admitted 
that the civilian benefits of the weather stations also “fit into the military picture.”168 
Nevertheless, the Canadians continued to defer their decision.   
 As King struggled to manage the situation, Bernard Montgomery, the chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, paid a visit to Canada and met with the Prime Minister and key 
military personnel.  The old soldier, whom King held in high regard, insisted that there 
would be another war in ten to fifteen years. “There was no possibility of Russia 
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attempting to invade the North American continent at any time during the next fifteen 
years,” Montgomery noted, “but … she might attempt air raids either direct or from a 
base, or bases, established in the Arctic Islands.”169 Although the inaccessibility of the 
North provided some security for the continent, Montgomery thought that an air defence 
scheme should be implemented to thwart any Soviet raid across the northern approaches.  
When Montgomery hinted that Canadians should pay for the scheme, King told him “all 
development in the Canadian North was frightfully expensive, and he also explained the 
difficulty of securing large appropriations from Parliament for this purpose without 
disclosing the reason these appropriations were necessary.”170 Still, King kept the 
Americans waiting.  
 Although the Canadian government stubbornly refused to accept continental 
defence in principle and withheld permission for permanent projects like the weather 
stations, they appeased the Americans by approving less ambitious projects in the 
summer of 1946.  Despite misgivings about the Americans overflying the Arctic, the 
Cabinet Defence Committee (CDC) considered the proposal for Operation Polaris.  
According to secretary J.W.C Barclay, the Committee felt that since “these proposed 
flights would be primarily concerned with gaining experience in the operation of long 
range aircraft in the Arctic and the investigation of an analysis of matters relating hereto, 
the establishment of this air route would prove advantageous.”171 The CDC asked that 
publicity concerning the project be kept to a bare minimum, reflecting the Canadian 
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government’s extraordinary sensitivity about the public’s reaction to any disclosure of 
American presence in the North.172 Still, the Canadians, like their American counterparts, 
thought that if war broke out the type of experience provided by Polaris would be 
essential.   
 The Canadians granted permission for Operation Polaris on 8 June 1946.  
Macdonnell supported General Spry’s recommendation that “careful attention should be 
given to the form in which such permission is granted and to the manner in which such 
undertakings are carried out.”173 He made it clear in his letter that the government only 
approved the project as laid out by General Henry on 30 April.  He also mentioned that 
“it would be appreciated if an opportunity could be provided for the participation of 
Canadian observers in the flights in order to gain experience of mutual benefit.”174 The 
Americans accepted the restrictions placed on publicity and agreed to Canadian 
observers.   
 In the middle of June the Canadian government also approved Operation Nanook, 
the American naval exercise proposed earlier that year.  The Canadians wanted the USN 
to drop the ‘Operation Nanook’ title for the project and adopt something less military.  
This way, Canadian officials hoped that the press might emphasize the scientific nature 
of the operation.  They also requested that publicity be strictly regulated and that any 
proposed press releases be passed along to them.  Finally, the Canadians requested that 
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the Marine landing component of the operation be confined to Greenland.  If the U.S. 
needed to land Marines somewhere in the Canadian Arctic, the Canadians requested 
Dundas Harbour, where an RCMP detachment demonstrated Canadian sovereignty.175 
The Canadian decision to allow the United States to continue to operate certain 
weather stations in the southern portion of the Canadian North also encouraged the 
Americans.  They had abandoned most of the weather stations established for the 
Crimson Route following the war, but small numbers of U.S. personnel still operated 
several sites.  On 14 August 1946, Major General Henry requested permission for the 
United States to continue running weather stations at Padloping and Frobisher Bay on 
Baffin Island; Indian House Lake, Mingan, Fort Chimo and Mecatina in Quebec; and 
Cape Harrison in Labrador.176 In early September the issue came before the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee, which agreed to allow the U.S. to continue operating the requested 
stations, as well as one at River Clyde, on a temporary basis.  The Chiefs of Staff also 
wanted the Americans to use Canadian civilian personnel whenever possible.  Canada’s 
ultimate goal remained to operate all of these stations itself.177 In the meantime, the 
Canadians approved continued American involvement on 24 September.178  
 The Canadian military also began to strengthen its capabilities in the Arctic.  In 
the summer of 1946 the RCAF began to undertake more regular flight missions over the 
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region.  Its previous experience was limited.  In 1922 and 1928 representatives from the 
Canadian air force first travelled to the Arctic islands to investigate the feasibility of air 
operations.  Not until 1943, however, did the RCAF actually fly over the archipelago.179  
In August 1946, an RCAF B29 covered 3,467 nautical miles in twenty hours and 
explored some of the most remote and inaccessible parts of the Arctic, becoming the first 
plane to traverse some of the islands in the summer months.180 The crew noted inaccurate 
mapping and suggested that Borden Island might be two islands. This revealed how little 
the Canadians knew about their Arctic, and reaffirmed fears that the Americans or 
another country might find undiscovered islands in the archipelago.181   
 
Bringing the Canadians to the Table 
 As fall began the Americans grew more restless for action on the larger 
continental defence projects.  On 19 September 1946 the PJBD amended its 35th 
Recommendation to better protect the sovereignty of both countries.182 King, however, 
still refused to sign off on the recommendation.  He hoped to gain a better understanding 
of American defence plans for the Arctic before he agreed to any defence agreement.  
The Canadians continued to wonder if their ally planned on constructing the air defences 
in the Arctic called for by the MCC.   
                                                
179 Royal Canadian Air Force Operations in the Arctic Islands, DHH 75-50. 
180 B 29 Operations, Report on Reconnaissance of the Canadian Archipelago, Made During Flight No. 16, 
16-17 August 1946, K.R Greenway, Liaison Officer, B. 29 Detachment, Edmonton, 29 August 1946, DHH 
75-50;  Another Canadian operation in June 1946 also travelled throughout the Western Arctic in several 
small aircraft, Royal Canadian Air Force Operations in the Arctic Islands, DHH 75-50.  
181 The Canadian government also approved the establishment of the Joint Services Experimental Testing 
Station at Fort Churchill for the winter of 1946-1947. 
182 Memorandum for the Cabinet, 21 October 1946, LAC, RG 2, vol. 74, file D-19-2. 
 
 71 
By October, Dean Acheson, the acting Secretary of State, suggested to President 
Truman that the Canadians might require a nudge before they agreed to defence 
collaboration. “The planning and application of joint defence measures remains the most 
active of our current relations with Canada,” Acheson explained. “Our military 
authorities are naturally insistent on closing the gap between Alaska and Greenland and 
on pushing the defence of our industrial centers north of our border.  For this we are 
dependent on the cooperation of the Canadian government.” Acheson understood that 
this decision was a matter of great importance to the Canadians, who worried about the 
political risk and the danger it posed to their sovereignty.183 He urged the President to tell 
King that the civilian members of the U.S. Administration, and not just the military, 
wanted more defence cooperation.184  
 As the State Department grew increasingly anxious, the Canadian government 
tried to figure out what American defence planners required of Canada.  Hume Wrong 
observed that the Canadians still did not have a very clear understanding of U.S. 
planning or American conclusions about the Soviet threat.  Wrong also commented to 
King that there “is still…a lot to be learned in Washington about our position and our 
problems.” Closer military cooperation was necessary, but Wrong did not believe that 
such a relationship should be based on the current defence appreciation created by the 
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MCC. 185  He urged King to tell the President that the Canadians wanted high level 
diplomatic discussions.  
 During a meeting at the White House on 28 October 1946, Truman attempted to 
get King on the same page about continental defence.  The President stressed the need 
for cooperation, and brought up the Arctic weather stations and the U.S. plans for a large 
air base at Goose Bay, Labrador.  Truman approached the situation calmly and did not 
place undue pressure on the Prime Minister.  The next day, however, King received an 
oral communiqué from the President that presented quite a different message.  Truman 
urged the Canadians to quickly approve the defence scheme created by the MCC and to 
concur to PJBD Recommendation 35 and its principles regulating continental defence.186   
 On 12 November 1946, Lester Pearson responded.  Any discussion on defence 
needed to take into consideration the world political situation, and the fact that Canada 
could not escape a global conflict if one broke out.  It would be extremely difficult to 
work out a tolerable relationship with the Soviet Union as long as it was “governed by 
ruthless despots” and inhabited by “millions of fighting men to whom life is hard and 
cheap.” War remained unlikely in the next few years, but “the way the world is now 
going, there can only be one ultimate result – war.”187 Canada had obligations in 
continental defence, Pearson stressed, and had to cooperate with the Americans.  It was 
time to commit. 
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American threat assessments remained more alarmist than those prepared by 
Canadians.  Senior American military men publically advocated a large-scale Arctic air 
defence system.  A speech by General Kenney, Commander of Strategic Air Command, 
in mid-November gave the Canadians a glimpse of American strategic thinking.  He 
envisaged a war beginning with a series of simultaneous attacks in the model of Pearl 
Harbor designed to knock out the centers of production.  Keeney told his audience to:  
Turn to the north.  There on the other side of the Polar Basin are four-
fifths of the people of the world in Europe and Asia.  There is where the 
attack will come from if some future Hitler makes a bid for world 
dominion…And make no mistake – we will be the primary target for the 
modern 10,000 mile bomber and its load of atomic bombs or bacteria or 
incendiaries or whatever weapons of mass destruction are in vogue at that 
time…It does not take much imagination to see an avalanche of 
devastation launched across the Polar Basin to take out our centers of 
industry and population at a single blow.  
 
Four of the bombs used on Hiroshima could destroy all of New York City. With a few 
hundred the casualty list across the United States could reach 25,000,000.188 These 
statements concerned the Canadians, who saw the threat of enemy action as well as an 
ally potentially interested in establishing massive air defences in Canada’s Arctic.  
During meetings of the Cabinet Defence Committee on 14 and 15 November, 
officials debated Canada’s next move.  They urged that Canada accept Recommendation 
35 to give the two countries some principles on cooperation with which to work. Before 
Canada made any decision on defence collaboration, however, diplomatic negotiations 
were needed.  Air Marshall Robert Leckie vehemently disagreed with Air Vice Marshall 
Wilfred Curtis, the Canadian chairman of the MCC, who supported more expansive air 
                                                




defence.  While most Canadian planners anticipated that any assault on North America 
would be diversionary, the Americans wanted to prepare for a large-scale attack.  Leckie 
told the assembled senior officials that he could not accept the financial implications of 
the program envisioned by the MCC, and suggested Canada push for more modest plans. 
Brooke Claxton, who in a month would become the Minister of National Defence, 
reminded all present of the fundamental difference between the viewpoints of the 
Americans and Canadians.189 In the end, the Canadians wanted to accept the principles of 
defence cooperation as proposed by the PJBD, but remained wary of American 
intentions for the Arctic.   
On 21 November 1946, senior Canadian and American officials, led by Pearson 
and Atherton, met to lay the groundwork for high-level defence discussions.  The group 
decided that the discussion would seek to answer Canadian concerns and include topics 
such as defence estimates of enemy capabilities, global strategy, and details on 
continental defence planning.190 The Americans wished to avoid discussing Arctic 
sovereignty and particularly the sector principle,191 again indicating that this was not a 
basis upon which they could officially support Canada’s claims. By the end of 
November, R.M. Macdonnell had finished his pivotal report on Soviet intentions, 
advocating a policy of firmness and cautious anticipation.192 The Canadians used the 
paper as the starting point for their discussions with the Americans.    
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On 16 and 17 December 1946 senior Canadian officials found themselves sitting 
in the Chateau Laurier in Ottawa with their American counterparts, looking to hammer 
out a deal on bilateral defence cooperation.  Canada, a country that traditionally favoured 
multilateral or tripartite agreements, had come to the negotiating table prepared to 
compromise.  Of all the defence meetings between the Canadians and Americans 
following the war, this one stands out as the most important.  Over two cold winter days, 
the allies worked out the principles for a defence relationship that would last for years 
and had a significant impact on Canadian interests and sovereignty.  Out of the meeting 
emerged an informal relationship, based on careful negotiations and agreement. “In the 
all important area of joint defence planning, both sides agreed that all the defence plans 
were ‘somewhat utopian’ and that their implementation had to be ‘decided step by step,’ 
with the rate of implementation ‘under constant review,’” concluded David Bercuson.193 
The Canadians also discovered that the Americans had little interest in creating a vast air 
defence system, which undoubtedly soothed their anxieties.194 
 The Americans conducted the meeting in a friendly and informal manner, 
sending some of their best men for the occasion - including George Keenan, the resident 
Russian expert.195 Political scientist Denis Smith has asserted that “as the diplomatic 
catalyst of the policy of firmness, and the American diplomat most respected by the 
Canadian Department for his judgement of the Soviet Union, Keenan was an inspired 
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choice for the American delegation.”196 These men made a reasonable case and allowed 
the Canadians to draw their own conclusions.  They did not attempt to “present demands 
or to insist on certain things being done.”197 Indeed, the Americans behaved impeccably. 
“So far from being in an excitable or panicky frame of mind, the Americans had 
shown themselves very cool, level headed and realistic,” a Canadian report on the 
meeting observed.198 The American contingent told the Canadians that, while they did 
not believe a war would break out in the near future, measures should be taken to 
safeguard the continent. “In their general game of power politics Russians usually carried 
on with their bludgeoning tactics until ‘A quarter of an hour before midnight,’ and only 
modified their policy at the last minute.”199 The North American continent required 
defences if they decided to go “five minutes past midnight.”  The Americans believed 
that Arctic defences were long-term insurance, and they promised that any defence plan 
would proceed cautiously and gradually year by year, based on the international 
situation.200 The Canadians questioned the Americans extensively about their global 
strategy and were pleased to hear that the U.S. strategic focus remained offensive in 
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nature.201 For the most part, Canadian and American officials at the meeting saw eye-to-
eye on Soviet intentions and the steps required to counter the communist threat.  
The Americans also told the Canadians exactly what they had in mind for the 
North.  They did not want to dash into grandiose proposals, but “seemed as anxious as 
the Canadians to keep the whole business as modest as possible.”202 The U.S. wanted 
weather and Loran stations in the Arctic, but Pearson acknowledged that these proposals 
were moderate and benign.  Financing would be discussed for each specific proposal and 
allotted proportionately. “The general intention,” he explained, “would be that the 
Canadians should themselves finance in toto any measures which they themselves would 
have undertaken for their own purposes apart altogether from United States interest.”203 
The American proposals would do little to burden Canada’s budget and they promised to 
assist in the development of the North.   
Pearson felt that this quieter tempo on the part of the Americans resulted largely 
from six months stalling on the Canadian side.204 The Americans recognized Canadian 
insecurities about sovereignty and made the price of defence cooperation significantly 
easier to bear.  They agreed on a policy of firmness and patience.  Accordingly, Canada 
finally committed to a joint continental defence agreement.  Canada’s de jure 
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sovereignty would be protected and its rights respected.  As the defence relationship 
between the two countries began to heat up, however, and the Arctic became the scene of 
more activity, the Canadian government again worried about its de facto sovereignty. 
Paper agreements were important, but Canada still needed to maintain control of 




















Chapter 3:   Letting the Americans In 
 
Making it Official: Announcing Defence Cooperation 
 After the Chateau Laurier meeting, the Canadian policy-makers lost some of their 
reservations about cooperating with the United States in continental defence.  Worries 
about the Americans initiating large scale defence projects in the North of the type 
envisaged by the Military Cooperation Committee quickly disappeared.  The British 
were also onside. Upon hearing about the Canadian decision to fully participate in 
continental defence, Lord Arthur Tedder, Chief of the Air Staff in England, argued that 
“the Chiefs of Staff saw no particular dangers and many advantages in the course which 
[the Canadians] had taken.”  The situation would, of course, have to be watched and the 
Canadians needed to be careful not to devote too much of their effort and resources in 
the Arctic.205 Knowing that the British High Command supported a continental 
orientation, the Canadian government and military certainly felt more at ease embracing 
the defence relationship with the U.S.   
 On 16 January 1947 the Canadian Cabinet approved the final version of 
Recommendation 35 of the PJBD, which laid out regulatory principles for the continental 
defence projects.  Renamed Recommendation 36, the document represented, in the 
words of historian David Bercuson, “an explicit U.S assurance to Canada that the United 
States had no wish to violate the de jure sovereignty Canada claimed over the north.”206 
All defence projects would remain under the control of the host country, no permanent 
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rights would be granted to the visiting forces, and both countries would study each 
project individually and approve all public statements about the defence projects.207 The 
Recommendation ensured that the principles of bilateral defence cooperation 
safeguarded Canada’s sovereignty and protected its interests.   
 The Canadians and Americans had different views about the need to publicize 
this new defence relationship.  This subject elicited more debate than any other topic at 
the Chateau Laurier meeting.  While the Americans only wanted to allude to the 
Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940 in the press to emphasize the continuing nature of 
defence cooperation, “the Canadian representatives succeeded in convincing the United 
States representatives that because of the interest that had been displayed by the public in 
northern defence problems, it would be impossible to avoid some sort of statement at the 
forthcoming Session of Parliament.”208 The Canadians desired a simple announcement 
that the two countries cooperated for defence purposes.  They hoped that this would 
avoid provocative press reports calling into question Canada’s sovereignty and its 
inability to withstand pressure from the Americans.   
  Of course, the press continued to speculate on the Canadian-American 
relationship.  In December 1946 journalist Leslie Roberts claimed that Canada was far 
more concerned with American ‘militarism’ than Soviet expansionism.  Roberts 
explained that “pressure has come from the American naval, military, and meteorological 
authorities who want to go ahead with their own plans without regard for our 
sovereignty.” By January the article fell on the desk of the Acting High Commissioner 
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for Canada in Canberra, Australia.  In a reply to the Commissioner’s queries about the 
article, R.M. Macdonnell stated that “the attitude of the United States Government 
towards Canadian sovereignty could not be more reasonable and sympathetic and all our 
discussions with them on questions of joint defence have been carried on in an 
atmosphere of complete cordiality and reasonableness.” Macdonnell quoted a recent 
report prepared by External Affairs, which acknowledged that “it is some years since 
there has been any table pounding in defence discussion between the two countries.”209 
Despite its inflammatory statements, however, the Canadian government did not believe 
that the article would do it great harm.  Nevertheless, External Affairs recommended that 
Canada should issue a reasoned and carefully prepared publicity statement on its defence 
relationship with the United States.210  
 On 12 February 1947 the Prime Minister and the President made joint statements 
about the general principles of defence cooperation.  In his speech to parliament, King 
avoided controversial subjects like the sector principle, while insisting that Canada’s de 
jure sovereignty had been secured. He explained that “as an underlying principle all 
cooperative arrangements will be without impairment of the control of either country 
over all activities in its territory.” King also noted that the United States had not 
demanded air bases in the North, nor had they suggested the establishment of an “Arctic 
Maginot Line.”  He stressed that both countries simply wished to learn more about the 
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Arctic and gain experience in the region.211 The government maintained that the new 
northern program was primarily civilian in nature, with the armed forces assuming a 
supporting role.   
  After King announced in the House of Commons that sovereignty would be 
protected, the press started to support defence cooperation.  On 14 February 1947 The 
Times wrote an article on North American security that emphasized the growing 
importance of the North and the interdependence of Canada and the U.S.  The author 
noted that Canadian-American cooperation “is the formal expression of a geographical 
necessity and is wholly compatible with the United Nations Charter.”212 Canadian 
newspapers such as the Montreal Star echoed these sentiments.213 With this support, 
Canadian decision-makers granted the U.S. permission to undertake more permanent 
defence programs in the North.   
 
Establishing Control 
 By most accounts the U.S. military behaved responsibly in carrying out defence 
projects in the North after the summer of 1946.  Relations remained generally positive 
between personnel on joint missions and the largest American effort, the naval cruise in 
the Arctic, had accomplished most of its objectives and adhered carefully to Canadian 
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guidelines.214 Regardless, many Canadian officials worried about Canada’s ability to 
control current U.S. missions.  While observers on the naval cruise did not condemn 
American actions, they noted the unwillingness of low ranking military personnel to 
wholeheartedly cooperate with the Canadians.  Lt. W.E. Widdows revealed that “the 
Observers were treated with courtesy, but on the whole it was felt that they were 
considered merely as passengers.  Information was never volunteered, and when given as 
a result of a direct question, seemed to be with reluctance.”215  Another observer, Lt. 
Dunn Lantier, complained that the Americans often refused to discuss operational 
matters with the observers and even forbade the Canadians from entering the navigation 
bridge.  The eyes and ears of the Canadian government were left feeling that the 
Americans considered them to be “very much in the way.”216 Any such tendency to 
disrespect or ignore Canadian participation worried Ottawa.  
 Despite gaining solid assurances protecting Canada’s claims in the Arctic during 
the defence negotiations of late 1946 and early 1947, and the great attentiveness the 
Americans had shown to Canada’s concerns, Canadian officials feared that their 
counterpart’s sensitivity might fade.  As a result, the government carefully crafted out 
agreements on individual defence projects to ensure the greatest level of Canadian 
control.  Canadian officials continued to monitor all American activities in the region to 
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ensure nothing happened that called into question Canada’s de facto sovereignty in the 
Arctic. 
 In late 1946, Canadian officials, especially in the Department of Mines and 
Resources and the Northwest Territories Administration, began to ponder how Canada 
could best maintain its control of developments in the Arctic.  While their counterparts at 
External Affairs obsessed over Canada’s de jure sovereignty, these officials focused on 
de facto control.  In late November 1946, J. Wright insisted that the Americans be forced 
to follow NWT Administration’s laws and regulations protecting the Natives and 
wildlife.  Other officials asked that RCMP detachments be established around the new 
stations.217 In mid-December, R. A. Gibson recommended that any American scientists 
working in the North should be required to obtain an Explorers and Scientists 
Ordinance.218 If followed, these actions would cement Canada’s de facto sovereignty. 
 In a letter dated 11 March 1947, D.M Johnson informed the U.S Embassy of the 
specific Northwest Territories rules and regulations that all American personnel involved 
in Arctic operations would be expected to follow.  These included the Game Laws of the 
Arctic Preserve, the Scientists and Explorers Ordinance, and the Archaeological Sites 
Ordinance of the Northwest Territories Administration.  Section 48 of the Game Laws 
forbade all but the Inuit from hunting in the Arctic Game Preserve.  Section 40 insisted 
that no auto-loading rifles could be taken into the territories and prohibited automatic 
pistols.  Revolvers required a permit from the RCMP.  The Archaeological Sites 
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Ordinance held that no site could be excavated or relics taken from the territories without 
a license from the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories.  Johnson insisted that this 
ordinance applied to all personnel at the defence stations and to any visiting scientists.  
Finally, any scientists attached to Arctic operations would need to attain special 
permission from the Northwest Territories.219  
 Insisting that the Americans followed Canadian laws, especially rules specific to 
the North, represented the most effective assertion of Canada’s de facto control of the 
region.  The games laws, in particular, were a clear indication of sovereignty.  Before the 
Americans could hunt in the Arctic (something they always wished to do), they had to 
secure the approval of External Affairs or the Department of Mines and Resources.  In 
May 1947, for instance, the American military sought permission for men posted at the 
desolate weather stations to supplement their diets by hunting caribou.  J.P Richard, the 
Deputy Commissioner of the Eastern Arctic, argued that “if each gets one caribou they 
will be doing much better than anyone else who will be living in that part of the country 
– or for that matter anywhere else in the northland.  How many families in Canada these 
days get the amount of food that the army personnel will get in the north, and at that 
Canada is supposed to be one of the best fed countries in the world.”220 The Canadians 
rejected this request and the U.S. accepted the decision. Interestingly enough, the 
original creators of the Arctic Game Preserve hoped it would uphold Canada’s 
sovereignty.  As O.D Skelton described in 1926, “Aside from its immediate purpose, this 
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Preserve should prove of distinct value as an assertion of our sovereignty in the North 
and it is all the more valuable because apparently arising as a normal active police 
administration.”221 At the least, the American willingness to follow Canadian laws 
represented an implicit recognition of Canadian sovereignty in the region. 
 The Canadian government also asserted its control over the Arctic using the 
parameters it established for specific projects.  In late February, Cabinet finally approved 
the Arctic weather stations program.  On 4 March, C.D Howe announced to the House of 
Commons that nine weather stations would be built over the next three years in the 
Canadian archipelago.  He described the beneficial role weather stations would play in 
agriculture, lumber, transportation and the determination of feasible air routes over the 
polar regions.  Howe also noted that Canada’s climate and weather is affected more by 
the Arctic than any other point on the compass.  Furthermore, the Soviet Union 
established a large number of weather stations on their side of the Arctic, and Canada 
hoped to work with the USSR and the other polar countries in exchanging 
meteorological data.  This message reaffirmed the theme that this program was not 
aggressively military, and might actually promote circumpolar cooperation.  Finally, 
Howe commented on the long range forecasting capabilities the stations would give to 
the United States.  As a result, the Americans wanted to assist in the construction of the 
stations, which would always remain under Canadian control.222  
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 In early February the Canadians began debating the American proposal to initiate 
a low frequency long range aid to navigation (Loran) program for the North American 
Arctic.  The Cabinet Defence Committee concluded that the stations could significantly 
improve navigation for ships and aircraft operating in the Arctic.  The Loran stations 
acted as a series of interdependent ‘lighthouses’ which ships or aircraft could use to 
pinpoint their position through a triangulation.  By sending out a message to an aircraft 
from a tower and measuring the time of the echo from that tower with the time of an 
echo from two to three other stations, an aircraft could determine its exact position using 
measurements running into the millionths of seconds.223 If the Canadians decided to 
operate the stations independently, however, they would cost $2,670,000 in 1947-1948 
and $900,000 annually thereafter.224 On 27 February, the Cabinet accepted the financial 
contribution offered by the U.S. and authorized the construction of three Loran stations 
in the Canadian North. 
The agreements worked out between the Canadians and Americans for the 
weather stations and Loran project contained stringent guidelines to protect Canada’s 
sovereignty.  Most importantly, at least half of the personnel serving at the stations had 
to be Canadian, as did the commanding officer at each station.225 External Affairs 
insisted that Canadians be in charge of the operations in the Arctic, and argued that as 
soon as qualified Canadian personnel could be trained, they would replace the 
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Americans.226 Other provisions ensured that Canada retained title to all permanent 
installations.  The U.S. would pay for all of the special equipment needed at the stations 
and provide all of the transportation and supply services.227 Canada would cover other 
costs.  For example, in the Loran program the Canadian government provided all of the 
materials and equipment except the radio towers, Loran sets and motor transport 
vehicles.  Canada paid for all permanent facilities, and thus ensured its clear title to 
them.228 
 Despite the importance placed on increasing the Canadian presence on these 
projects, a lack of qualified Canadian personnel was an immediate problem.  Canada 
scrounged for the personnel required to provide half of the staff at the two weather 
stations established in 1947.  Nonetheless, most government officials concluded that a 
sufficient number of technicians could be trained to staff the stations before the 
conclusion of a five year period.229 In January 1947, however, Cabinet approved a three 
year plan to take over operation of the U.S.-run weather stations in northeastern 
Canada.230 A lack of Canadian personnel forced the government to allow the U.S. to 
operate these stations independently.  They required an increased Canadian presence and 
personnel would take over these stations before they ventured to new facilities.  In light 
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of this need, the government’s desire to fully staff the arctic stations within five years 
was overly optimistic. 
 Some Canadian officials looked at the situation more realistically.  Mr. Cameron, 
a member of the Department of Transport (DOT), understood that it would be impossible 
to replace the American personnel in the near future.  In fact, Cameron stressed the 
advantages of having some Americans at Eureka Sound and Winter Harbour: “after all, 
the U.S was responsible for supplies and transport and obviously their interest and their 
ability to obtain appropriations would be greater if American personnel were at these 
stations.”231 Canada’s inability to transport supplies in the region made it dependent on 
American assistance.    
  The Loran program suffered from a more acute shortage of Canadian personnel.  
At the 13 March joint Loran conference, the Canadians acknowledged that they could 
not provide enough personnel in the first 18 months to make a significant contribution to 
the project.  Many of the trained Canadians could not be removed from southern 
experimental stations.  Nevertheless, Canadian control and participation in the project 
would be enforced through the presence of a Canadian commanding officer at each 
station.  Additionally, although construction of the stations was to be in the hands of the 
United States Corps of Engineers, Canada remained in charge of all civilian contractors 
hired out.232 This still ensured a modicum of Canadian control.  
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 Officials also worried about the military nature of the two projects and the public 
perception that a new wave of American soldiers entered the North.  L.E. Coffey, a radio 
engineer attending the 13 March Loran conference for the DOT, wrote that the 
Canadians required a way to minimize the role of the U.S. Forces in the program and 
find a means of “giving the Loran project a Civil appearance also.” Coffey suggested 
showcasing the project as a joint RCAF and DOT effort to the public, with the 
understanding that the air force would actually execute the project.233 The Minister of 
National Defence, Brooke Claxton, also worried that the large number of military aircraft 
used for the weather stations and the Loran program might cause the public to perceive a 
new American ‘invasion’ of the North.  He argued that the planes should not be allowed 
to fly over heavily populated areas or fly in formation.  Whereas before the Americans 
planned to use fifty C-54’s at a time, the Canadians managed to get them to limit that 
number to fifteen.234 Throughout the post war years the government took many such 
measures to ensure that the public did not begin to think Canada had lost control of its 
Arctic to the American military.   
 After working out the overall parameters for the weather stations, the two 
countries set about drafting a note on the program.  The Canadians immediately took 
issue with the first draft, which seemed to indicate that the Canadians asked permission 
to take part in an American program.  The note required clarification so that it gave a 
more accurate impression of the cooperative nature of the project and highlighted that 
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Canada had invited the United States onto its territory.235 As the two countries struggled 
to formalize a note on the weather stations, an informal agreement with strict guidelines 
would be enough for 1947.    
 Work on a formal note for the Loran program also continued.  The initial 
proposal protected Canadian sovereignty and ensured that personnel at the stations would 
be subject to Canadian law, but one clause stated that if Canada lost interest in the 
stations the U.S. could take them over at its own expense, as long as they remained under 
Canadian control.  J. Wright of the Northwest Territories Administration worried that 
this section granted perpetual rights to the United States to operate stations in Canadian 
territory.  He argued that the note should indicate that the Americans could take over the 
stations, but only after careful review by both countries.236 The challenges of reaching a 
formal agreement proved insurmountable for the first year of the Loran project as well, 
and an informal agreement regulated the stations for the time being.       
 
Maintaining a Dominant Position at Churchill 
 The Loran program and the Arctic weather installations remained the primary 
concern of the Canadian government in 1947, but other projects also kept officials busy.  
In mid-February a PJBD report emphasized the success of the program at Churchill and 
the importance of the Fort’s accessibility, isolation and geographic terrain.  The Board 
noted that “only at Fort Churchill is it at present possible for personnel of the Armed 
Forces of Canada and the United States to acquire the experience of working together 
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under arctic conditions in a terrain similar to that prevailing throughout a large 
proportion of the northern approaches to the continent.”237 The joint testing facility did 
not cause Canadians the same type of sovereignty concerns as the stations in the high 
Arctic, and its location far away from the major centers of population in the south 
avoided raising the ire of the Canadian public over American troops stationed on 
Canadian soil.  Still, the Canadian government did its utmost to retain control at the Fort.   
 Canadian officials did an admirable job of ensuring that daily life at the Fort did 
not diminish Canada’s sovereignty.  The Canadian High Command ensured that all of 
the American troops stationed at the Fort understood the chain of command, including 
the Canadian officers from whom they took orders.238 Both the Canadian and American 
commanders at the Fort insisted that U.S personnel follow Canadian rules and 
regulations.   
When the Canadian section of the PJBD visited Churchill on 24 February 1947, 
they noted the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes flying side by side at the Fort.  The 
flag issue may seem small and insignificant in retrospect, but the American tendency to 
fly the stars and stripes at bases on Canadian soil without a Canadian counterpart had 
caused consternation in Ottawa during the war.  General Henry of the PJBD, realizing 
Canada’s sensitivity about foreign flags flying over its soil, guaranteed the Canadian 
section that at all installations where “the flag of the United States is flown…the 
Canadian flag – will also be flown- both flags to be approximately the same size and 
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from staffs of equal height under identical conditions and rendered correspondingly 
appropriate honours.”239  
Although the Americans made good on their promise at Churchill, the Canadian 
section of the PJBD still believed that the use of the Union Jack did nothing to strengthen 
Canada’s position.  They agreed that it would be best to examine the possibility of flying 
the red ensign rather than the Union Jack to remind all visitors about who really 
controlled the Fort.240 The PJBD recalled Order-in-Council P.C 5888 of 5 September 
1945, which read in part “that it shall be appropriate to fly the Canadian Red Ensign 
within and without Canada wherever place or occasion may make it desirable to fly a 
distinctive Canadian flag.” Given the present situation at Fort Churchill, the Canadian 
section of the PJBD recommended that the red ensign be flown to provide a distinctive 
Canadian marking.241 This way, none of the American personnel stationed at Churchill 
would be confused about which country controlled the Fort.  
 Canadian officials also attempted to control the number of Americans posted at 
Churchill.  By the winter of 1947 the U.S. Army planned to post an additional 500 troops 
at Churchill.  The Americans got ahead of themselves, and the New York Tribune ran a 
story in early March which asserted that the U.S. Army would shortly be sending 
additional personnel to Churchill.  Graham Parsons, the American secretary of the PJBD, 
commented on the press story, claiming “Tip the Gen’l off – tell him the story is out.  
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(This may be quite awkward since we do not yet have permission to get these troops etc. 
in there).”242 Indeed, the Canadian government rejected the proposal.  The original 
agreement for the Joint Services Experimental Station allowed for 450 Canadian 
servicemen to be posted at the Fort alongside about 100 U.S servicemen.  With an 
additional 500 troops, the US servicemen would outnumber the Canadians on the base: a 
situation the King government desperately wanted to avoid.243 Canada carefully 
defended its dominant position at Churchill, as it would do throughout the early Cold 
War.   
 In April 1947 the Canadians and Americans also discussed financial plans for 
Churchill.  The fort was in rough shape and required a water and sewage system, 
improved barrack accommodations, and married quarters.  To meet these new 
requirements, the United States offered $350,000 and told the Canadian section of the 
PJBD that an agreement about the use of the money could be worked out between 
service personnel at the Fort.  The Americans did not want a formal and publicized 
diplomatic agreement that would inform the public about the amounts of money the U.S. 
poured into joint defence projects.244 Canada seemed to have everything to gain in 
accepting the U.S. initiative, especially when the Americans promised to provide the 
necessary tradesmen to carry out the construction program at Churchill.  The Cabinet 
Defence Committee discussed the American offer at its meeting on 5 May 1947, and 
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assessed that the $399,000 included in the Canadian budget for additional facilities could 
not cover all of the construction projects at Churchill.  The Chief of the General Staff, 
Charles Foulkes, recognized the poor living conditions and agreed that the proposed 
American arrangement offered the best opportunity for improving the fort, as long as 
care was “taken to ensure that the programme was kept under Canadian control.” The 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, noted that the plan “deviated 
somewhat from the generally accepted principle that Canada should pay for permanent 
facilities at joint defence establishments.” Nevertheless, the relatively small amount 
offered and the results seemed to justify accepting the American assistance.245 The CDC 
noted that the isolated operation at Churchill differed from the large-scale integrated 
continental systems like weather and Loran stations.  A precedent at Churchill would not 
have the same impact as one established for these stations.   
 The CDC decided to accept the American funds on 9 May 1947, so long as “no 
one in Canada, nor the U.S.A, could say that the U.S.A had acquired a vested interest.” If 
the Americans ever wanted to withdraw any items of equipment purchased with its 
funds, it could do so.246 Within weeks, the Americans and Canadians began to improve 
the facilities at Fort Churchill.  The U.S. never claimed permanent rights to the Fort, 
demonstrating that Canadian actions were appropriate.  
 
Establishing the Weather and Loran Stations 
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 Canada and the United States agreed to establish two weather stations (one at 
Winter Harbour, Melville Island and the other at Eureka Sound, Ellesmere Island) in 
1947.247 On 7 April representatives of the U.S. Weather Bureau and the Canadian 
Meteorological Service found an appropriate site at Eureka Sound and American aircraft 
from Greenland began to deliver materials to the site. By July, station personnel 
established a temporary airstrip and began weather reporting.  That same month, a small 
convoy of USN ships, consisting of the icebreakers USS Edisto and USS Whitewood and 
the transport ship Wyandot, brought permanent buildings, additional supplies, and a 
fuller complement of staff.  One American inspecting the Eureka site characterized 
relations between the American and Canadian personnel during the construction phase as 
“good.”248  By the time winter approached, the permanent installations were up and 
running at Eureka Sound.   
While the Eureka Sound operation went smoothly, the problems experienced in 
the establishment of the second weather station highlighted both the difficulties of 
operating in the Arctic and the limited assistance that Canada could provide in remote 
regions.  The Canadians and Americans hoped to make the proposed station at Winter 
Harbour the central hub for the whole program.  The personnel for this station (eight 
Canadians, eight Americans and one RCMP constable) travelled on the Wyandot, as did 
most of the equipment.  Heavy ice, however, stopped the Edisto at 108° West longitude 
in Barrow Strait.  On 15 August the Edisto started west to find its way to Winter Harbour 
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through the Viscount Melville Sound, but it suffered damage to both propellers.  Without 
a hope of reaching Winter Harbour, Canadian and American officials quickly looked for 
an alternate site.  By the end of August they agreed on Resolute Bay on Cornwallis 
Island.  This spot could accommodate an airstrip, it could be reached by sea, and its 
central location (compared to an alternate site on Devon Island) allowed it to support 
future Arctic operations.249 Unfortunately the Canadian government had little presence in 
this part of the Arctic and could offer little to no information about the ice conditions, so 
the USN had to learn many things on its own.  The inability of the Canadian government 
to offer assistance in the region diminished its de facto sovereignty.  
 During the initial construction operations Canada found few reasons to complain 
as the Americans tried to respect Canadian sovereignty.  The Americans handled all of 
the heavy lifting in the Arctic, but they still made decisions on a joint basis.  On 13 June, 
before the naval supply expedition even set out, Colonel J. Donald Cleghorn, eventually 
the Official in Charge (OIC) of the weather station at Resolute Bay, told J. Wright, “that 
he gained the impression from the general attitude of certain high-ranking U.S Service 
personnel (not civilian) that the establishment of these weather stations was largely a U.S 
matter and that Canadians were being taken along largely as matter of courtesy.”250 
Nevertheless, the lack of complaints from the Canadian observers about American 
conduct reflects that the latter remained on their best behaviour throughout the 
construction phase.   
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 According to historian Kenneth Eyre, the construction of the Loran stations 
underlined the difficulties of work in the northern environment and the lack of planning 
and coordination between the civilian and military agencies involved.251 To a certain 
degree the same problems plagued the establishment of the weather stations and the other 
northern defence projects of the early post war years.  The Americans and Canadians 
decided to establish the master Loran station at Kittigaziut at the mouth of the Mackenzie 
River, the slave station at Cambridge Bay, and the monitoring station at Sawmill Bay.252 
While the master and monitoring stations proved unproblematic given their relative 
accessibility, the slave station at Cambridge Bay posed problems.  Nasty weather 
conditions kept the airfield from going operational until late April.  The airfield became 
especially important when no USN or commercial ships could be found for the mission, 
and the Americans had to airlift all of the material to the remote site.  Once the USAF 
finished its transportation duties, construction crews inexperienced with the arctic 
environment struggled to get the station up and running.  When the RCAF brought in 
two bulldozers for construction, the Canadians forgot to supply operators and the 
equipment went unused until a specialist was brought in from southern Canada.253 
Despite these difficulties, the Cambridge Bay Loran station became operational in the 
fall.   
 
Flying the Flag in the Arctic and Managing Publicity 
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 While the USN shuttled in supplies and equipment for the weather stations into 
the Arctic, the Canadian navy began discussing the possibility of sending its own 
expedition into the northern waters.  The USN operated in the Arctic waters as far west a 
Melville Sound, an area which no ship of the RCN had ever entered.  Canadian 
sovereignty and control in the Arctic was certainly not strengthened by the American 
supply missions.  At a Naval Staff meeting on 21 April 1947 planners considered a 
cruise into Hudson Strait and Hudson Bay and concluded that “in light of the present 
situation in the Canadian Arctic it is considered that such a cruise would be of benefit to 
the Canadian defence programme.” Naval officers understood that the north was 
increasing in importance, and the RCN should acquire a capability in the area sooner 
rather than later.254  
After the war the RCN discussed the idea of leasing a U.S. ship capable of 
operating in the Arctic waters.255 In May 1947, Captain H.N. Lay of naval intelligence 
insisted that the RCN explore the problems and conditions of Arctic sea travel on its 
own.256 Canada could neither depend on the occasional observer’s berth on an American 
ship, nor on a loaner from the USN, to gain essential experience. The RCN would have 
to be more proactive and create a transport capability if Canada did not want to play a 
subordinate role in its own Arctic.  
 The proposed Canadian northern cruise for 1947 was known as Operation 
Iceworm.  The Navy, however, experienced a drastic curtailment in its fuel supplies and 
                                                
254 Memorandum to ACNS, Operation Iceworm, 2 June 1947, LAC, RG 24, vol. 8153, file 1160-18. 
255 Northern Cruise Planning Discussions, 17 February 1948, DHH file. 
256 Captain H.N. Lay, Director of Naval Plans and Intelligence, to ACNS, Operation Iceworm, 23 May 
1947, DHH file.  
 
 100 
naval planners noted that the 4,800 miles involved in a round trip between Halifax and 
Churchill would place a great burden on its logistical capacity.257 Furthermore, the lack 
of ice capable ships and the problem with fuel consumption led Claxton to reject the 
proposed plan in late June.258 Although the government scuttled its plans for a northern 
cruise in 1947, the navy began to make plans for the next summer.  On 9 July 1947 
Claxton announced the immediate winterization of the tribal class destroyers and of the 
Magnificent, Canada’s aircraft carrier.259 The winterization of these vessels would not 
allow them to truly operate in the northern waters, however, save for a brief period in the 
summer and only in select areas.  Acquiring a true northern naval capability required 
more resources.   
 As Canadian officials attempted to lock down their control in the Arctic, they 
also worried about unwanted publicity on the northern defence projects.  The PJBD 
recommended that “public information in regard to military projects… jointly conducted 
or conducted by one country in the other country, or in the territory leased by it, should 
be the primary responsibility of the country whose territory is utilized.  All public 
statements on these subjects shall be made only after mutual agreement between the 
appropriate authorities of the two countries.”260 Canadian officials feared that the press 
would sensationalize the American activities in the Arctic and mislead the public on the 
condition of Canada’s sovereignty in the region.  They also worried about such press 
reports making ongoing cooperation with the Americans in the Arctic politically 
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untenable.  Basically, Canadian officials did not want the wrong ideas put in the public’s 
mind.  Bad press could lead certain Americans to doubt Canadian sovereignty and 
encourage them challenge Canada’s claims.  The Canadian public could also get the 
wrong idea and blame the government for giving the Americans the keys to the Arctic 
free of charge.  With all of these risks Canadian officials hoped that the large scale 
activities carried out in the Arctic could be quietly kept a secret.  This hope, however, 
proved misguided.        
 In mid-August 1947 the Canadian Ambassador to the United States informed 
Louis St. Laurent of an article in the Washington Post that insisted Canada and the 
United States were building a network of Arctic air bases and Loran stations.  The report 
claimed that USAAF officials admitted to the existence of a multi-million dollar joint 
project and predicted the bases would be in operation by October.  The author asserted 
that the Americans provided all of the equipment in the Arctic and that the USAAF Air 
Transport Command handled the difficult job of supply.261 Readers would likely have 
perceived that Canada had neither the capacity to provide transportation in the Arctic nor 
the equipment necessary for civil and military aviation.  The same day that the Canadian 
Ambassador sent his report, the U.S. War Department called on the embassy to 
acknowledge the leak and express its sincere regret.  It also admitted to killing a similar 
story the previous week.  Quickly General Henry dropped off a press release he believed 
would fix the situation.262 St. Laurent, however, insisted that this draft release would not 
help the situation either, as it also emphasized the role played by the USAAF.  “While 
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we greatly appreciate that contribution, emphasis of this kind in a statement appearing in 
this country might, as you will understand, be misinterpreted...,” St Laurent explained. 
“What we really would like is to have the War Department exercise some check on 
unauthorized disclosures of this kind by members of the United States Army or Air 
Forces.”263 The Americans promised to investigate the press leak and others like it.   
 The Loran story again found its way into the public domain when newspapers 
began to quote from an article on the program printed in the Infantry Journal of October 
1947.  Once more the press mistook the Loran stations for three massive air bases along 
the northern coast.  Again the Canadians complained and the Americans promised to fix 
the press release.264 The Canadian government also grew annoyed that month when the 
Americans released information about the possible establishment of a weather station on 
Cornwallis Island without first clearing it through diplomatic channels.265  
These press leaks reflect the indiscretions of low ranking U.S. officers, not 
official U.S. government policy.  Nevertheless, Canadian officials worried about the 
possible impact these leaks might have and took steps to keep them from recurring.  
Despite their best efforts, stories continued to appear in the press, embarrassing the 
government and worrying the public.   
 
Mechanisms of Control and the Canadian Voice 
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The Canadian government also continued to develop mechanisms to protect its 
interests at the higher levels of defence planning.  Of all the diplomatic and military 
channels connecting Ottawa and Washington, the PJBD remained Canada’s strongest 
tool for protecting its interests.  Historian David Beatty had argued that the PJBD 
continued to serve “in the postwar period as the primary agency for initiation and 
coordination of joint defence measures.”266 Prior to the creation of NORAD, the PJBD 
dealt with almost every major defence issue and the U.S. and Canadian governments 
accepted most of its recommendations.  Shelagh Grant explained that the PJBD 
appeared, at times, to function as an executive agency, rather than an advisory committee 
as originally intended.267  
The organization and structure of the PJBD proved conducive to the protection of 
Canada’s interests.  R.M. Macdonnell stated that it provided a forum not only for making 
joint recommendations, but for negotiating, exchanging views, testing ideas, and 
rejecting bad solutions.268 The membership of the Board included upper echelon military 
officers and senior officials from External Affairs and the State Department who wielded 
authority in their respective branches.  Furthermore, these men belonged to the small 
group of decision-makers actually involved in negotiating continental defence initiatives 
on both sides of the border, and the PJBD helped them to form close relationships that 
helped resolve debates.269  
In this setting, the Canadian members often stood their ground on tough issues.  
                                                
266 Beatty, The Canadian-States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, ii.  
267 Grant, Sovereignty or Security? 193. 
268 Beatty, The Canadian-States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 70. 
269 Roger Swanson, “An Analytical Assessment of the United States-Canadian Defence Issue Area,” 
International Organization, Vol. 28 No. 4 (1974), 786.  
 
 104 
Much of the Canadian section’s boldness emanated from its capable chairman, Andrew 
McNaughton, who took over the position in August 1945.  George Ignatieff, a friend and 
aide to McNaughton, depicted him as a man known for “forthrightness in speech rather 
than tact, vigour and tenacity in pressing what he believed to be right rather than 
compromise; a born fighter.”270 McNaughton’s aggressive personality and strength as a 
negotiator always held him in good stead at the PJBD.271 His background in science and 
engineering also proved useful due to the technical nature of the Arctic defence projects.  
In short, McNaughton’s personal characteristics made him an ideal fit as Canadian 
chairman, and he remained vigilant when dealing with American initiatives in the Arctic 
during his tenure between 1945 and 1959.   
In the years following the war the Canadians also established their own strategic 
voice and security interests.  In Avoiding Armageddon, Andrew Richter made use of 
recently declassified documents to prove that, in the early Cold War, the “Canadians 
identified and articulated strategic interests’ independent from those of its allies- in 
particular the United States.”272 Canada’s acceptance of certain American ideas did not 
deafen its own strategic voice. “No country has the luxury of establishing defence 
policies and interests – and formulating the strategic thinking that supports them – in a 
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vacuum,” Richter concluded.273 Canada did a fine job of formulating its strategic 
interests in the difficult post war period.  Lawrence Aronsen also applauded the 
independent nature of Canadian intelligence estimates in the early post war years.  From 
1945 to 1947 the government worked through the Cabinet Defence Committee, the 
Department of External Affairs and the Joint Intelligence Committee of the DND to 
prepare JIC Final, a detailed report on the scope, direction, and timing of the Soviet 
military threat to Canada.  Although the intelligence agencies of the two countries 
enjoyed an excellent working relationship, the Canadians carefully separated American 
assumptions from the facts.  If the Americans assumed that enemy troops would attack 
the Canadian Arctic in a time of crisis, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff asked what the 
Soviet objective might be.274 Canadian strategists consistently disagreed with the 
Americans about the nature of the threat the Soviet Union posed to the Arctic.  For 
instance, by the late 1940’s American planners posited that the Soviets could deploy 
occupying forces to seize outlying positions in Canada and northern Alaska.  Canadians 
argued that the primary threat came from small raiding parties striking targets in western 
Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, and an air strike on Port Radium.275 While Canada agreed 
with the Americans on the general threat, it also put its own stamp on defence planning.   
 As the defence plans became active projects the Canadian government realized it 
required a mechanism to keep track of all these activities.  In the spring of 1947, Hugh 
Keenleyside proposed the establishment of a Geographical Bureau, attached to the 
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Department of Mines and Resources,276 which would assist in the coordination of all 
government activities, including the defence programs in the North.277  Supporters of the 
concept also hoped the Bureau would address the communication problem that existed 
between the different Canadian departments, resulting in interdepartmental 
misunderstandings and annoyance at the Americans for breaches of conduct they did not 
commit.  In early summer 1947, for example, the Americans requested permission to 
establish three SHORAN (Shore Aid to Navigation) geodetic control stations on Baffin 
Island.278  These stations would allow the United States Air Force to establish highly 
effective ground control in Greenland to support their aerial mapping program.  On 4 
July Air Vice Marshall Curtis acknowledged that the U.S. proposal actually supported 
the RCAF’s own plans.279   
 In early July, one of the Department of Mines and Resources’ senior geodesists, 
Earl Ross, learned that the Americans planned to send a party of over 100 men to Baffin 
Island to establish temporary SHORAN stations, the first anyone in the department heard 
of the project.  An internal memorandum on the project explained “the real point…is that 
this seems to be another case in which the United States authorities are going ahead with 
an operation on and over Canadian soil for which no prior clearance has been 
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obtained.”280 The SHORAN program did not mark an American transgression, however, 
but a lack of coordination between the necessary Canadian departments.  After the 
Department of Mines and Resources threw up the red flag on the project, the RCAF 
admitted that the Chief of the Air Staff and the Canadian Joint Staff Mission already 
knew of the American activities.281 Although the RCAF apologized for not sharing 
information, this lack of coordination indicated a deeper problem in Canadian defence 
planning that would lead to problems in the ensuing years.   
 The idea of an organization that could track all Canadian and foreign activities in 
the North, and inform all the different government departments involved, appealed to 
many Canadian officials.  The military and the Joint Intelligence Committee, however, 
objected to the creation of any civilian agency responsible for collecting sensitive 
strategic information.  Nevertheless, after much debate, the Cabinet approved the Bureau 
in July and it quickly set to work creating a report on all of the American activities going 
on in the Canadian Arctic.282  It would not be completed until December 1947.     
 
The Calm Before the Storm?   
 Through most of 1947 the defence relationship between Canada and the United 
States seemed to function smoothly.  By mutual preference the relationship worked 
without grand projects or extensive commitments, and remained friendly and informal.283 
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The 36th Recommendation of the PJBD called for the investigation of all new defence 
projects on a case by case basis and the Board reviewed every initiative.  “No blanket 
approvals were given Washington,” Bercuson noted. “The details of each operation were 
worked out separately.”284 At the meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee on 16 
August 1947, Andrew McNaughton “observed that in discussions in the Joint Defence 
Board there had been an attitude of complete propriety regarding Canadian rights.”285 
While the Americans refused to accept the sector principle, McNaughton optimistically 
added that “circumstances are such that our claims in the Arctic Archipelago are being 
progressively strengthened.”286  
 By early October 1947 the Arctic weather and Loran programs continued to run 
smoothly.  In these first months, the Canadians exercised effective command and control 
of the stations, and the Americans created few problems.  J.D. Cleghorn, the station 
controller who once angrily wrote about the poor American attitude towards the 
Canadian contribution, happily commented that:  
We have no personnel problems.  Everybody is pulling his weight and 
relations between the Americans and ourselves are on a very cordial basis.  
There have been minor misunderstandings and some differences of 
opinion on both sides, but these are to be expected in any normal operation 
of this kind.  I blame the prolonged strain and overwork, rather than any 
personal animosity, for any small outburst of temperament in the past.287 
 
These harmonious working relations exemplify the cooperative nature of the Arctic 
defence projects.    
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 Even the complicated issue of financing was slowly worked out to the 
satisfaction of both countries.  As Bercuson pointed out, Canada did not have the ability 
to pay for all of the continental defence projects on its own, but if the United States paid 
for most or all of the projects, “Canadian sovereignty existed only in theory, not in 
substance.”288 Still little desire existed to establish a specific payment strategy or a 
detailed cost sharing formula.  If Canada chose to share half the costs of all projects or 
based its payment on population size, however, defence expenditures might quickly 
outstrip the country’s means.  Therefore, the Canadians decided its share on a project-by-
project basis.289 Even if some American officials resented pouring money into the 
northern defence projects while Canada refused to grant them long-term rights,290 this 
issue rarely surfaced at the diplomatic level.   
Despite the wave of American development in the Canadian North, which 
included weather and Loran stations, regular transportation flights, more airfields, a 
Canadian air photography program, USN cruises and other scientific investigations, 
Canada’s terrestrial claims were stronger than ever by the end of 1947.  Canada also 
appeared to maintain fairly effective control over the region. “Although it derived as 
much from ad hoc decisions as from careful planning, the policy served Canada well,” 
Bercuson concluded. “Canadian participation was ensured, even if token, and each 
agreement brought another U.S. recognition of Canadian claims to the Arctic.”291 
Subsequent events tested McNaughton’s optimistic assertions, however, and threatened 
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Canada’s interests.  For the first time since the war, Canada would have to ‘go to the 























Chapter 4: Controlling the Arctic 
 
A Coordinating Committee 
 Although the situation in the Arctic seemed well in hand as 1947 neared an end, 
Canadian officials saw problems beginning to form.  They found it increasingly difficult 
to keep track of American defence projects and the lack of coordination between 
Canadian departments and services did not help matters.  According to American 
historian Stanley Dziuban, the key problem that caused many of the misunderstandings 
and breaches in protocol that upset the Canadians during the war was the disorganization 
of hemispheric defence planning.  Ideally, all projects should have been approved at the 
governmental level, but in reality approvals came from PJBD recommendations, direct 
arrangements at the service level, agreements at different diplomatic levels, or some 
combination of them all.292 In the postwar Arctic, developments also started to progress 
at a rate that left little time for inter-departmental discussion and consolidation.  As 
Canada attempted to assert its control over the Arctic, the confusion and disorganization 
on both sides of the border led to American indiscretions and sloppy Canadian mistakes.     
 On 13 November 1947, a memorandum from the Chiefs of Staff Committee to 
Albert Heeney, the Secretary of the Cabinet, called for greater control over the northern 
defence projects and urged greater coordination amongst the different departments 
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involved in the Arctic.293 The memorandum explicitly mentioned the burgeoning number 
of airstrips in the Arctic as proof of Canada’s lack of control.  By late 1947 the USAF 
still operated wartime airfields at Mingan, Fort Chimo and Frobisher Bay and began 
building more to support the weather and Loran stations.  The Canadians recently 
learned of U.S. plans to extend the runway at Resolute Bay to 10,000 feet and prepare it 
for year round operation.  The Chiefs of Staff argued that “obviously, unless control is 
exercised and provided by Canada, the U.S. will just carry on as they please.”294 While 
no Canadian department stepped up to take responsibility for the airstrips, the American 
desire to create more air bases in the Arctic grew.  
 The memorandum also highlighted the lack of Canadian transportation 
capabilities in the North.  “Undoubtedly adequate transportation facilities, both air and 
sea, must also be provided and controlled by Canada if over-all control is to be 
maintained,” it noted.  “Control of aerodromes and air strips will be insufficient in itself 
if we remain dependent on the U.S for transportation.”295 The government’s inactivity on 
this dimension suggests an inexcusable lapse in judgement during this period.  Although 
the RCN did plan a summer cruise in the Arctic, the government made no concerted 
effort to improve Canada’s transport capabilities in the region.  Instead the entire burden 
for the resupply of the Canadian Arctic fell on the Americans.   
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To address some of these pressing issues the Chiefs of Staff recommended the 
creation of an Arctic Committee to advise the Cabinet Defence Committee and the 
Cabinet on all aspects of Arctic defence and development policy.296  “I share with you 
considerable anxiety in the hap-hazard form in which the Arctic developments are being 
handled at the present time,” Charles Foulkes, the Chief of the General Staff, wrote to 
Heeney in November 1947.  The northern projects required better coordination and 
control, especially the airstrips “which have been put in without our knowledge and have 
only been discovered by accident.”297 Andrew McNaughton also weighed in on the 
subject of improved coordination.  “I fully agree that it is necessary to set up an 
organization to bring our various activities in the Arctic into focus and in particular to 
ensure that in our arrangements with the United Sates, all necessary steps are taken for 
the protection of Canadian interests and the maintenance of full Canadian control in all 
respect,” the PJBD chairman told Heeney.298 Backed by these opinions, Heeney wrote to 
Brooke Claxton asking him to consider the creation of an Advisory Committee on 
Northern Development to provide advice on the general policies adopted by the 
government.  The lack of coordination could not be blamed on any one department, but 
“rather to the lack of any machinery to bring them together.”299 
 In mid-January Claxton informed Minister of Mines and Resources James Glen 
of his plan to establish a joint coordinating body to manage all government activities in 
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the North and to advise on policy.300 He lamented Canada’s inability to control the Arctic 
airstrips or provide any transport service to the region, and expressed concern about 
Canada’s inability to supply enough personnel for the weather stations in the northeast, 
which Canada had promised to take over by 1950.301 Claxton hoped that an advisory 
committee would coordinate action on these pressing issues, and it met in February 1948 
for the first time.   
 
The Problem With Operation Polaris 
 As Canadian officials created a new committee to coordinate activities in the 
North, officials dealt with the one of the first true American challenges to Canada’s 
authority in the postwar years.  Although observers attached to Operation Polaris 
reported on all American activities, the Canadian government and military paid little 
attention to the Polaris project until the fall of 1947, when the RCAF suddenly became 
concerned that the USAAF was performing aerial reconnaissance and photography in the 
Arctic.302 The Canadian military began asking questions in September 1947 when Air 
Vice Marshall Wilf Curtis requested from General Henry “certain information regarding 
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the work already done and contemplated work to be done” by the Army Air Force in the 
Arctic.303  
 General William McKee, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the newly formed 
United States Air Force (USAF), believed all operations over Canadian territory were 
carried out with the full coordination and concurrence of Canadian officials.304 He 
maintained that the original Polaris project included training, gathering weather 
information, navigation, and “such visual and photo reconnaissance as weather 
permitted.”305 According to McKee, the Americans used this “photography of 
opportunity” to identify shore lines and possible sites for radar and weather stations.306 
The general informed the Canadians that the photographs would not be used for mapping 
or charting purposes. 
 Although General McKee tried to whitewash the additional activities of the Air 
Force, Canada approved neither aerial photography nor reconnaissance for the project.  
When the Americans carried out these activities they violated the newly established 
model for defence negotiations that Canadian officials thought firmly in place after the 
Chateau Laurier conference.  They bypassed the case by case discussion called for in 
Recommendation 36 of the PJBD, and showed little respect to their Canadian 
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counterparts.  The unauthorized American photographic activity also violated the PJBD 
rule for aerial photography.307  
 Certain Americans regarded air reconnaissance and photography as important 
enough aspects of the security plan to risk the fragile harmony in the bilateral defence 
relationship.  In May 1946 a PJBD memorandum to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff listed 
the completion of mapping and photographic programs as a pressing security 
requirement.308 On 25 November of that year, General Henry claimed that if the 
Canadians and Americans accepted the Air Annex portion of the Basic Security Plan, 
extensive mapping of Northern Canada and the Arctic should begin immediately.309 The 
Strategic Air Reconnaissance Plan presented on 24 April 1947 emphasized that 
reconnaissance to detect enemy infiltration, and photography to provide geophysical 
data, were essential to continental security.  The appendix also stated that “economy of 
force in peace time will require that air reconnaissance be combined with meteorological, 
photographic, transport, or any other mission moving in the areas under 
consideration.”310 A memorandum attached to this appendix recommended “that Project 
Polaris be continued in order to facilitate the accomplishment of the peacetime 
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surveillance of northern areas.”311 Without Canada’s permission Polaris became a 
reconnaissance and photographic operation.  
If the Canadians were completely negligent in their aerial reconnaissance and 
photography duties, the American actions would have seemed more acceptable. The 
RCAF, however, was conducting aerial mapping at a good pace.312 The DND’s annual 
report claimed that by 31 March 1947 Canada’s air force surveyed 335,000 square km, 
and planned to complete 550,000 square km in the next fiscal year.313 Furthermore, the 
RCAF deployed an air reconnaissance squadron to the North and established an air 
photography school.  Not only did the Americans violate the informal political rules 
established for the defence relationship, they also ignored the work of their Canadian 
service colleagues. 
 On 19 November 1947, Albert Heeney informed Andrew McNaughton that 
discussions between RCAF and USAF officials revealed regular American 
reconnaissance flights and air photography in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.314 He 
worried that the Americans might use these photographs for mapping purposes – despite 
official denials that the USAF intended to do so.315  Heeney argued that the Canadians 
authorized no regular reconnaissance flights and, unlike General McKee, the Cabinet did 
not believe that the American activities fell under any established program.316 Rather 
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than raising a formal inquiry into the problem, Canada chose the informal approach 
offered by the PJBD. 
 At the next meeting of the Board, McNaughton emphasized that all USAF 
activity in the Arctic should be in strict accordance with a program already approved by 
the Canadian government.317 He demanded that the USAF turn over all photographs and 
other materials in its possession.  His American counterparts fully agreed with these 
measures but argued that “any flights which had taken place were either part of the 
approved Polaris project or were routine training flights which they claimed they thought 
had been approved in principle.”318 Their excuses remained unconvincing.  The 
Canadians maintained that, according to the original terms of the project, the operation 
had overstepped its bounds.  Furthermore, as members of the PJBD they would have 
known that defence projects were never “approved in principle” -- there was no “blanket 
approval.”   
 The Americans made some inquiries.  On 26 November 1947, Charles 
Deerwester wrote to O.P. Weyland, the American Director of Plans and Operations, 
about Polaris and suggested that the Air Force submit an official request for all desired 
flights over the Canadian Archipelago in order to gain fresh Canadian approvals.319 
Although not yet admitting any fault, the Americans indicated that it might be necessary 
to attain proper Canadian permission for the flights they wanted to undertake.     
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 Meanwhile, the Canadian section of the Board took issue with the American 
conclusion that all aerial activities in the Arctic fell under the auspices of Polaris and 
“that no further authorization was necessary.”320 Canadian officials investigated their 
records and decided that the project did not include flights such as those carried out by 
the USAF.  David Johnson, Canadian secretary of the PJBD, wrote “it would be most 
unfortunate if the Board’s Journal gave the impression that once the Canadian 
government had authorized a particular operation, permission to undertake a similar 
operation could be assumed.”321 Citing the initial purposes of the Polaris project laid out 
by General Henry in April 1946, the Canadian section proved that the Americans strayed 
from the original agreement.  Weak American assertions that U.S. activities in the Arctic 
were proper and acceptable did not sway Canadian opinion.   
 As the Canadians continued to investigate Operation Polaris, they found more 
evidence of American transgressions.  On 3 July 1946, General Henry told the Canadians 
that initial experimental flights would start in the Arctic by 1 August. The Americans 
delayed the flights, however, and told the Canadians they rescheduled them for early 
October.   Johnson, however, found an article from the New York Times dated 20 
October 1947, which revealed that the 46th Reconnaissance Squadron flew its first 
mission over the Arctic on 21 July 1946, in advance of the dates given by General 
Henry.322 Did the Americans consider these flights part of Polaris, or did they belong to 
a separate, unauthorized project?  Either way, the Americans disregarded protocol and 
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misinformed the Canadians.  Another unauthorized article about the American 
overflights appeared in the New York Times a week later.323     
 The two New York Times stories, coupled with the Canadian investigation, 
proved that the Americans had violated the terms of the Polaris project, leaked publicity 
about the operation, and started another project before Polaris even started. Worst of all, 
the press articles raised the possibility that the Americans acquired the photographs of 
the Arctic for mapping purposes.  Anthony Leviero’s article “All Arctic is Open to the 
Air Force” stated that “in the year of experimentation and research, the squadron criss-
crossed the Arctic in 5000 hours and 1,000,000 miles of flight.”324 Besides testing men 
and materials in the Arctic, the journalist claimed that the American project mapped 
many unknown regions and made many new discoveries.325 Leviero’s next report also 
hailed the activities of the 46th squadron and claimed that the photos taken facilitated the 
design of new defence installations.326 These violations were tantamount to a breach of 
Canada’s sovereignty and rights.   
 The Americans had to salvage the excellent defence relations that existed before 
the Polaris incident.  On 12 December, Charles Deerwester resumed his correspondence 
with O.P. Weyland to work through the problems arising from Polaris.  Weyland 
proclaimed that the ultimate objective of the USAF program involved training the 
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maximum number of air crews in arctic conditions, not air photography.327 It made sense 
to engage in some surveillance and check for signs of enemy infiltration during these 
flights.  Based on these assumptions, Weyland laid out a new plan, calling for two flights 
a week over the Arctic for “navigational training and necessary air surveillance.”328 
Weyland stated that Canadian observers would be welcome and made no attempt to 
include aerial photography in the mission’s mandate.   
 Deerwester gave Weyland’s new project proposal to Andrew Foster, the Assistant 
Chief of British Commonwealth Affairs and member of the PJBD, on 19 December so 
that it could be presented to the Canadians.  The Americans recognized that they made 
mistakes and conducted unauthorized activities in the Arctic, and the American secretary 
offered to his Canadian counterpart what amounted to a tentative apology.  Foster 
advised that:  
 In view of the doubt which has arisen concerning the precise nature of the 
 authority granted by the Canadian Government for the ‘Polaris’ program and in 
 view of the questions that have come up concerning certain individual flights 
 during recent months, it seems to me that the sensible thing to do, from the point 
 of view of both government’s, would be to adopt Colonel Deerwester’s letter…as 
 the basis for the program in future.329  
 
He also assured Johnson that he did not want to evade Canadian complaints about 
American aerial transgressions.  In fact, he took “some pains to try and find out about 
these flights and the authority for them.”330 His investigation found that General Henry 
thought of the Polaris project as “a continuing one…of general scope” and that the 
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Americans believed their flights fell under this program.331 Foster suggested starting 
fresh with a new American proposal, rather than dwelling on the Polaris project and its 
problems, since the Americans never considered the flights “a serious violation of the 
original Polaris authority.”332  
 Although Foster made excuses, he also informed the Canadians that if they did 
not wish to move on quickly he would continue his inquiries with the USAF.  The 
Americans never formally apologized, but they allowed the Canadians to decide whether 
they wanted to launch a more formal inquiry.  Foster did, however, apologize for the 
publicity about Polaris and aerial activities leaked to the press.  Nonetheless, he 
attempted to excuse the American actions, saying that the American officer responsible 
had acted in “good faith.” The soldier talked to two Canadian officers attached to the 
Joint Staff Mission in Washington, and thought that they had cleared the release. 
“Subsequent investigation showed that they had not done so,” Foster explained, “but I 
was satisfied that we could not altogether blame the USAF officer.”333  
 In the end, the Americans took steps to correct their mistakes and listened to 
Canadian concerns about sovereignty and national rights.   The Canadians could 
gracefully accept this attempt to fix the situation, or they could push for a formal 
investigation and inquiry.  In a letter to Air Vice Marshall Morfee on 31 December 1947, 
David Johnson proposed that a fresh start be made by presenting the new American 
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proposal to the Canadian government.334 Morfee, the Canadian Air Member on the 
Board, agreed and the PJBD sent off their informal recommendation to the Canadian 
government.  The military and government adopted the plan.  In February 1948, the CDC 
approved the new American project which included the original goals of Operation 
Polaris as well as limited surveillance duties.335 Any photographs taken during the 
flights would immediately be made available to the Canadian government, and the U.S. 
welcomed Canadian observers.  The Chiefs of Staff reminded the Americans of the need 
to gain the approval of the Canadian government before they engaged in aerial activities 
over the Arctic, especially on a “regular basis.”336 With these stipulations the new project 
began and the Polaris incident ended.   
The Canadians viewed the Polaris incident as a violation of their country’s 
sovereignty and rights.  Not only did unauthorized American activities resurrect 
sovereignty concerns, they also reinforced fears that Canada was losing control of its 
defence relationship with the United States.  The incident forced the Canadians to do 
more to ensure that the Americans stopped overstepping the bounds of approved projects 
and played a role in Albert Heeney’s proposal for a regulatory committee for the Arctic.  
The episode also led to greater Canadian activity in the Arctic.  Elements of the USAF 
exceeded the parameters of Operation Polaris because they considered aerial 
photography so important.  Thus, in late June 1948 the Canadian government authorized 
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the immediate establishment of an additional RCAF photography squadron for service in 
the North.337 Bercuson observed that this “was an indication of the increased urgency 
being felt in Ottawa to devote more resources to the North.”338  
 The episode also proved the effectiveness of the PJBD as the central forum in the 
Canadian-American defence relationship.  The controversy surrounding Polaris was not 
sorted out by the embassies or key Canadian diplomats, but worked out almost 
exclusively through the PJBD.  On the Canadian side, McNaughton ensured that his men 
always defended Canada’s national interests and was not easily deterred by American 
intransigence.339  The American section understood Canadian needs and sensibilities and 
attempted to accommodate their demands.  Andrew Foster reiterated several times that 
the Americans did not believe the problems with the Polaris project were severe, but he 
took Canadian complaints seriously.  Both sides of the PJBD operated from a position of 
mutual understanding and compromise, and worked out an acceptable solution.   
 
Trevor Lloyd and the Advisory Committee on Northern Development 
 The Polaris incident coincided with the release of a report by the geographer 
Trevor Lloyd, the Chief of the newly formed Geographic Bureau.  Lloyd had always 
worried about the protection of Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic, and actively lobbied 
the government to take more effective control of the northern defence projects during the 
war.  In April 1947 Lloyd wrote an article for the International Journal, entitled 
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“Canada’s Strategic North,” in which he lambasted the Canadian government for its 
failure to effectively develop and control the North. He noted that some Americans 
disputed Canada’s claims and feared that they might attempt to take control of the 
Arctic.340 Although Shelagh Grant has attempted to make something of a hero out of 
Lloyd as a defender of Canadian sovereignty,341 the man clearly had an axe to grind 
against the Americans.   
His Geographic Bureau report, released on 22 December 1947, insisted that the 
United States repeatedly violated Canada’s authority in the region.  He insinuated that, in 
the case of the Arctic weather stations, the U.S. Weather Bureau attempted to make all of 
the important decisions independently.  He also criticized the Americans for disregarding 
the rules for publicity established by the PJBD and for building airfields in the Arctic 
without permission.342  Furthermore, the report noted that U.S. forces often ignored 
Canadian wishes and refused to accept its ally’s control and authority.  Lloyd chastised 
the Canadian government for not doing enough to regulate particular American activities 
in the region.  All in all, it offered a dismal, even conspiratorial, view of American 
activities in the North.  
 Canadian officials did not accept Lloyd’s report as complete truth.  Group 
Captain W.W Bean asserted that “this memorandum seems to consist mainly of an 
                                                
340 Trevor Lloyd, “Canada’s Strategic North,” International Journal, April 1947, LAC, RG 2, vol. 56, file 
A-25. 
341 Shelagh Grant, “Northern Nationalist: Visions of a ‘New North,’ 1940-1950,” in For Purposes of 
Dominion: Essays in the Honour of Morris Zaslow, eds. Ken Coates and William Morrison (North York: 
Captus University Publications, 1989).  
342 Memorandum to the Advisory Committee on Northern Development: Revised Summary of US Military 
Activities in Canada, Trevor Lloyd, LAC, RG 2, vol. 57, file A-25-5.  Heeney also agreed that the 
scientific investigation of Operation Nanook should have been explored more thoroughly.  In the 1948 
operation, this was assured.  Memorandum for Advisory Committee on Northern Development, 28 January 
1948, DCER, Volume 14, 1948, 1514-1519.  
 
 126 
attempt to show that the US is, in some clandestine fashion, attempting to carry out a lot 
of projects in Canadian territory without obtaining proper authority.” Bean effectively 
countered or disproved most of Lloyd’s accusations.  He argued that the report 
exaggerated the U.S. role in picking sites for weather stations and the number of 
personnel it posted to these stations.  Although the Americans wanted to establish more 
airfields in the Arctic, these sites fell under the original weather stations agreement and 
the U.S. did not want to “put one over” on the Canadians.  While Bean agreed with 
Lloyd that the situation called for “closer liaison all around,” he argued that “the proper 
channel is probably through the Services not between Mines and Resources and the U.S. 
Service Departments, which I am sure is Trevor Lloyd’s objective.”343 Bean concluded 
that all of the projects mentioned in Lloyd’s report had some kind of authorization.    
 Other Canadian officials also criticized Lloyd’s report.  At the first meeting of the 
newly formed Advisory Committee on Northern Development on 2 February 1948, most 
of the committee members labelled Lloyd’s report an “attack” on the United States.  
Both Heeney and Pearson commented that there did not seem to be any underlying 
American design to carry out activities in the Arctic without the approval of the 
Canadian government.344 Problems arose in the Arctic due to a lack of coordination and 
communication in Ottawa and Washington, not an American conspiracy.  
 Although all Canadian officials agreed that the Arctic projects required better 
coordination, Pearson complained at the second meeting of the ACND in June that 
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difficulties continued to arise due to loosely worded authorizations and inadequate 
bilateral dialogue.  Others on the council noted that the Canadians still struggled to attain 
accurate information on United States activities in Canada.  On the American side, 
breaches of protocol often occurred when projects were undertaken on the authority of 
lower ranking military officers unfamiliar with the proper procedures.  To fix this 
problem the “U.S. authorities needed constant reminding that, when operating in 
Canadian territory, proper authority must be obtained for every project undertaken and 
the Canadian authorities kept fully informed at all times.”345 In the end, the committee 
agreed that the government should keep a detailed record of all U.S. activities in Canada 
and ensure that it gave the Americans strongly worded authorizations for their defence 
projects.   
 The committee formed to foster improved interdepartmental coordination had its 
own communication problems.  Disputes arose between the military representatives on 
the committee and their civilian colleagues over the regulation of Arctic defence 
projects. “To the liberal reformers, protection of sovereignty was of paramount 
importance; to the military, the issue threatened to interfere with their plans for North 
American defence,” explained Shelagh Grant.346 Although the two opposing groups 
agreed on many important issues, such as the need for an improved Canadian transport 
capability in the Arctic, the military members grew annoyed when sovereignty concerns 
hindered operations.  This created tensions on the council and impeded its effectiveness. 
 Through 1948, the Canadian and American militaries, and even civilian agencies, 
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grew increasingly annoyed with Trevor Lloyd.  The geographer first managed to alienate 
himself from many officers in the Canadian services when he persisted in asking for 
information about the Canadian-American defence arrangements not required by the 
Geographic Bureau.347 He even attracted the ire of External Affairs when he “endangered 
the machinery for the exchange of reports and other material between the Services of the 
two countries by going himself or sending assistants to the U.S. Service Departments in 
Washington to ask for copies of various reports, etc., only part of the contents of which 
was relevant to his work.” The military’s dislike of Lloyd became so intense that a rift 
formed between the Department of National Defence and the Department of Mines and 
Resources, the Geographic Bureau’s parent organization.348 While the senior officials at 
the DMR continued to support Lloyd’s actions, the military grew more distrustful of his 
entire organization.  
 This atmosphere led to conflict between the military and the DMR.  An 
especially hostile dispute broke out when the DND attempted stop the DMR from 
obtaining copies of the USN’s report on the Arctic operations of 1947.  Even worse, the 
military’s distrust for the department actually permeated the U.S. services.  While the 
Canadian observers prepared for the summer supply mission of 1948, the USN singled 
out the DMR personnel for security checks and “special going over.”349 External Affairs 
ordered the Canadian ambassador to tell the Americans that the RCMP fully examined 
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and cleared Lloyd.  “Our feeling in this Department,” noted St. Laurent, “is that the 
explanation of Lloyd’s interest in joint defence matters is that his zeal as a geographer 
has carried him a bit too far in a Department which, of course, has always kept a cautious 
eye on U.S. activities in the Northwest Territories and especially in the Arctic 
Archipelago where our claims to sovereignty have not all been formally acknowledged 
by the United States.”350  
 Throughout the summer of 1948, Trevor Lloyd followed the annual Arctic sea 
supply mission like a hound dog, trying to sniff out American indiscretions.  Lloyd, 
however, could find few people who shared his level of concern about American 
activities in the Arctic.  “I am disappointed that no one else in town seems to know much 
about what is going on in the Task Force, or if they do, that they are keeping it to 
themselves,” Lloyd complained in August. “I have checked with Jim Wright who has no 
information, with the Navy and the Department of Transport, but none of them have 
been much help.”351 He remained in contact with his Bureau’s observers on the mission, 
and presented their reports to whoever would listen.352 By September, however, Lloyd 
grew discouraged with the entire situation and with his continued alienation from those 
who held important information on the Arctic defence projects.   
 In the middle of September rumours began to circulate about Lloyd’s imminent 
resignation.  This helped to alleviate the strained relations.  G.L Magann, the Canadian 
ambassador in Washington, informed his superiors at External Affairs that “it will at 
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least be of some comfort to you to know that Lloyd is understood to be returning in a 
very few weeks to his academic pursuits at Dartmouth College (if he can get a U.S. visa, 
I suppose).  Only this sort of a change will really get us over the long-standing 
Geographical Bureau-Services conflict.”353 Lloyd’s retirement represented a welcome 
relief for many in the military and External Affairs.  
 A few supporters appreciated Lloyd’s efforts to keep an eye on the Americans in 
the North.  When Commander T. Fife, an observer on the resupply mission, heard about 
Lloyd’s resignation he wrote a letter to the embattled head of the Geographic Bureau. 
“Up North we caught a story that you were getting fed up with your job and were going 
to quit,” Fife stated.  “I, and many others particularly those we meet in the North 
sincerely hope it isn’t so, we all feel that this great and growing country of ours needs 
you.” The sea supply mission gave Fife “a strong conviction that if we don’t get busy 
and vein the N.W.T. as an all Canadian show we shall have some one doing it for us, and 
not ‘By the powers vested therein’ but by right of ‘Dollars invested therein.’”354 To avoid 
this tragedy, men like Lloyd would need to keep pressuring the government to pay 
attention to the Arctic.   
Despite Fife’s wishes, Lloyd returned to Dartmouth in October.  He remains one 
of the most interesting people from this time period.  Was he a defender of Canadian 
sovereignty betrayed by his government or a man beset by anti-Americanism who saw 
dark intentions where none existed?  Although genuinely concerned with American 
actions in the Arctic, his approach was inappropriate.  Instead of improving the situation, 
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he simply alienated himself from all of the people who could have helped him in his 
quest to strengthen Canada’s control over the Arctic. 
 
Life at the Permanent Stations 
 While Lloyd saw American indiscretions everywhere, the Canadians and 
Americans continued to get along well at the semi-permanent Loran and weather 
stations. The agreement for the Loran program stipulated that the commanding officer at 
each station and most of the administrative officers for the program come from the 
RCAF.355 At the higher level, therefore, the Canadians remained in control of the 
stations.  Technical control, however, remained in the hands of the senior U.S. technical 
officer. Canadian commanding officers expressed occasional annoyance at visiting 
American officers who bypassed them and went straight to the American technical 
officer.  According to historian Kenneth Eyre:   
This phenomenon may be partially attributable to the fact that visiting 
officers were usually on a technical inspection and hence their interest 
would primarily lie with the Loran operation itself. On the other hand, the 
blithe assumption by individual American servicemen in the late 1940s 
and 1950s that the Canadian Arctic was really the American Arctic was a 
common occurrence in the North.356 
 
Despite the occasional American indiscretion, the working relationships at the Loran 
sites usually proved to be cooperative and friendly. 
 The Canadians could not train enough personnel to replace the U.S. servicemen 
at the Loran stations in 1948.  The Canadians trained RCAF personnel in the 
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experimental chain and slowly gathered enough men to take over full responsibility for 
the stations.  Meanwhile, the Americans continued to offer technical supervision at the 
sites.357 By the time the Canadians actually took over the Loran stations in October 1948, 
however, the program was already being phased out.  The Loran’s method of obtaining 
fixes of rotation worked well in places further south, but the difficult ionospheric 
conditions of the Arctic did not allow the stations to send out signals strong enough to 
determine the exact position of aircraft.358 By the end of 1948 the stations were 
practically abandoned save for skeleton crews performing housekeeping duties.  Critics 
labelled the project a ‘white elephant’ after reports surfaced that it cost Canadian and 
American taxpayers over 50 million dollars.359  Although a brilliant idea, in the end the 
Loran stations simply could not cope with the northern environment. 
 With the weather stations, as in most joint ventures, the relationship between the 
Canadians and the Americans differed from station to station.  Throughout the joint 
enterprise, however, the Canadians continuously worked to improve their control.  In the 
spring of 1948 two more stations were established at Isachsen, Ellef Ringnes Island and 
Mould Bay, Prince Patrick Island.360  In the summer of 1950, the Canadians and 
Americans successfully established a fifth weather station at Alert, Ellesmere Island, 
which became the northernmost settled point in the Canadian Arctic.   
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 By 1948 the responsibilities of the Canadian official in charge (OIC) and his 
American executive officer were well established.  The Canadian in charge was 
responsible for the overall administration of the station, for the safety and security of its 
personnel, its scientific programme, the preparation of official reports and for the 
maintenance of morale and discipline.  The American executive officer remained in 
charge of the administration and welfare of U.S. personnel and property, and supervised 
the technical work at the station, including all mechanical maintenance.  He was also 
“responsible for the amicable international relationship of his US subordinates with 
Canadians and Canadian authorities.”361 Peter Inglis, a reporter permitted to visit some of 
the stations in the early 1950’s, wrote: “For the sake of Canadian sovereignty, the 
official-in-charge at each station is Canadian.  But anything he does is subject to appeal 
to Ottawa and Washington by his executive officer, who is American.  This gives the 
executive officer something very close to veto power.” 362   
 In April 1952, External Affairs sent its first observer into the Canadian Arctic to 
tour the weather stations and to study some of the problems involved in their operation. 
The entire tour lasted only a week, hardly enough time to make impressions and draw up 
conclusions.  R.A.J. Phillips noted that, on paper, the command and control 
arrangements at the weather stations seemed a “good means of protecting Canadian 
sovereignty with a minimum expenditure of manpower.” The greater pay the Americans 
received, however, caused tension as did the lack of control the Canadian official in 
charge retained over U.S. personnel.  Furthermore, when disagreements erupted between 
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the OIC and his executive, they were often sent to Ottawa or Washington for arbitration.  
These situations occurred because the American second-in-command was not clearly 
subordinate to the Canadian in charge.  When this system did not work correctly, the 
consequences could be serious.  In one unfortunate case at Resolute Bay an OIC troubled 
with melancholy slowly lost his control to the U.S. executive officer and committed 
suicide.363   
 According to Phillips, the central problem with the weather station program 
rested in recruitment.  On some of these remote stations, the Canadian government chose 
to put 21 or 22 year old students in charge.  Suddenly these young men found themselves 
“responsible for perhaps a million dollars worth of equipment” and sometimes they 
became “the senior Canadian official in thousands of square miles of Canadian territory.” 
Obviously the ideal solution for Canada would be to take over the stations completely.  
Phillips noted, however, that some government officials disagreed with this option, lest 
the Americans withdraw their financial support for the program.   In lieu of this, Phillips 
suggested that the Canadians provide an authoritative senior officer and supply essential 
personnel for the operation of the stations – advice that the Canadian tried to take in 
subsequent years.364  
 Individual personality, not nationality, created most of the tension at the stations.  
The hardship of isolation and the boredom either brought out the best or worst in the 
personnel.  The weather stations, however, had a yearly turnover rate, and the Canadian 
and American meteorological services could not effectively screen fifty replacements 
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annually.365 When Captain A.C Chouinard, a Canadian naval observer with the 1948 
resupply mission, visited the central weather station at Resolute Bay he “found a very 
poor set-up ashore.  After a few enquiries we found that they had trouble during the 
winter.  The people on the station are not congenial, housing is poorly situated and very 
badly kept.  One of the Department of Transport Radio Operators who is stationed at 
Resolute Bay, is a Union man and this has created ill feeling amongst the others.”366 
Relations at the stations still remained quite good.  A 1948 report on the construction 
phase at Isachsen noted that no nationalistic tensions existed and described morale as 
‘first class.’367 When Chouinard visited Eureka Sound he found everything under perfect 
control and clean, complete with well dressed weather bureau personnel in splendid 
spirits.  No complaints existed between the Canadians and Americans, only “good 
cooperation and feelings.”368 Such a system could not have worked without a spirit of co-
operation between Canadian and American forces.  The Americans at these stations did 
not want to challenge Canada’s de facto sovereignty over the Arctic. They simply sought 
to get along with their allies.    
 Canada strengthened its control in the region by making American personnel at 
the stations adhere to Canadian regulations.  In the summer of 1947 the Northwest 
Territories Council decided to allow the army and scientific stations in the Canadian 
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Arctic to shoot two caribou per person each year for food purposes.  By the beginning of 
1948, however, the number of caribou plummeted rapidly throughout the Territories.  
The Council revoked the hunting permit, and Canadians and Americans complied.369 In 
March, Commander Reichelderfer of the U.S. Weather Bureau informed the Canadians 
that there would be no fresh meat for the stations at Isachsen and Prince Patrick in the 
coming year.  He asked the Canadians if they would allow the two stations to take two 
muskox, two caribou and ten geese for the year.370 The Canadians informed 
Reichelderfer, however, that his request could not be received favourably by the 
Department of Mines and Resources, who considered any infraction of the Game 
Preserve regulations a serious matter.371    
Accordingly, Canadian officials enforced game laws throughout the Arctic.  In 
February 1949, R.A Gibson, the Deputy Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, 
informed the Americans that due to a scarcity of meat no hunting permits could be issued 
to station personnel.  If an emergency developed, the personnel could approach the local 
RCMP officer to plead their case and he could authorize the taking of caribou meat.372 
The American government, the U.S. Weather Bureau, the military and the personnel on 
the ground all acknowledged Canada’s right to make and enforce these regulations.  In 
addition, the Americans proved compliant in ordering their scientists visiting the Arctic 
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to seek proper Canadian authorization.373 American acceptance of these regulations 
translated into acceptance of Canada’s control and sovereignty over the Arctic islands.  
Gradual acquisition seemed to be working on the ground.  
Canada still lacked control over the customs privileges enjoyed by U.S. personnel 
deployed at the stations in 1948.  Although Canadian and American personnel were 
supposed to obtain a permit from the Northwest Territories Council to purchase and 
consume alcohol, few actually did.  Rather, a habit formed of personnel smuggling liquor 
into the stations in their luggage, in direct contravention of Canadian customs laws for 
the Arctic.374 Although the DMR knew this, they believed that External Affairs 
implicitly approved actions and did not take measures to stop the practice.375 At 
Frobisher Bay and other sites, the Americans actually opened canteens and sold 
American liquor.  Section 91 of the Northwest Territories Act prohibited the importation 
of liquor for sale or possession without the special permission of the Commissioner.  
Additionally, Section 92 of the Act prohibited the importation of liquor into the 
territories from any place outside Canada.376 These actions by U.S. personnel challenged 
Canadian authority, but the unwillingness of the government to crack down on these 
illegal practices was the primary cause.    
In early March 1948, the government attempted to improve its enforcement of 
customs regulations.  At a conference on the weather station program, the Canadians 
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finally brought up the issue of liquor permits.  Charles Hubbard suggested that liquor for 
the weather stations be supplied and relegated by the Canadians, but the Americans 
could be allowed to continue bringing in their yearly supply of cigarettes direct from 
U.S. sources.377 Rather than settle the issue, however, both the Canadians and Americans 
decided it required further study.  In the meantime, the U.S. Weather Bureau applied for 
permits to legalize the possession of liquor by their personnel and sought permission to 
operate a canteen at Resolute Bay.  On its own accord the Northwest Territories Council 
had issued the Americans Class C liquor permits and authorized the Canadian official in 
charge at Resolute to purchase and sell liquor.  At a meeting on 23 July, diplomats 
agreed that officials in charge of Arctic installations could sell liquor, so long as they 
purchased it in Canada or from the Northwest Territories Council.  In addition, the only 
cigarettes that could be sold at these posts would be those purchased in Canada or 
imported after proper customs declarations and payment of duties.378 The allies resolved 
the customs issue by July 1948, with no harm done to Canada’s sovereignty.  
 By late 1948 the Loran program and the weather stations project continued to 
operate in absence of a formal note.  The USAF had become less enthusiastic about 
making written agreements for the weather or Loran stations because of the need to 
register any such arrangement under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.  This 
surprised the Canadians who thought the USAF required formal notification to justify its 
expenditures.  The complexity of the programs also seemed to demand an agreement 
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setting forth respective responsibilities, ownership of materials, the possibility of 
Canadians taking over posts, and the problem of transport and supply.  Some Canadian 
officials also wanted to show the note to the public as proof of the strict regulations the 
Americans followed while serving in the Canadian North.  Without such an agreement, 
however, politicians could stand up in Parliament and say that the United States retained 
no rights in Canada and remained in the Arctic at the government’s pleasure.379 
Accordingly, both countries deemed the need for a formal note laying out the Loran and 
weather stations programs unnecessary.  The two countries engaged in these large scale 
projects without any official agreement.  This highlights the cooperative and informal 
working relationship that developed between the U.S. and Canada.  
 
Kilt and Cane at Fort Churchill 
 The ongoing relationship at Fort Churchill also reflected the respect of U.S. 
personnel for Canadian control and authority.  An American report from the end of 1948 
stressed the difficult conditions at the Fort, which included complete isolation from the 
amenities of civilization, crowded and inadequate living quarters, and severe weather.  
Nevertheless, the morale of the U.S. personnel remained high and they never registered a 
complaint against the Canadians,380 even though their hosts could have provided better 
facilities.  Another American report emphasized the excellent working relationship that 
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developed between the technical staff of each nation.381 Canadian reports echoed these 
sentiments.   
 In August of 1948 two member of External Affairs, Jerry Riddell and Jim 
George, visited Churchill to investigate relations on the ground.  The two men reported 
that everything they saw and everything they heard indicated that Canadian military 
authorities remained “firmly in control of the camp, and that the Americans were there 
for specific and limited purposes only, by grace rather than by right.”  Both the Canadian 
and American personnel seemed to recognize this situation and accepted it in a “casual 
and informal way that made emphasis on the letter of the agreement unnecessary.” 
Relations between personnel remained natural, friendly and informal, and the Canadian 
military authorities in the camp carried out their responsibilities in such a manner that 
“their position was accepted as a matter of course.” 382  
From the very beginning of the visit Riddell understood that the Canadians 
remained the dominant force at Churchill:   
When we arrived at Churchill, we were met at the airport by a small party 
which took us to our quarters.  Of three drivers, two were American 
soldiers and one a Canadian.  The party was in charge of a Canadian 
regimental sergeant-major complete in every detail according to the 
pattern which is familiar to us, even to waxed mustache and leather 
covered cane.  The officer who met us was a major of the Seaforth 
Highlanders, in kilts.  In spite of the presence of United States soldiers, the 
environment could not possibly have been less American in character.383 
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The base looked Canadian (or at least British), acted Canadian, and was controlled by 
Canadians. There was no apparent threat to Canada’s de facto sovereignty.  Riddell also 
underlined the importance of the Fort, which acted a giant scientific laboratory geared 
towards improving northern transportation and communication.384 Brooke Claxton 
wholeheartedly agreed with the report from External Affairs.  When he visited the Fort, 
the relationship between the Americans and Canadians also struck him as “pretty well 
ideal.”  According to Claxton, the trick to these good relations rested in the assumption 
by the Canadians of full responsibility for the housekeeping duties at the Fort.  This 
relieved the Americans of a lot of routine work and “psychologically compensate[d] 
them for their lack of control.”385  
 Fort Churchill was a prime example of relationship between Canadians and 
Americans at most permanent installations.  While the Americans could have been bitter 
at their lack of control, particularly given the money that they invested, they remained 
ideal guests. Churchill remained a distinctly Canadian post. 
 
American Respect 
 The Polaris incident and the conditions at the permanent installations highlight 
the cooperative nature of the defence relationship in the post war years.  Unauthorized 
activities and American indiscretions did occur in the Arctic, but these were relatively 
few and far between and senior American officials always fixed these mistakes.  Clearly, 
American transgressions did not represent a conspiracy by the American government to 
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steal the Canadian Arctic.  As historian Whitney Lackenbauer described, “indiscretions 
by lower level American officials (usually military) were always met by loud Canadian 
protests and were not indicative of the regard for Canadian sovereignty among high level 
U.S. decision makers.”386 The American government accepted the Canadian right to 
control events in the Arctic and took action to see its people followed suit.   
 In resolving the Polaris incident, the Canadians won a diplomatic victory and 
strengthened their role in the defence relationship with the United States.  The 
controversy represented a breach of the bilateral protocols so painstakingly constructed 
in 1946 and 1947, and the Canadians realized that they could not ignore this violation. 
They took a stand, deciding to “go to the mat” with the Americans and let the PJBD 
work out a mutually satisfactory solution.  Mutual accommodation of interests solidified 
a relationship built on cooperation and respect.   
 With a solid defence relationship in place, the Canadian decision to adopt a 
policy of gradual acquisition in the Arctic makes a great deal of sense.  The Americans 
did not wish to undermine Canada’s terrestrial claims in the region.  They just wanted 
the relationship to function smoothly, and recognized Canada’s sovereignty and control 
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Chapter 5: Naval Missions and Airstrips 
 
While the more permanent installations posed no significant threat to Canada’s 
control over the Arctic by mid-1948, worries persisted over northern naval expeditions 
and airstrips.  Canada remained completely dependent on the United States for the 
resupply of the Arctic stations and desperately attempted to find competent ways to exert 
some control over these activities.  This posed problems, given that the only Canadian 
presence on these naval missions came from observers the Americans allowed onboard 
their ships.  The Arctic airstrips placed Canada in an equally difficult position.  The 
Americans wanted these airbases for strategic purposes and planned for expanded 
operations, while Canada worried about their implications for sovereignty and authority 
in the region.  Between 1948 and 1949 these became the two most pressing issues on the 
Canadian agenda.     
The resupply mission of the summer of 1948 caused difficulties for Canadian 
officials, although it got off to a promising start.  In planning for the mission, the United 
States carefully took Canadian sensitivities into consideration.  The operation plan for 
Task Force 80 noted the difficulties that defence operations created for the Canadian 
government, given the serious division that still existed inside the government and the 
public about Canada’s participation in continental defence.387 The two most pressing 
matters emerging from the U.S. naval expedition and the other Arctic defence projects 
centred on the question of sovereignty and control of the projects and publicity.  The 
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report noted that “these issues, after numerous difficulties and altercations, finally have 
found effective answers through the efforts of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 
Canada-United States.  Care must still be taken to insure that small oversights do not 
occur to mar present friendly relations.”388 The Americans in command of the naval 
expedition understood the need to respect Canada’s interests. 
The Canadians also understood the need to better direct and watch over American 
naval activities.  Few complaints emerged from the two previous naval cruises to the 
Arctic, but Canada did not regulate the operations as extensively as it could have.  For 
instance, the Canadians never asked the Americans to disclose the routes they would take 
or to provide information on the additional studies they would perform.  In March 1948 
G.L. Magann, the Canadian ambassador in Washington, suggested that in reply to the 
American request to send a task force into the Arctic in the coming summer, the 
Canadians should demand an outline of all activities in which the expedition would 
engage.  The government required a “full picture” of what would happen during the 
expedition “so as to avoid the repetition of the confusion that arose in connection with 
the previous naval expeditions as a result of their engaging in activities without an 
entirely clear authorization having been given for them in all cases.” Magann also 
expressed concern about American planners’ lack of knowledge of the directives 
outlining joint defence publicity.389 Past events proved that the Americans did not control 
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publicity as carefully as their Canadian counterparts.  Magann hoped their attitude would 
change in preparation for the upcoming naval mission.  
 Canadian officials also set about assuring that they could send more observers on 
the 1948 mission than in previous years.  In mid-June, Hume Wrong asked Andrew 
Foster that the ten spots offered by the United States Navy be increased to eighteen.  He 
argued that the work done by the observers would benefit all involved and that he could 
not “overestimate to you the importance which is attached to this matter by my 
Government.” Wrong also admitted that the Department of Transport planned to bring 
two to three icebreakers into line over the next few years to assume a greater share of the 
supply responsibility.  The Department required experience in the far north and was  
“most anxious to acquire the necessary navigation and construction picture through 
Chouinard who has had much icebreaker experience in waters to the south of those to be 
visited by the Sea Supply Mission.”390  Hume Wrong suggested that the Canadian 
observers would be willing to sleep on the floors of the crowded U.S. ships.391 This idea 
did not sit well with Canadian officials who never wanted to give the Americans the 
upper hand while carrying out defence activities on Canadian territory.  As one report 
stated “the Americans are very conscious of creature-comforts, and it has been brought 
home to me in talks even with people normally as good-natured as Mr. Foster and Miss 
Tibbetts that we have lost face by making this offer.  I am so sorry this one slipped past 
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me this year, but it just did not register, somehow (one of the flaws of a militaristic 
training, no doubt).”392 The Canadians would never again suggest that their observers 
could sleep on the floor, below the Americans in their comfortable cots.   
 Eighteen Canadian observers from several different departments accompanied 
Task Force 80.  By the time the ships left Boston everything appeared in order and the 
Canadians seemed in firm control of the situation.  In their hands they held operation 
plans for the expedition, including details of all the experiments that the Americans 
hoped to carry out.  Nevertheless, the observers began to send worrisome reports back to 
their departments and agencies.  On 8 August 1948, Tom Weir from Mines and 
Resources informed Trevor Lloyd that an icebreaker, the USS Edisto, broke a record by 
pushing to a position beyond Cape Sheridan on Ellesmere Island.   Weir noted that even 
in the age of atomic power, a ship could only make only it slightly further North than the 
explorer Robert Peary did in 1908.  The Edisto had nonetheless ventured further into the 
Arctic ice than any ship before her.  Weir understood the implications of the 
accomplishment, telling Lloyd “it is really atomic isn’t it?  It is really something to do 
for Canadians in the near future, and it is in my opinion good news for Dr. Keenleyside 
and for you in their efforts to get full support of [the] Canadian Government for Arctic 
projects.”393 Weir hoped the American success would embarrass his government into 
deploying its own ships into the Arctic.    
 The Canadian government also understood the implications of the Edisto’s 
accomplishment.  A report on the sea supply mission explained that “this event is, you 
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will see, partly ‘buried’ in the draft release simply because it appears dangerous, from 
the sovereignty point of view, to make an official announcement to the effect that the 
ships went further afield than did that of the British explorer Nares (who went much 
further himself by sled).”394  D.M. Johnson suggested that the press statement on the 
expedition not mention the journey of the Edisto.  He argued that those in the United 
States who still toyed with the idea of claiming territory in the Canadian North often 
focused on the northern part of Ellesmere Island and any admission of the Edisto’s 
accomplishment would likely encourage them.395 Although this would be the ideal 
solution, avoiding any sovereignty fallout and averting embarrassment, officials 
realistically feared one of the 700 U.S. navy personnel assigned to the mission would 
leak the accomplishment.396 As a result, the government chose to release the news to the 
press, but made the rather extraordinary feat as ordinary as possible.   
 Another event transpired during the mission that irritated the Canadian 
government much more than Edisto’s voyage past Cape Sheridan.  Prior to giving 
approval for the expedition, the Canadian government insisted that the USN provide the 
proposed route of the Task Force and required the U.S. commanders to seek Canadian 
approval before they took any alternate routes.397 The government did not want the 
Americans to feel as though they could sail anywhere in the Arctic at their own 
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discretion.  Unfortunately, the Americans decided to use the Fury and Hecla Strait on the 
return trip to Boston.  Captain Dufek, the Task Force commander, notified the senior 
Canadian observer, but it remained his responsibility to inform the Canadian 
government.  He failed to do so.398 Since the USS Wyandot, a transport ship attached to 
the expedition, returned via the proposed original route, Canadian officials later 
concluded that “it is plain from the information already available that the change was 
made not for operational reasons but because Captain Dufek wished to do so and because 
he had forgotten the instruction which said he was not to change his route without 
permission.”399 Dufek’s actions also annoyed the Canadians because the two U.S 
icebreakers became the first ships to successfully transit the Fury and Hecla Strait. 
This breach of protocol challenged Canada’s control over what happened in the 
Arctic, and Canadian officials set about correcting the situation.  They wanted to ensure 
the Americans understood that in future naval operations in the northern waters “there 
must be no further excursions into areas that are quite irrelevant to the weather station 
programme.”400 The Canadians also informed USN authorities that deviation from 
previously agreed upon plans would greatly impede the ability of the U.S. to secure 
approval from Canada for its defence proposals.401 Several Canadian officials wanted to 
launch a complaint against the unauthorized use of the Fury and Hecla Strait, but G.L. 
Magann doubted the validity of Canada’s case.  Once before the ambassador had made a 
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protest to the State Department about something already approved by the Canadian Joint 
Staff, and he did not want to make the same mistake. He decided to ensure that some 
section of the RCN had indeed informed the USN of the need to seek the government’s 
approval before travelling though the Strait.402 He discovered that Commander Fife, an 
observer on the Edisto, telephoned Ottawa to ask Naval Headquarters for charts of the 
Strait.  The Chief of the Naval Staff quickly called the Canadian Joint Staff with 
instructions to find out why the task force required these charts.  The Joint Staff started 
asking questions around Washington and found that, while the USN did not plan to enter 
the strait, if these plans changed the Chief of Naval Operations would be consulted.  
Magann could not tell if anyone involved cared that the Chief of Naval Operations was 
an American, not Canadian.403 Either way the Canadians soon dropped the matter. 
Magann’s investigation revealed some troubling issues that required clarification.  
All of the conversations that Magann discovered took place over the telephone, leaving 
him with no documentary evidence.  In addition, Lieutenant Russel, the Joint Staff man 
who actually looked into the matter, took his leave in Mexico. The story given to 
Magann came from another officer who overheard the conversation.  According to this 
officer, Russell never indicated to the Americans that they would have to seek Canadian 
permission before changing course.  “If, of course, it turns out that there is some usable 
evidence that Russell told the United States Navy that the approval of the Canadian 
Government must be obtained,” Magann noted, “our hand in taking this up with the State 
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Department would be greatly strengthened.”404 The ambassador never found any.  
Indeed, Russell may have approved the changing of the route through his silence, making 
the whole issue at least partially Canada’s fault.    
Magann’s investigation revealed that a lack of effective coordination in 
continental defence planning played a role in the USN’s decision to use the Fury and 
Hecla Strait. While the American commander understood that he had to consult a 
Canadian authority figure if he changed the mission’s route (and he failed to do this) a 
lack of concerted effort on the Canadian side also contributed to the confusion.  With the 
results of this investigation fresh in his mind, Magann wrote a far gentler and less 
accusatory letter to William Snow, his contact at the State Department, than originally 
intended.  He inquired as to what happened and reminded the State Department of the 
need to inform the Canadian government before deviating from approved plans. 405    
The Americans did not accept the gentle criticism of their actions.  Snow replied 
that prior to the voyage the Canadian government only insisted that it be told the 
probable routes and left the USN with the impression that the actual routes need not be 
rigidly followed.  Even if the Canadian government asked for the specific routes the 
USN would take, the commander required some operational latitude given the hazards of 
travel in the Arctic waters.  In addition, one of the Canadian observers on the mission 
sponsored the decision to use the Fury and Hecla Strait.406 Snow had certainly raised 
some valid points, and Magann saw “a great deal of merit in Mr. Snow’s implied 
                                                
404 G.L. Magann to Mr. Johnson, 27 September 1948, LAC, RG 25, vol. 3841, file 9061-H-40. 
405 G.L. Magann to Mr. Johnson, 27 September 1948, LAC, RG 25, vol. 3841, file 9061-H-40.   
406 William P. Snow, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs, to Mr. Magann, Canadian Embassy, 11 
October 1948, LAC, RG 25, vol. 3841, file 9061-G-40. 
 
 151 
criticism of the relatively loose way we tie up affairs of this nature.”407 Magann argued 
that a formal exchange of letters should lay out the conditions that the Canadian 
government wanted followed prior to the next mission to the Arctic.   
Magann still believed that Canada could complain about Dufek’s ‘operational 
decision’ to change routes. The ambassador argued that it would have been “only 
common sense on the part of Captain Dufek to send telegraphic notice that he had found 
it necessary to change the route for operational reasons.”408 Furthermore, since the 
Wyandot returned to Boston using the accepted route, Dufek did not change the route for 
operational reasons.  He simply wanted to do so.  The Canadians, satisfied that the USN 
would take disciplinary action against Dufek, made no formal complaint.  The Canadians 
later found out that the Commander was “in very hot water” for his mistake.409 
A third event during the resupply mission of Task Force 80 also caused the 
Canadian government consternation.  In early August, Charles Hubbard, who 
accompanied the mission, reconnoitred Ellesmere Island.  He came across a whiskey 
bottle full of papers in a cairn on Cape Sheridan.  The documents came from Captain R.E 
Peary’s USN expedition of 1905 and from they voyage of G.S. Nares in 1876.  On 4 
August, Captain Chouniard, the senior Canadian observer, viewed the documents in 
Dufek’s cabin.  The commander told the Canadian that he wanted to take these relics to 
the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis and asked him to make copies of the documents.   
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As Chouinard set about making the copies, the other observers insisted that he demand 
the Americans place the documents in his custody.  According to the old seaman, “the 
opinions voiced had all the makings of a very unpleasant situation which was averted 
when I advised them that due thought had been given to such action and I had decided 
that it would be neither polite or politic to many any such demands at the moment.” He 
feared that if the Canadians made an issue over custody of these documents, the 
Americans might ignore them the next time U.S. personnel made a discovery.410 Again 
both the Americans and Canadians erred.  Hubbard, involved in weather station planning 
since the start, and the other U.S. officers should have been aware of the Northwest 
Territories Administration regulations that forbade anyone from taking archaeological 
material from the Canadian Arctic.  The Canadian observers also should have known 
about this regulation, chastised Hubbard for removing the whiskey bottle without a 
permit, and confiscated the materials.  The Canadians had much to learn.  An 
occurrence at Slidre Fiord also annoyed the Canadians.  Two American servicemen went 
ashore and shot four hares in violation of the Canadian Game Laws for the Arctic 
Preserve.  John P. Kelsall, an observer from the Dominion Wildlife Service, understood 
that the men did not know of the Game Laws, but he informed an American officer that 
he had to tell Ottawa.  The Americans took the offense seriously and publicly punished 
both men.  Besides this one case, Kelsall concluded that “all game laws have been 
adhered to in the most gratifying manner and …there can be no doubt in the mind of 
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anyone that Canadian Game laws will be respected at all times.”411 In this case Canadian 
observers proved sharp enough to note and reprimand an American violation of approved 
conduct.  In other situations the observers made careless errors.  
  In an incredible lapse in judgement, Captain Chouinard informed his American 
hosts of his desire to name points in the Arctic after Captain Dufek and the other 
American officers on the expedition.  Obviously, the Canadian government did not want 
points in the Arctic where Canadians rarely set foot named after Americans.  While 
Ottawa officials managed to avoid an awkward situation by claiming Canada did not 
name places after living people, a wiser Canadian observer would never have created 
such a situation.412 Chouinard did not even realize his error when the Canadian 
government rejected his request and he was upset by the stipulation that land could only 
be named after a deceased person.413 In the future, Canadian observers would require 
better training to avoid such mistakes.  
Accompanying these problems was a wave of complaints from the Canadian 
observers lamenting their treatment on the mission and the general situation in the 
Arctic.  Lt. MacLean, a Canadian observer on loan from the RCN, explained that “with 
the exception of a few of the highest officers on the mission, none of the United States 
personnel aboard was aware that the mission was a joint enterprise.” Most of the 
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Americana did not realize the Canadians contributed to the resupply mission and 
commanded the weather stations.  To MacLean it seemed as though everyone thought 
Hubbard, who “palpably kept himself in the limelight,” controlled everything.  The 
lieutenant argued that Canada must provide physical evidence of its participation in the 
Arctic projects.  Ideally, either RCN ships should accompany the next mission or RCAF 
aircraft make an appearance overhead.  Without some kind of symbol representing 
Canada “the United States personnel were left with the firm impression (not altogether 
unfounded) that they were the only people taking an interest in that part of the Arctic.”414 
MacLean considered the Canadian presence in the Arctic inadequate.   
 The other observers on the mission echoed MacLean’s criticisms and 
suggestions.  Kelsall complained about the USN’s tendency to treat the Canadian civilian 
scientists as an “unavoidable nuisance.”415 Captain Chouinard lamented that Canada did 
not have a ship capable of operating in the Arctic waters.  “While waiting to have a 
proper ship to be built for this region, it is felt that steps must be taken now to show the 
Canadian flag in one of the most important parts of the world due to its nearness to the 
Pole,” he advised. “This importance is stressed by other foreign countries who have 
operated in the area for the last three seasons.” Chouinard also wanted Canada to do 
more to investigate the potential geological and meteorological value of Ellesmere 
Island.416 Commander Fife explained that Canada would need to strengthen its 
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sovereignty in the Arctic before the U.S started to “consider it hers by reason of 
investment made.” He wanted Canadian capabilities in the region built up, for “it is 
better to be self-reliant than wait for the crumbs which fall from the rich man’s table.”417  
The observers also wanted more training the next year and asked that an official 
Canadian leader be assigned to the observer party.418 The government chose its observers 
at the “eleventh hour last summer and there was no attempt to brief even the leaders of 
the two Canadian parties in their responsibilities.”419 The lack of training given to the 
observers showed throughout the mission.  Although the Canadians considered the sea 
supply missions to be a civilian undertaking in which the USN gave a helping hand, the 
naval personnel on the voyage refused to talk as freely to a civilian as they would a 
member of the armed forces.  MacLean suggested that the leader of the Canadian party 
and most of the observers come from the military.420 Other observers commented that 
their hosts gave them little access on the voyage and did not let them see everything they 
wanted.421 The same complaints had surfaced in 1946.  The Canadians would have to fix 
the problem for the next mission.  
 Prior to Task Force 80, Canada insisted that only joint press releases be issued at 
the beginning and end of the mission. As soon as the expedition returned to Boston, 
however, leaked information began to find its way into the newspapers, and U.S. 
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government sources alluded to the fact that the Truman administration wanted to release 
more details on the expedition but the Canadians would not allow it.422 Charles Hubbard, 
enjoying his position in the limelight a little too much, became one of the main sources 
of these leaks.  William Snow actually sat him down and told him that the rules on 
publicity prohibited him from making any statement without approval from both 
governments.  Quotes from Hubbard nevertheless appeared in the news, and a photo of 
him in his office, looking every bit the part of the Arctic explorer with a roll of maps on 
his lap, appeared in The Times.  Snow believed that Hubbard, with his “mania for 
publicity,” spoke to the press before their talk.423 He was as angered by this blatant 
breach of protocol as the Canadians.424 
 The Canadians showed more restraint.  When the Deputy Minister of Transport, 
Jean Lessard, visited the expedition at Ellesmere Island, Captain Chouinard picked up a 
can of potatoes left by Nares or Perry and presented it to the Minister as a photographer 
took their picture.  After the expedition’s completion Lessard “wished to know whether 
this touching ceremony should be recorded in the deathless pages of the newspapers.”425 
The Under-Secretary for External Affairs insisted that: 
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its release might involve us in some embarrassment since, after the recent 
Washington leakages regarding the Sea Supply Mission which led to 
widespread interest in the activities of the Mission, we not only took the 
U.S. authorities to task for the leakages but informed them that, in 
accordance with the decisions reached at an interdepartmental meeting at 
which your Department was represented, the authorities here wanted the 
Mission to drop into obscurity.426 
 
This conclusion fell in line with the repeated instructions from Claxton that “everyone… 
forget about the Sea Supply Mission.”427 The Canadians wanted to draw attention away 
from defence projects in the North.  This would have the dual benefit of not raising 
public anxiety about the extent of U.S. activities in the region, and of avoiding any 
further strain in Canada’s relations with the USSR.428  
 The Canadians did make their dissatisfaction with the American press leakages 
known.  When they decided to release six photos of the voyage along with attached 
captions to the press, External Affairs asked George Magann to point out “that the 
Canadian Government authorized the issue of both the release and photographs only with 
the greatest reluctance and as a result of the fact that the press has been informed that the 
documents and the photographs were available but were being held up by the Canadian 
Government.”429 External Affairs thought that the State Department and U.S. military 
handled the joint directive on press irresponsibly.430 Leaked publicity remained a source 
of tension in the Canadian-American defence relationship.  
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Winter Cruises in the Arctic 
 The winter months usually offered a respite from the heightened tempo of 
defence activities that occurred in the Arctic during the summer.  In early December 
1948, however, the USN sought permission for the USS Edisto to operate in the waters 
off Baffin, Devon and Bylot islands the following January and February.  The purposes 
of the operation reflected the American military’s overall goal of gaining more 
experience in the Arctic region.431 The Americans made a point of asking for permission 
to enter Canadian territorial waters, asked the Canadians to send observers, promised to 
provide Canada with copies of all reports made on the voyage, and obtained all of the 
proper permits and licences.432 Canadian officials understood the operation would 
provide useful data and wanted to accept the American request, but they had also learned 
from their past mistakes.  They decided that before approving the American request they 
wanted to know of all the projects the U.S. wished to undertake, all the aircraft involved, 
any additional investigations contemplated, and the type of training that would be 
undertaken.433 
     When the project went before the Chiefs of Staff, they argued that in the future 
they wanted proposals for the movement of U.S. ships in Canadians waters to be as 
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specific as possible.434 On 11 January the Canadians decided to allow the Edisto to 
operate in the Arctic in February, as long as the Americans provided a detailed operation 
plan.435 Before External Affairs gave Canada’s approval to the State Department, the 
Americans informed the Canadian embassy that the USN planned to take photographers 
from the National Geographic, Life and the Evening Star on the voyage.  The State 
Department assured the Canadians that the newsmen would not join the ship until it 
docked in Greenland after leaving Canadian waters.  This provided little solace to the 
Canadians who replied that after joining the ship the newsmen would no doubt learn 
many details about the Canadian portion of the voyage.436 Why would a service 
expedition collecting confidential data even allow the reporters to tag along?  In previous 
expeditions, Canadian and American civilian scientists had to go through security checks 
to gain ‘Secret’ clearance.  
 The publicity directives called for intergovernmental consultation before either 
country allowed journalists to go north.  Given that these journalists would undoubtedly 
write about the Canadian portion of the journey, the USN should have consulted with 
Ottawa. Now the only way to avoid unwanted publicity was to cancel the Canadian 
portion of the journey.  Although such a course would demonstrate how seriously the 
Canadians took publicity matters, it would also invite criticism that they allowed 
concerns about bad press to impede continental security preparations.  Furthermore, any 
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denial of access to journalists might itself stir up bad press.  It would also be difficult for 
the Canadians to forbid the Americans from picking up journalists in a foreign port if 
that is what they wanted to do.  The only real solution was to pick up the journalists only 
after the ship left the Canadian Arctic, and then request that any mention of the Canadian 
portion of the voyage be reviewed.437 The Americans put the Canadians in a tough 
position with few desirable options. 
 While the Canadians did not launch a formal protest, G.L. Magann reminded 
William Snow of the need for closer consultation on publicity and the difficulties created 
by arrangements made with the press without Canadian knowledge.  On another note, the 
ambassador suggested that a press release be issued at the beginning of the expedition, or 
both governments would be swamped with numerous media inquiries.438 The Americans, 
however, did not come to a quick decision and the voyage left for the Arctic with no 
publicity.  The matter came to a head when one of the helicopters attached to the Edisto 
crashed, and one crew member was killed.  G.L. Magann “took advantage of the 
occasion to point out to the State Department that had the United States authorities 
reached a decision earlier about a press release they would not be in their present 
embarrassing position.”439 The Canadians hoped that the incident would force the 
Americans to make quicker decisions about publicity in ensuing missions.    
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 While the publicity problems surrounding the Edisto were bothersome, the 
voyage remained an overall success.  It gathered new information, reporters consulted 
the Canadians before they released their stories, and the Americans treated the Canadian 
observers in a respectful manner.  Captain F.A. Germain noted that “the cordial relations 
between the Officers of the ship and the Canadian party established on the first day of 
joining, continued throughout the voyage.  Every effort was made for the comfort and 
convenience of the party insofar as the facilities of the ship would permit, and the fullest 
co-operation was received to carry out the duties of observers.”440 The success of the 
operation and the Canadian participation encouraged Canadian officials planning for the 
annual resupply mission of 1949.     
 
Canadian Capabilities, Sovereignty, and the Resupply Missions of 1949-1950 
 In the previous resupply missions the Americans asked for little Canadian 
assistance beyond the occasional chart or map.  This changed as planning began for the 
summer mission of 1949.  In early March 1949 the State Department indicated that, 
owing to the demands of the Berlin airlift, the USAF would be unable to carry supplies 
to Alert, the proposed site for a new weather station on the northern tip of Ellesmere 
Island.  As the Soviets blockaded Berlin, the U.S. needed to use its resources, including 
most of its heavy transport aircraft, to keep the city supplied.  Another complication 
arose after the U.S. icebreaker Eastwind collided with a merchant ship and suffered 
damage from the resulting fire, barring it from participation in that summer’s naval 
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mission to the Arctic.  The State Department reminded the Canadians that at a joint 
meeting on 6 January, all agreed on the importance of establishing Alert as soon as 
possible.  To meet this goal, the State Department asked if the Canadian icebreaker N.B. 
MacLean could participate in the supply expedition for the first two and half weeks of 
August and carry materials to Alert.441   
As the only powerful icebreaker owned by the Department of Transport, the N.B. 
McLean was heavily booked providing escort assistance to vessels entering Hudson Bay 
in the summer months and delivering supplies to posts along its shores.  Transport 
simply could not spare the ship for the weeks it would take to deliver supplies to Alert.  
In responding to inquiries from External Affairs about the American request, J.C. 
Lessard remarked that “the Department of Transport regrets very much having to take 
this decision.  It would certainly give me great pleasure to have the Canadian flag carried 
to the north of Ellesmere Island, but we cannot sacrifice the other important 
commitments which fall upon Transport in order that this may be achieved.”442 Simply 
put, the other tasks were more important than the establishment of Alert.  The Americans 
were told that the McLean could not be used, although the Canadians did promise to 
hasten the construction of an RCN icebreaker.443  
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 While the Canadians worried about their inability to provide transport assistance 
during the sea supply mission, they set about preparing the observers who would be 
attached to the voyage. In April 1949 the Northwest Territories Administration chose 
J.W. Burton, a former commander in the RCAF and a Deputy Director of Intelligence 
during the war, to act as the senior observer.444 Burton threw himself into the task with a 
whole hearted commitment to study all aspects of the upcoming voyage.  Notably, 
Burton began to ask questions about Canada’s sovereignty that few in the government 
had ever seriously explored.  
 Canadian officials understood that Canada’s claims in the Arctic required 
protection as American interest in the region grew, but few explored the contentious 
legal issues surrounding sovereignty, especially in relation to the waters and ice of the 
Arctic Archipelago.  When Canadian officials pondered sovereignty questions they 
usually focused on terrestrial claims or the sector principle.  When in mid-April 1948 the 
Department of Mines and Resources received a request that it prepare an article on 
Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic for inclusion in an Arctic Encyclopaedia prepared by 
Vilhjalmur Stefansson, the Deputy Minister sought a qualified person to write the article 
in his department or in External Affairs.  The Minister, however, concluded “that no 
person with adequate qualifications or who could be spared for the purpose is available 
in either department.”445 Although both departments thought that an authoritative paper 
should be produced for the Encyclopaedia, neither could provide someone with the 
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necessary expertise.  After spending the previous two years worrying about sovereignty 
and trying to protect it, the government still lacked an expert on the subject.    
 The latest Canadian attempt to investigate the legal aspects of sovereignty in the 
Arctic also focused on the sector principle and effective occupation.  The report 
remained hopeful that recent events in the Arctic actually strengthened Canada’s claim to 
the region.  The report argued “it is generally agreed in international law, that, should no 
foreign state oppose your claim to a certain territory and this condition last during a 
sufficient period of time, your claim may be implicitly recognized.” It also mentioned 
that all over the world “every time there is need to refer to the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago, it is done without implying any doubt as to Canadian sovereignty.”446 Still, 
the Canadian sovereignty file did not deal with any other pressing legal issues in the 
Arctic that Burton began exploring, such as the contentious questions surrounding 
territorial waters and permanent ice.  He requested that Wright learn the government’s 
opinion on the following problems, which are worth quoting in full:   
(a)Does the Canadian Government consider that, “the waters lying within 
the Islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago to be under Canadian 
Sovereignty?”  
(b)At what distance seaward from the outer Islands of the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago does the Canadian Government consider that, “the Canadian 
Territorial waters extend?” (Low water mark, 3 miles, 12 miles, or?) 
(c)Regarding a permanent surface of ice extending from the coast out to 
sea; does the Canadian Government consider that,  
(1) “ A permanent surface of ice extending from the coast outward to sea a 
continuation of the land and that such a area should be subject to the same 
sovereignty as the land itself,” 
(2) “A permanent ice surface should be assimilated to water and not 
subject to national sovereignty beyond the Territorial water limits?”447  
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These were relevant questions, but the Canadian government had never formulated a 
strong opinion on any of them.   
 Burton, however, performed a lot of research on the issues, examining multiple 
works on territorial waters and permanent ice.  In a letter to J.G. Wright, he discussed the 
opinions on territorial waters expressed by Shawcross and Beaumont in their treatise on 
International Law published in 1945.  The book held that territorial waters, over which a 
nation has complete sovereignty, usually extend three miles from the coast.  In some 
cases, like bays, straits, and estuaries, this three miles limit could be expanded.  Burton 
understood that this opinion on bays and straits could be of great importance to Canada’s 
Arctic and suggested that the Legal Division of External Affairs develop an opinion on 
Canada’s claims.448  
 In another letter to Wright, Burton explored the prospect of claiming sovereignty 
over the permanent ice in the Arctic and outlined the views of leading experts on the 
subject.  Several scholars postulated that a permanent surface of ice extending from the 
coast outward to sea should be considered a continuation of land and become subject to a 
state’s sovereignty.  In the 1920’s S.V. Sigrist wrote that no difference existed between 
frozen land and immobile ice, given that transportation was equally possible on both.  
Other experts disagreed.  Gustav Smedal associated the ice in the Arctic with the high 
seas and thought that no nation could assume sovereignty over it.  L. Oppenheim 
believed that since occupation of the ice on a permanent basis was impossible, no 
effective sovereignty could be exercised over the area, an opinion held by several 
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others.449 Burton assumed that the government would accept the view that permanent ice 
in the Arctic within the territorial limit fell under Canada’s sovereignty, but there is no 
indication in the documentary evidence that the government prepared decisive answers to 
his questions.               
 Burton’s deep interest in his duties mirrored the Canadian government’s new 
interest in training its observers, who received three full days of instruction from 
specialists on topics such as the Northwest Territories, Tides and Currents, Ice, Geology 
and the RCMP.450 This training prepared them to deal with any violations of Canadian 
ordinances that might occur.  Hugh Keenleyside gave the closing address to the 
observers at the end of the training and remarked:   
As you know, Sovereignty over the Canadian Arctic carries with it duties 
and obligations.  We must make our administration of the area active and 
complete.  This not only involves vigorous administration and supervision 
of all activities carried on in the area but it also means a continuous, close 
study of the territory from every aspect likely to lead to its greater 
development or usefulness.  Your activities, of course, being primarily 
devoted to scientific observation and investigation, would come under the 
second category.  Your aim, in brief, is to extend our field of scientific 
knowledge.451 
 
The observers were told that Burton was in charge, to bring all problems to him, and he 
would make representations to the American Commanding Officer. 
 The Canadian government still suffered from a lack of coordination and 
communication.  After External Affairs pressured the State Department to accept all of 
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the Canadian observers nominated for the mission, by the beginning of July some 
security checks remained outstanding.452 After the expedition, complaints also arose over 
the Canadian failure to properly coordinate requirements for air and ground 
reconnaissance with the USN’s Chief of Operations, the commander of the resupply 
mission, and the Arctic Projects section of the U.S. Weather Bureau.453 These Canadian 
requests should have been organized and relayed to the American in the early stages of 
planning for the operation.      
 Once again, the actual expedition went smoothly. The Americans took steps to 
ensure that they did not repeat previous mistakes, and only one minor breach of conduct 
occurred during the entire operation.  As the mission travelled in the waters of Radstock 
Bay, Charles Hubbard went ashore and discovered two wooden mallet heads. 454 
Apparently no one rebuked Hubbard for his violation of the Northwest Territories 
Archaeological Ordinance the previous summer.  After his discovery, Hubbard showed 
the artefacts to J.W. Burton and explained that he hoped to take them home as souvenirs.  
Unlike Chouinard, who allowed the Americans to take artefacts from the Arctic in 1948, 
Burton explained to Hubbard that no one could disturb any site of historical importance 
or remove any artefact without a permit from the Northwest Territories.  Hubbard denied 
any knowledge of the ordinance, insisted that he did not want to breach any Canadian 
regulation, and immediately gave the mallets to Burton, who in turn brought them home 
for analysis.  When Burton recounted the event he explained that “Canadian Sovereignty 
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has been recognized by an Official of the United States Government.”455 A few months 
later, after the Canadians found little of historical value in the mallets, they gave the 
artefacts back to Hubbard.456 Although it seems somewhat odd to create a fuss about two 
mallet heads, Hubbard’s actions represented an American concession of the Canadian 
right to command in the Arctic.    
 The Canadians continued to carefully review defence plans through 1949.  In 
December, the U.S. embassy requested permission for the Edisto to enter Canadian 
waters in the Hudson Strait, Davis Strait and Baffin Bay during the course of another 
winter cruise to be held in January and February 1950.  The Canadians approved the 
request by the end of December.457 J.C. Lessard sent one of his most experienced 
icebreaker officers on the voyage as an observer with specific instructions to obtain 
information on icebreaking in the Arctic and to write a daily report on the mission’s 
activities.458 
 Despite Lessard’s careful instructions to his observer, the Americans conducted 
unauthorized activities in Canada’s northern waters.  The USS Edisto visited Hamilton 
Inlet, an action outside the parameters agreed upon by External Affairs and the State 
Department.  Approval to carry out this side project should have been formally requested 
through diplomatic channels.  Instead the USN attempted to go through service 
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channels.459 Brigadier J.D.B. Smith of the Canadian Joint Staff commented that “I should 
think that it would be abundantly clear to the U.S. authorities that we only intended that 
matters coming within the framework of the proposal that was approved by Mr. Claxton 
should be worked our through Service Channels and that we were not suggesting that 
proposals to extend the scope of the cruise in Canadian waters be raised through those 
channels.”460 Although the use of Hamilton Inlet did not overly concern the Canadian 
government (which saw this area as secure from a sovereignty standpoint), the 
Americans had again violated the principle of consultation and coordination established 
for joint defence operations.  The Canadians informally approached the Americans with 
the problem and insisted that before using service channels they should consider whether 
the Canadian government actually gave them permission to do so.461  
 The Canadians remained diligent as they entered into planning for the summer 
supply mission of 1950.  In a memorandum to J.G. Wright, Burton again asked for 
information relating to sovereignty over the Arctic waters and ice.  He noted that his 
request in 1949 went unanswered and he hoped for some response before the 1950 
expedition began.462 In late 1949 the ACND met to discuss the Prime Minister’s intent to 
make the Gulf of St. Lawrence inland waters, as well as the need for a coherent policy on 
Canada’s territorial waters.  The addition of Newfoundland to Canada surrounded the 
Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the committee noted that to secure Canada’s sovereignty over 
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these waters the government should employ the headland to headland theory it used in 
1937 to claim the Hudson Strait as territorial waters.  The committee, however, 
cautioned that if the International Court rejected this theory in the Gulf of St. Lawrence 
case, any future Canadian attempt to use this method to secure the Arctic waters would 
be weakened.463 This seems to be the extent of Canadian discussion on the Arctic waters 
during this period, and once again Burton’s questions did not receive a formal reply from 
the government.   
 As the planning for the mission continued through the spring, the close 
relationship between the Canadian and American planners became more evident.  Many 
of these men worked together for years and they handled the planning in an efficient and 
friendly manner.  In May, Hubbard spoke to Burton privately about retrieving some old 
meteorological instruments from Fort Conger on Northeastern Ellesmere Island.464  
Hubbard clearly learned his lesson after the events involving the mallet heads, and now 
sought Canadian permission before he tampered with another historical site in the Arctic.  
In the end of May Hubbard received his Archaeological Sites Ordinance permit.465 
 One again the government expanded and refined the role of the Canadian 
observers.  The Northwest Territories Administration informed Burton that he would be 
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the official Canadian representative on the mission and that he needed to “ensure that 
while travelling within the Canadian Arctic Sector and its territorial waters adjacent 
thereto, that Canada’s sovereignty is respected and her laws and ordinances are enforced. 
Further, you will ensure that Canada’s prestige is maintained in every respect during the 
entire Mission.” To accomplish this, Burton was made into a Game Officer, a notary 
public, a coroner, and given the authority to issue licenses to scientists, explorers, 
archaeologists and ethnologists.466 The government also clearly defined its expectations 
for the other observers.  They would examine sites for the establishment of ground 
control fixations, engage in geological reconnaissance of coal deposits on Ellesmere and 
Melville Islands, and conduct biological, hydrographical, topographical, geological, 
geographical and wild life land reconnaissance studies, particularly of those areas close 
to stations and those areas of strategic and economic importance.  They would also study 
icebreaker designs and operation, seek out future RCMP detachment sites, and 
investigate ice, navigation, living and working conditions.467 More and more the 
observers’ role was to assist Canada in learning about its Arctic, an essential element in 
establishing control.  With such explicit instructions the sea supply mission was a 
success with no infractions against Canada’s sovereignty.  
 
The Arctic Airfields 
 By 1948 the Canadian government became aware of the American desire to 
increase the number of airstrips in the Arctic.  Canadian officials constantly worried 
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about the size of these airfields and American intentions to develop and enlarge them.  
Already in 22 October 1947 Air Vice Marshal Morfee learned from Colonel C.H. 
Deerwester that the United States planned to improve the airstrip at Eureka Sound to 
make it usable all year round by C-47’s and expand the airstrip at Resolute from 6400 
feet to 10,000 feet in length making it usable by the heaviest of aircraft.468 In his 
astonished reply Morfee claimed that:  
plans for the development of extensive facilities at Resolute Bay came to 
me as a complete surprise. You will recall that the present establishment is 
one of those covered by joint agreement between the Canadian and U.S. 
Governments, that it relates to weather only…Any development at this 
point or elsewhere in Canada of the kind and significance mentioned by 
General Gaffney would, of course, be one for consideration of the highest 
government level.469 
 
Deerwester seemed annoyed by the Canadian sensitivity towards expanded air facilities 
at the weather stations.  He noted that he never used the word ‘extensive’ to describe the 
planned facility at Resolute Bay and pointed out that if the American military ever 
planned such facilities the Canadian government would be informed.  Deerwester argued 
that there was a real need for suitable runways because the two stations required a supply 
lift every month.  He concluded that he did not see how the extension of the Resolute 
airstrip constituted extensive and inappropriate development.470 
 Deerwester’s letter did nothing to alleviate Canadian concerns. The Chief of the 
Air Staff recognized the important policy questions raised by the American request.  Air 
Vice Marshal Curtis wanted to know the motivation behind the American desire to 
expand the airstrip at Resolute Bay.  Would the strips simply be used for supply 
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purposes? He also wanted to know who would be responsible for their maintenance and 
control, and whether the government’s policy of retaining title to all installations built in 
the Arctic actually worked if the Americans paid for all of the costs associated with the 
airstrips?471 The Chiefs of Staff Committee discussed the proposed airfield extension on 
7 January 1948, and explored whether the program proposed by the Americans fell 
within plans already approved by the Canadian government - a cornerstone of the 
Canadian-American defence relationship.472 The original guidelines established for the 
weather stations recognized the need for an air strip to shuttle in supplies, but the new 
American plans seemed excessive.  
 The Chiefs of Staff assessed that, because sea transportation north and east of the 
Mackenzie River Delta remained unreliable, a centrally located supply centre was 
needed to serve the weather stations in the Canadian Arctic.  Resolute Bay was an ideal 
choice, given the strategic potential of the base and the interest of the U.S. Strategic Air 
Force in it.  Should a hostile force attack the continent by way of the Arctic, a base at 
Resolute Bay would provide an operating position within 1500 miles of any enemy 
installations situated in Franz Josef Land or Spitsbergen, thus facilitating offensive 
action.  The committee also speculated that the Americans might be interested in turning 
Resolute into the apex of an outer triangular early warning system.473 Above all else, the 
Chiefs of Staff worried about establishing a negative precedent for the situation in the 
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Arctic.474 They recognized that if one northern base had all of this potential, any of them 
could be similarly developed - at great cost to Canada financially and in terms of its 
sovereignty. 
 The Chiefs of Staff Committee recognized that Canada retained only three 
options, given the importance the Americans placed on the airstrips.  It could proceed 
with the development of an airstrip at Resolute Bay on a joint Canada-U.S. basis, allow 
the base to be developed as an American project, or provide the necessary transportation 
services and establish the airstrips independently.  The Committee recommended that the 
CDC accept the first option.475 At its next meeting, the CDC accepted the 
recommendation but demanded that the national responsibilities should be the same as 
the ones accepted for the weather and Loran stations, with the air facilities under 
Canadian command.476 The Canadians thus approved plans to expand the airstrip in 
February.  In the 1948 construction season, however, the Americans decided to expand 
the runway to 10,000 feet without any of the additional facilities that Deerwester had 
proposed.  The Americans informed the Canadians that they required no assistance and 
would handle construction on their own.477 The Cabinet Defence Committee, however, 
refused to accept this proposal, fearing that it would give the Americans too much 
control of the project.  It wanted Canada to participate in establishing the new facilities at 
the station.478 The American plans for Resolute eventually fizzled out, however, and by 
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1950 both countries wanted to Canadianize all the airstrips.479 That year, the RCAF took 
responsibility for the airbase at Resolute Bay and the facilities at Frobisher Bay.480   
 The Canadians desperately sought to avoid negative publicity about the airstrips.  
When one proposed press release about the weather stations noted that small airstrips 
would be established at the stations, Pearson objected.  He suggested that “it would be 
preferable not to designate any particular airstrip as “small” since that immediately 
raised the question as to which of the air strips were large.”481 Eventually the Canadians 
and Americans decided that details on airstrips, including the length of runways, plans 
for expansion, and new installations, should be classified.482 The Canadians did not want 
the public or the Soviets to perceive that bomber bases were being built in the Arctic. 
 
Neutralizing the Threat 
 By 1950, Canadian officials neutralized the greatest threat to Canada’s control 
over the Arctic: the naval resupply missions.  The Canadians refined their approach to 
the missions, remained vigilant, and taught the Americans to respect Canada’s needs and 
sensitivities.  Although American plans for more Arctic airstrips concerned the 
government, control of the airbases fell into the hands of the Canadians.  The American 
military always considered continental defence to be its foremost priority, but it also 
respected Canada’s sovereignty concerns, reflecting the attitude adopted by Washington.  
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In August 1948 the American attitude was encapsulated in a memorandum from the U.S. 
section of the PJBD to James Forrestal:      
Bearing in mind that the Canadians are extraordinarily sensitive about 
their sovereignty and independence and as they live, so to speak, under the 
constant shadow of the ‘Colossus to the South’ such Canadian 
apprehensions have been inevitable.  It has therefore behoved the United 
States to act with the utmost circumspection and restraint…On the whole, 
the U.S. record…is good.483 
 
When the Americans misbehaved, the Canadians promptly rebuked them.  At the end of 
the 1940s, the bilateral defence relationship functioned well, and Canada reaffirmed its 
sovereignty and strengthened its authority in the Arctic.  All that remained was to begin 
Canadianizing the different defence activities.      
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Chapter 6: Re-Canadianization 
 
 Between 1946 and 1949 Canada’s policy of gradual acquisition accomplished a 
great deal.  The government secured de jure sovereignty in the Arctic, and in every 
defence agreement the Americans accepted Canada’s right to control activities in the 
Arctic Archipelago.  While the Canadian government continued to scrutinize American 
indiscretions on the ground, the higher levels of the U.S. government consistently 
respected Canada’s rights and interests.  Canadian officials, however, recognized that all 
of the American concessions meant little if Canada could not effectively operate in the 
Arctic, and they sought a functional approach towards sovereignty that would support 
their allies’ interests but not to the detriment of Canada’s own.   
 In 1949 the St. Laurent government launched a policy of re-Canadianizing the 
Arctic. To ensure its sovereignty, Canada had to improve its capabilities in the region 
and assume a larger role in defence projects.  No Canadian ships had participated in the 
Arctic resupply missions and the RCAF continued to play a small role in airlifts.  
Sovereignty required that Canada take on more of the transportation responsibilities and 
establish an independent transport capability.  It also demanded that Canada at least try 
and take over the Arctic stations and replace American personnel with Canadians where 
possible.  The government successfully implemented a similar policy in the Northwest 
during the last years of the Second World War, and they hoped it would work again.   
 The Canadians had slowly improved their operational capability in the Arctic 
after the war.  In 1946 the RCAF engaged in its first independent flights in the area and 
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the army undertook several field exercises to test its own capabilities.  In subsequent 
years the RCAF expanded its role in the Arctic to include aerial photography and 
magnetic observations.  It was also given primary responsibility for search and rescue in 
the Archipelago and evacuated sick and wounded residents, including a dramatic 
Christmas day rescue of an ailing Department of Transport meteorologist from 
Nottingham Island.484 In 1950, the small meteorological post at Ennadai Lake, the only 
government presence for hundreds of miles, organized the evacuation of a starving band 
of Inuit.485 Functional roles such as search and rescue and assisting the native population 
represented strong assertions of Canada’s sovereignty.  Canada’s transport capability was 
less impressive. 
 
Establishing an Independent Transport Capability  
 Since 1946 the RCN had also strived to get involved in the Arctic.  Certain naval 
officers wanted Canada’s ships and their crews to attain operational capability in the 
strategic region.486 The Navy, however, continued to focus on its anti-submarine duties 
in the North Atlantic, and its shrinking resources did not permit large-scale Arctic 
activities.  Nevertheless, in 1948 the RCN decided to send a small task force to Hudson 
Bay.  On 2 September, the HMCS Magnificent, the destroyers Nootka and Haida and the 
tanker Dundalk left Halifax with American observers onboard.  Within days the ships 
reached the Hudson Strait and travelled to Wakeham Bay.  Eventually the Magnificent 
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went as far as the northern coast of Ungava peninsula, while the destroyers made it to 
Coral Harbour, Southampton Island.  During the cruise the ships carried out 
hydrographic, bathythermographic and magnetic observations and checked radio and 
Loran reception conditions.  Throughout the expedition, the RCAF carried out 
shadowing and interception exercises.487  
On 11 September 1948, the destroyers docked at Churchill, the first RCN ships to 
ever visit the Fort.  The military ran a four day publicity campaign trumpeting the 
success of the mission, even though the waters it traversed were neither challenging nor 
in areas where Canada’s sovereignty was contested.  As historian Kenneth Eyre 
explained, “the ships were simply following an established shipping route that had been 
in existence for three centuries and which had been marked with modern aids to 
navigation for twenty years.”488 The ships did not ferry supplies to any of the weather 
stations or airstrips in the High Arctic – it was purely symbolic.  Nevertheless, the navy 
took a great deal of pride in its accomplishment.  It highlighted Canada’s interest in 
improving its limited naval capabilities and acted as a visual display of the country’s 
authority in the North. 
The following year, the RCN sent the HMCS Swansea into the northern waters 
for training exercises around southern Baffin Island.  Once again the Canadians carried 
out the mission during the Arctic’s shipping season, when ice conditions were at their 
best.  The Swansea anchored off Frobisher Bay and made its way to Clyde River, before 
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returning to Halifax.489 Unfortunately the RCN ships sent to the Arctic in 1948 and 1949 
could do little to assist the Arctic military projects.  As soon as they faced any ice, the 
thin-hulled vessels had to retreat.  Almost as soon as its activities in the Arctic began, the 
navy took a break while it constructed an icebreaker capable of challenging the ice.  
 The RCN seriously considered constructing an icebreaker in 1948.  At a meeting 
of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in early January, Air Marshall Wilf Curtis insisted that 
Canada could only maintain effective long-term control in the Arctic if it possessed air 
and sea transport to supply, operate and maintain Arctic installations.  This would entail 
more Air Force and Navy commitments.490 The Chief of the Naval Staff, however, 
argued that it was too early to develop dedicated Arctic units “because of the continuing 
RCN responsibility for protecting vital lines of communication in coastal waters and 
possibly further afield.”491 The Chiefs of Staff concluded that the possibility of Canada 
taking more responsibility for the naval resupply missions required further study.   
 In early February, the CDC explored the construction of an RCN icebreaker to 
assist in the northern supply cruises.  The committee noted that the Department of 
Transport operated four icebreakers, but only one, the N.B. McLean, was seagoing.  Even 
the McLean had limited Arctic capabilities.  Although the committee understood that the 
construction of an RCN icebreaker would be costly and personnel might be difficult to 
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find and train, it proposed plans for a Canadian ship modelled after the American Edisto 
or Northwind class.492   
  At the second meeting of the ACND, the members discussed the construction of 
the two proposed icebreakers.  The Department of Transport anticipated that its new ship 
would be completed by September 1949 for use in the 1950 supply season, although the 
shortage of steel might lengthen the construction phase.  The RCN also indicated that it 
had commenced work on an icebreaker similar to the Edisto.  Again, the steel shortage 
was slowing construction of the ship and the navy estimated that it would not be finished 
until 1951.  The long period likely to elapse before suitable Canadian ships could be 
made available for Arctic transport duties worried the ACND, which made the 
acquisition of an icebreaker a government priority.493    
 At the meeting, Andrew McNaughton “pointed out the importance to Canada, in 
maintaining control over Canadian Arctic areas and supporting claims for sovereignty, of 
being in a position to provide access to these areas independently of the U.S.  In view of 
the importance of these considerations, it would appear reasonable that the government 
should allocate a priority for the steel required in the construction of the two ships.”494 
McNaughton brought the issue to the attention of C.D. Howe, the Minister of Trade and 
Commerce, who responded that the required steel would be supplied as soon as possible. 
There was a shortage because of the restrictions Washington put on the export of 
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American steel plates, and Howe suggested that McNaughton talk to the U.S. section of 
the PJBD to see if steel could be provided given the importance the Americans placed on 
northern transport.495 Despite the efforts of these men, steel remained in short supply and 
the construction of the ships slowed considerably.   
 By the end of December, the ACND’s Transportation Subcommittee encouraged 
accelerated construction so that the RCN could participate in the supply mission of 1951.  
Most on the committee believed that both icebreakers would be completed by 1952, 
allowing Canada to assume full responsibility for the resupply of the Arctic.  To provide 
an immediate capability the committee considered the possibility of purchasing an old 
icebreaker from the French government.  She would require a complete refit, including 
all new wiring, new generators and boilers, which would cost $ 1,600,000.  Accordingly, 
the committee decided against purchasing the vessel.496  Even a band-aid solution for 
Canada’s transportation problems in the Arctic proved impractical. 
 In early 1949 the DND concluded that Canada should assume supply duties for 
the weather station program to further the Canadianization program.  The report argued 
that the earliest practical date was the summer of 1951, “although the lack of icebreakers 
might introduce a delay of a further year in taking over one important phase of the task, 
namely, the early provisioning of the northern distribution centre at Resolute Bay.”497 At 
the 10 March 1949 meeting of the ACND, the committee stressed the need for two 
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serviceable icebreakers on the northern supply missions for safety purposes.  In 1948, 
one of the U.S icebreakers became stuck in the ice north of Ellesmere Island and had to 
be saved by its partner.  Thus, the committee recommended that both the Department of 
Transport and the RCN complete their proposed icebreakers.498 By late 1949, however, 
only the RCN seemed to be making progress on its project.  Marine Industries Limited at 
Sorel, Quebec laid the ship’s keel in November.  Work proceeded slowly due to design 
changes and material shortages, but the ship was launched in December 1951.   The 
vessel, named the HMCS Labrador, officially began its service with the RCN in July 
1954.499  
 As Canada awaited the construction of its new icebreakers, the ACND advocated 
the construction of a new Eastern Arctic Patrol vessel to provide some sealift capability 
to parts of the Arctic.500 At the end of December 1949 a new vessel, the C.D. Howe, 
replaced the Nascopie as the flagship of the annual summer supply mission to Hudson’s 
Bay.  Debate quickly broke out between different departments about the possibility of 
using the Howe to supply the Arctic defence posts.  The Northwest Territories 
Administration suggested that to strengthen Canada’s sovereignty, a “token visit” to 
Resolute Bay should be included in the ship’s mission.  The Department of Transport 
questioned why the Canadians would do this, when the C.D. Howe had such a small 
cargo capacity and the Americans easily supplied the stations.  Why risk the ship in the 
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dangerous conditions of the area?  After much discussion, the Committee “agreed that in 
1950 no attempt should be made to have the ‘C.D Howe’ visit Resolute Bay but that, in 
view of the national importance of maintaining all evidences and acts of Canadian 
sovereignty, the question should again be considered as soon as the Transport icebreaker 
is available to accompany the ‘C.D Howe.’”501 By 1950, the Canadian authorities still 
plodded towards the Canadianization of the naval resupply missions to the Arctic.  While 
steps were taken in the right direction, only in 1954 did a Canadian ship participate in the 
supply cruise.   
 The RCAF managed to fare better in assuming more responsibility for the air 
supply of the Arctic installations.  In February 1949, the Air Force took over full 
responsibility for supplying the northern Loran stations.502 Bercuson argued that the 
RCAF did not have the ability to participate meaningfully during the construction phase 
of the JAWS program because it lacked large transport aircraft.  When the weather 
station at Isachsen was established, for instance, the USAF flew in 84 tons of supplies in 
ten days.503 After the construction phase, however, the supplies required by the stations 
dropped dramatically and the RCAF began to take on a larger role in the airlifts.  In the 
spring of 1949 the Air Services Branch, Department of Mines and Resources, claimed 
that “the RCAF with their organization and equipment are the most suited to efficiently 
operate, maintain and supply these bases.  In so doing, the Air Force can show the flag 
continuously, and, equally important, acquire the Arctic experience and knowledge 
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necessary to defence.”504 In 1950 the RCAF instituted a regular northern supply service 
out of Montreal, largely achieving the Canadianization of airlift responsibilities.  
 
The Weather Stations and Airfields 
 Critics, both in the 1940’s and in modern scholarship, have taken aim at the 
Canadian government’s inability to Canadianize the Arctic weather stations within the 
first few years of their existence.505 They blame the Canadian government for its 
unwillingness to devote the time and money needed to assume control of the stations.  
Several factors, however, contributed to the government’s slow response.  First of all, the 
Canadians lacked the personnel to operate the stations independently.  The government 
considered it far more important to continue operating its stations along the Atlantic and 
Pacific coasts and wanted to assume control of the northeastern sites, which completely 
lacked a Canadian presence, before the jointly-run Arctic stations.506 As it took over 
stations in the northeast from 1948-50,507 it simply did not have the personnel to 
Canadianize the Arctic weather stations.   
 The Canadian government felt little urgency to Canadianize the Arctic stations.  
By 1948, the Americans had recognized Canada’s sovereignty in the region, the stations 
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ran well under joint staffs, and Canadians commanded them.  American personnel rarely 
misbehaved.  Furthermore, the U.S. provided sophisticated equipment that Canada could 
not.508 By the 1950’s the situation was so comfortable that the impetus for Canadianizing 
the stations had disappeared.  In 1946, only a few short years before, the Canadians 
desperately attempted to think of ways they could run the stations independently.  By the 
1950’s they seemed disinterested.  American personnel no longer represented a 
perceived threat to Canada’s terrestrial sovereignty, and the weather stations were not 














                                                






 By 1952 the Canadian government rest assured that it had protected its country’s 
interests and sovereignty over the past six years.  Although worries about the American 
presence in the region persisted, Canadian officials had weathered the first sustained 
challenge to their sovereignty in the Arctic.  The U.S. retained no long term rights to 
defence installations on Canadian territory, all projects undertaken remained joint 
enterprises as far as this was possible, and Canada retained effective command and 
control.509 For their part, the Americans consistently worked to improve defence 
coordination with Canada.  They accepted their ally’s difficult position and at the senior 
level - the level that truly mattered - they took realistic action to respect this position.  By 
1952, the State Department could claim that a “tradition of friendly relations” built upon 
the “frank discussion of difficulties as they arose” had been established between the two 
countries since 1946.510 Although a few American servicemen continued to misbehave 
and make brash statements about Canada’s sovereignty, the general U.S. attitude towards 
the relationship remained respectful.   
  Canadian officials’ approach to the early Cold War relationship with the 
Americans reflected valuable lessons that they had learned from the northern defence 
projects during the Second World War.  They realized that they needed to control 
American proposals and activities from the start by setting careful parameters and 
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guidelines.  Officials also learned how to deal with American intransigence and their 
occasionally domineering approach.   
 In 1946 the Canadians adopted a different attitude towards their defence 
relationship with the Americans than they had early in the war.  They tried to be more 
assertive and defensive in handling their close ally, and they succeeded by continuing to 
learn from their mistakes and improving their efforts to control activities.  For instance, 
when the observers on the 1948 sea supply mission failed to stop a number of American 
indiscretions, the Canadian government ensured that these men received proper training 
before the next mission.  These mistakes did not recur.   
 Though wartime experiences caused Canadian officials to distrust American 
intentions, they also realized that their southern neighbour would be their most intimate 
ally in the Cold War world.  Defence against help is another theme that underpinned the 
Canadian approach during this period.  The Canadians understood that the Americans 
worried about the undefended northern approaches to the continent and wanted to 
prepare defences accordingly.  Not wanting the U.S. to take unilateral action on 
Canadian territory, Canadians participated in continental defence activities as much as 
they felt their budget would allow.  Furthermore, they used the negotiations over defence 
activities in the region to strengthen Canada’s claims.  Involvement in continental 
defence planning allowed the Canadians to exercise modest control in defence planning.  
Defending against help was not a dramatic strategy, but it allowed the Canadians to 
secure their sovereignty effectively while leaving the primary financial burden for 
defence on their key ally.  
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 Canadian officials also used the tactic of delaying decisions to useful effect. In 
1946 the Canadians realized that they could delay decisions without the Americans 
taking unilateral action.   The government worked to slow defence planning, allowing 
time to ponder problems and formulate appropriate responses.  Prime Minister King 
proved a master of delay tactics in the summer of 1946, when American defence plans 
piled up on his desk and the parameters he wanted in place to protect Canada’s 
sovereignty failed to materialize.  By delaying decisions, the Canadians forced the 
Americans to make concessions and to re-evaluate their defence plans and their respect 
for Canadian sensitivities.  Rather than rushing to fill the Arctic with defence projects 
desired by the United States, Canadian decision-makers dictated the pace at which 
security planning progressed to suit their own interests. 
 Once they actually accepted American proposals, Canadian officials focused on 
establishing control over defence activities in their Arctic.  The government continuously 
strengthened Canada’s de facto sovereignty through its careful attention to detail.  
Seemingly minor American transgressions caused the Canadians to vividly remember 
their powerless position during the war.  History, however, would not be repeated.  
Canadian officials proved far more willing to “go to the mat” with the U.S. on 
indiscretions than they had in the past.  Employing control mechanisms such as 
observers, membership in the PJBD, and the ACND, the Canadians monitored activities 
in the Arctic. Whenever a defence project strayed from its approved guidelines, the 
Canadians complained and asked the Americans to rectify the situation.  They usually 
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complied.  Despite a growing sense of trust, Canadian officials remained ever vigilant to 
ensure that the sovereignty gains were not lost.  
 The Canadians were able to delay decisions and establish effective control in the 
Arctic because of the constant willingness of the Americans to accommodate their ally’s 
concerns and interests.   Arctic experts Gordon Smith and Graham Rowley told historian 
Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel that “some Canadians like Trevor Lloyd, ‘always a hawk on 
sovereignty,’ did ‘see [American] ulterior motives everywhere.’” Both men considered 
this belief utter nonsense.511 A sombre appraisal of U.S. actions during the late 1940s 
dispels the myth that the Americans had a hidden agenda to undermine Canadian 
sovereignty in the Arctic.  As the Canadians pushed for stronger regulatory guidelines 
for the defence projects, the Americans accepted them even when they disagreed with 
the measures adopted.  While some low ranking Americans, usually in the military, 
challenged Canada’s authority, the majority complied with it.  Senior U.S. officials took 
action to address these indiscretions and resolve Canadian concerns.  Though Hubbard 
probably thought it was ridiculous that the he had to give up the mallet heads he found in 
the Arctic because of NWT regulations, he did so without complaint.  His action 
embodies the American attitude towards the early Cold War defence projects.  They 
wanted to sign on the Canadians as faithful allies, and while they considered continental 
security of primary importance, they also respected Canada’s sovereignty.  In the end, 
the Americans could not give Canada a formal recognition of its sovereignty on the basis 
of the sector principle without prejudicing their own position in the Antarctic.  Still, the 
                                                
511 Gordon Smith and Graham Rowley interviewed 17 October 1991 and 21 October 1991 by Elizabeth 
Elliot-Meisel.  Elliot-Meisel, Arctic Diplomacy, 34. 
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U.S. informally guaranteed Canada’s terrestrial sovereignty and signed defence 
agreements that explicitly recognized Canadian control over the region.  
 Together the two countries established a precedent of compromise.  The 
Canadians became tougher and more assertive during this period, but they also conceded 
on issues when it was appropriate.  At the Chateau Laurier conference the Canadians 
signed on to a bilateral defence relationship when they would have preferred a 
multilateral commitment.  Similarly, the Americans sacrificed some of their defence 
plans out of respect for Canada’s interests.  Both countries built a relationship based on 
compromise, respect, informal negotiations, and mutually beneficial solutions.  The U.S. 
and Canada experienced problems, as many countries in such a close relationship would, 
but they worked through them to the betterment of both their respective positions.    
 While Pearson noted the indiscretions of the United States, he also stated, “I am 
not so critical of United States action as I am of our own inaction.”512 Canada could have 
done more to improve its capabilities in the Arctic or to simply learn more about its 
territory.  In the end, however, it successfully accomplished its overall objective.  
Despite the assertions of Grant and Lajeunesse, Canada could not have acted more 
aggressively and better protected its sovereignty through more forceful negotiations.  
The government was constrained by security concerns, international law, and the 
strategic interests of the U.S.  In the context of the time, the Canadians adopted the only 
realistic policy available to them: gradual acquisition.  An activist assertion attempting to 
trade defence rights for a public recognition of Canada’s sovereignty would have been 
                                                
512 Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Clerk of Privy Council, 15 January 1953,  
DCER, Volume 19, 1953, 1203. 
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rejected by the Americans.  By the end of the 1940’s, Canada’s quiet diplomacy had 
secured de jure sovereignty over its terrestrial claims in the Arctic, even though neither 
country abandoned its respective legal position.  Agreements also bolstered Canada’s de 
facto sovereignty in the region.   
  The defence relationship between the Americans and Canadians grew closer in 
the 1950s.  Fear of Soviet bombers carrying nuclear weapons across the Pole sparked the 
creation of a massive network of radar stations across the Arctic, the Distant Early 
Warning (DEW) Line.  Though the American presence in the high North increased 
dramatically during the construction phase of the radar line, Canadian decision-makers 
protected their rights in the region using the precedents and parameters established for 
the earlier projects.513 When E.B Wang, an international lawyer attached to the Defence 
Department, described the relationship that developed on the DEW Line, he stated that 
evidence of sovereignty encroachments had been overblown: 
American policy towards the DEW Line appears to be based on a desire 
to accommodate themselves as harmoniously and as constructively as 
possible into the Canadian setting which they have to operate….Perhaps it 
may be possible to detect some sour notes by diligent searching. I wonder, 
however, whether any such problems would weigh very heavily against 
the important benefits which accrue to Canada from this project in the 
development of the North, not to speak of its essential contribution to our 
security. Indeed we might be tempted to congratulate ourselves…for 
enjoying a “free ride” at least in this area of our defense activities on our 
own soil, without any unpleasant side effects.514 
 
                                                
513 Bercuson, “Continental Defence and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-1950,” 166.  
514 Quoted in P.W. Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, “Sovereignty and Security: 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Department 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The same statement could be applied to the defence projects that occurred in the 
Arctic between 1946 and the early 1950’s.  During these formative years the two 
countries established the model for harmonious bilateral relations.  Though the DEW 
Line continues to represent one of the largest development projects ever undertaken in 
the Arctic, its impact on sovereignty was minimal due to the precedents previously 
established.515   
These precedents proved pervasive.  In August 1985 the United States Coast 
Guard icebreaker Polar Sea transited the Northwest Passage on a simple resupply 
mission to the American airbase at Thule, Greenland.  As the ship wound its way through 
the ice-laden Passage that Canada claimed as internal waters, another sovereignty crisis 
swept the country.  Prior to the voyage, the American government suggested that the two 
countries should agree to disagree on the divisive legal issues involving the Arctic and 
argued that the transit in no way weakened either country’s juridical position.516 While 
the Canadians initially agreed to cooperate with the American initiative, the Mulroney 
government chose to take a much firmer stance when faced with a public uproar.  In the 
ensuing diplomatic storm, Ottawa insisted the United States ask for permission before 
entering the Passage and applied straight baselines to the archipelago on 1 January 1986, 
effectively enclosing the waters of the Canadian Arctic.  Mulroney also announced a 
range of defence plans for the Arctic, from increased surveillance to nuclear submarines, 
to safeguard Canada’s claims in the region.  It appeared that cooperation with the United 
States in the Arctic was a thing of the past.   
                                                
515 This argument will be advanced by Whitney Lackenbauer and Matthew Farish in their forthcoming 
history of the DEW Line. 
516 Coates et al, Arctic Front, 113.  
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 Despite its nationalistic sovereignty assertions, the Mulroney government still 
sought some kind of compromise with its close ally.  By the spring of 1987 President 
Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney decided to negotiate a working compromise over 
the Northwest Passage issue.  On 11 January 1988, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark 
and Secretary of State George Shultz announced an agreement on Arctic cooperation.  
The U.S. agreed to disagree with Canada on the contentious legal status of the Northwest 
Passage.  “While we and the United States have not changed our legal position,” 
Mulroney explained, “we have come to a practical agreement that is fully consistent with 
the requirements of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.”517 This pragmatic solution 
satisfied both countries and did not set any unwanted precedents.  
This policy of agreeing to disagree did not appear out of thin air.  Mulroney and 
Regan adopted an old and familiar position that had roots in the defence negotiations of 
1946.  After the Second World War, Canada and the United States found space to coexist 
in the name of continental defence, creating a solution to Canada’s sovereignty woes that 
both governments could accept, while continuing to disagree on the finer legal issues. 
Franklyn Griffiths and other commentators continue to suggest that a functional 
Canadian approach to managing and controlling its internal waters, based on “agreeing to 
disagree” with the Americans on the legal status of the Northwest Passage, remains a 
feasible and realistic option.  Such a policy has proven effective before and it might 
remain the key to the future of Canada’s Arctic.518 
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